US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1575

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001575 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS EB/ESC/TFS (DAVID NELSON), S/CT (TODD KUSHNER), 
IO/PSC (JOLEEN SCHWEITZER), EB/EPPD (CAROL THOMPSON), 
EUR/SE, TREASURY PASS JUAN ZARATE, OFAC (ROBERT WERNER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015 
TAGS: KTFN, KVPR, EFIN, PTER, ETTC, PREL 
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE 2005 UPDATE NO. 2--TURKEY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 32688 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT S. DEUTSCH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (U) This cable responds to questions in paragraph 10 of 
reftel. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ASSETS FROZEN FORFEITED OR SEIZED 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Since the establishment of the UN consolidated lists 
of individuals/entities linked to al-Qaida (AQ), Usama bin 
Laden (UBL), and/or the Taliban, there have been three cases 
in which the GOT has frozen assets pursuant to UNSCR 
Resolutions 1267 and 1373.  The actions were taken under 
administrative authority.  Two of these cases (Yasin Al-Qadi 
and Nasreddin Holding Group) are currently being challenged 
in Turkey's highest administrative court.  MFA officials 
requested more background information from the UN on these UN 
1267 Committee designees to help support the GOT's case. 
 
3. (C) There are significant weaknesses in Turkey's 
anti-terror finance regime.  First, terrorism finance is not 
yet clearly criminalized in Turkish law and Turkey does not 
fully comply with international standards such as the FATF 
Special Eight Recommendations to Fight Terrorism Finance. 
Second, the GOT has the authority to identify and freeze only 
the assets of terrorist individuals and entities designated 
by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. The GOT has no strong 
legal basis for action against non-UN designated individuals 
or entities unless they pose a threat to the Turkish State or 
Turkish citizens.  Finally, the tools that do exist for 
locating, freezing, and seizing terrorist assets are 
cumbersome and not particularly effective.  The GOT is 
currently working to improve its internal legal capacity for 
fighting terrorism finance by redefining terrorism and 
amending its laws to comply with international standards. 
 
-------------------------- 
IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (C) There are significant impediments to more robust 
cooperation with the GOT on co-sponsoring designations. 
Though Turkey cooperates with the international community on 
terrorism, with the exception of Turkey-specific terrorism 
finance, the GOT has not made the fight against the financing 
of terrorism a top priority.  Turkey is unlikely to 
proactively cooperate in designating terrorists with no 
specifically Turkish connection. 
 
--------------------------------- 
TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The GOT has been receptive to USG training and 
technical assistance in the past and continues to show a 
strong interest in receiving more training and assistance. 
The Ministry of Justice and the Turkish International Academy 
Against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) are two government 
agencies in particular which have recently benefited from 
USG-sponsored training and have requested more.  In Post's 
opinion, the GOT's anti-terrorist finance regime is weak and 
could benefit largely from more training in investigating and 
prosecuting financial crimes.  The GOT's financial 
intelligence unit, the Financial Crimes Investigative Board 
(MASAK), could benefit from more training on effective FIU 
operating procedures, including analytical training. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
RISKS OF TERRORIST FUNDRAISING OR BANKING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The risk that terrorists would raise significant funds 
in Turkey is high, as is the risk of terrorists using Turkish 
financial institutions to keep or transfer assets.  Turkish 
banks and foreign exchange dealers are currently used by 
narcotics traffickers to transfer money or to wire transfer 
cash.  Turkish bank offices have also been used to transfer 
terrorist funds, such as to Chechen groups, in the past. 
There is also sympathy among parts of the population for the 
objectives of al-Qaida and similar groups.  The terrorists 
who attacked UK and Jewish religious targets in 2003 were 
Turkish nationals who received financial support from the 
al-Qaida network, as well as raising funding locally.  The 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), regularly 
conducts bank audits and inspections and each bank has its 
own internal inspection team which routinely looks for 
suspicious transactions.  Nonetheless in 2004 it was revealed 
that the Uzan family had embezzled billions of dollars from 
Imar Bank which it controlled by keeping many transactions 
off the official books.  For the reasons mentioned above (in 
paragraph 2) and the fact that Turkey is a cash-based economy 
whose government has taken no steps to regulate or register 
alternative remittance networks, there is very little chance 
that terrorist money transiting through Turkey would be 
detected. 
EDELMAN