US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS1149

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WHAT NEXT ON CROATIA'S EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

Identifier: 05BRUSSELS1149
Wikileaks: View 05BRUSSELS1149 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2005-03-18 16:23:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: PREL PGOV EAID ETRD HR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, ETRD, HR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT ON CROATIA'S EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A. HOLTZAPPLE-ENGLISH ET AL 3/17/2005 EMAIL 
     B. LUXEMBOURG 250 
     C. STATE 44531 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) As reported Ref A, EU Foreign Ministers on March 16 
postponed opening of accession negotiations with Croatia. 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council 
Conclusions said negotiations would be opened "by common 
agreement as soon as the Council has established that Croatia 
is cooperating fully with the ICTY."  But this issue will 
reappear on the EU agenda quickly, and continue reappearing, 
because the EU is unable to agree on a clear definition of 
what "full cooperation" with ICTY means, and how it should be 
assessed.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The decision to postpone accession negotiations was 
supported by a clear majority of Member States, including the 
UK, Germany, France and Italy, as well as the Commission. 
Malta, Cyprus and Lithuania joined those (Austria, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Hungary) who have long been saying they were ready 
to open negotiations, while Ireland and Poland both sent 
signals about their readiness to reconsider the decision to 
postpone. But divisions within the EU were on nearly public 
display, with lots of spokesmen briefing on who took which 
side.  To the "dismay" of those EU Members who urged the 
Council to send Croatia a strong and united message, Austria 
insisted on inserting language (stating the decision was 
taken "in the absence of common agreement") that revealed a 
division of views within the Council. 
 
3. (C/NF) The Luxembourg Presidency (FM Asselborn) at the 
GAERC insisted categorically that the issue would not be 
placed on the agenda of the March European Council on March 
22-23, and sought to reinforce that message with the press at 
the GAERC's concluding press conference, claiming that PM 
Juncker agreed. But on March 18 we were told (strictly 
protect) that Austrian Chancellor Scheussel had already sent 
a letter the afternoon of March 16 to PM Juncker asking that 
accession negotiations with Croatia be put on the agenda of 
the March 22-23 European Council.  (Croatian press is 
claiming five EU Member States in total have made such a 
request of Juncker.)  We do not know whether Luxembourg has 
responded, but we understand from REF B that PM Juncker was 
disappointed the GAERC did not find a way to open 
negotiations with Croatia, and in press comments both Juncker 
and Asselborn have commented on their hope that "within a few 
weeks" a way could be found to begin negotiations.  Given, 
however, that the same FMs who attended the GAERC will be at 
the European Council alongside their Prime Ministers, the 
most likely outcome of any Summit debate, if it happens, 
would be to reconfirm the EU's internal divisions on this 
issue (although, as one EU official put it to us, "the higher 
up you go, the less predictable it gets"). 
 
4. (C) Assuming the EU's decision on March 22 remains 
unchanged, a key factor will be how the Luxembourg Presidency 
handles the issue for the rest of its Presidency.  It will be 
under considerable pressure to further define what the EU 
means by full cooperation, and how and when the EU will 
define it.  The general sentiment within the Council is that, 
while ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte's opinion will be 
influential, the EU cannot sub-contract this judgement out to 
the ICTY.  And even the hardest-line Member States (UK, 
Netherlands) have been unwilling to state as bluntly as the 
US (REF C) that only Gotovina's presence in The Hague can 
equal full cooperation. 
 
5. (C) EU sources note Del Ponte is scheduled to do a written 
report to the UN in late May, followed by an in-person 
presentation to the UNSC on June 13.  The UK and others will 
likely signal that, in the absence of dramatic new measures 
by the Croatian government or the resolution of this issue by 
means of Gotovina's appearance in The Hague, there is little 
point in reassesing Croatia's performance until after Del 
Ponte's next report.  This could mean including it on the 
agenda of the European Council (Summit) on June 16-17, but 
would, we hope, mean no further consideration until the first 
GAERC of the British Presidency in July.  Given Austrian 
behavior to date, however, we expect they will take a stab at 
forcing the issue at each month's GAERC, as well as next 
week's Summit. 
 
SCHNABEL 
. 

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