US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1571

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 ANKARA 001571 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2025 
TAGS: OVIP, MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY UPDATE FOR THE VISIT OF COMNAVEUR ADM MIKE 
MULLEN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  Your visit comes on the heels of a series 
of US visits since the first of the year (Deputy Secretary of 
State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Jones, 
Commander US Central Command General Abizaid, Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, Secretary of State Rice and 
US Army Europe and 7th Army Commander General Bell).  You 
arrive in Turkey as we are emphasizing renewed dialogue on 
areas of mutual concern to maximize achievable cooperation. 
Our task is complicated by a government still questioning the 
value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship.  Recently the Turkish 
General Staff (TGS) has been steadily, rationally, and 
publicly signaling a desire to make the relationship work, 
although there seems to be an overall resistance to the 
movement towards change coming from the EU and IMF. The 
reinvigoration of Mil to Mil engagement is therefore, a 
welcome and timely building block to this effort. End Summary. 
 
----------- 
The Context 
----------- 
 
2.  (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth 
of Turkey,s feelings towards restoring the U.S.-Turkey Mil 
to Mil relationship to its pre-March 2003 levels, their 
eagerness to host General Bell,s recent visit may serve as a 
reasonable barometer on this matter. Land Forces Commander 
(and likely CHOD in 2006), General Buyukanit, while 
charismatic, popular within the Army and adept at working the 
press, is also successful at playing his political cards 
close to his vest, and consequently has avoided becoming 
fixed to politically controversial positions(his nickname 
among many officers is "weathervane").   Members of his staff 
assert to us that he strongly favors returning to a robust 
military relationship with the U.S. and he rolled out the red 
carpet for General Bell. 
 
3. (C) That said, there have been several issues, which 
underscore the fragility of our relationship.  An informal 
U.S. request in June 2004 to permanently base F-16 aircraft 
at Incirlik went unanswered and was withdrawn in January 
2005.  Despite the informal nature of the request and lack of 
written information, it still managed to surface in the 
Turkish press, where speculation over U.S. military 
intentions went wild.  The U.S. also formally requested the 
use of Incirlik AB as a Multi-Directional Cargo Hub, serving 
as an air bridge between Afghanistan and Iraq theaters.  To 
date, the U.S. has not received an official response from 
Turkey.  After nine months it is clear this is as close to a 
"no" as we will ever get. 
 
4.  (C) The GOT shares our goals of a stable, democratic, 
unified Iraq, but our intervention there is unpopular-- owing 
to a combination of refusal by the armed forces to support us 
and a concerted disinformation campaign in the media stoked 
in part by elements of the Turkish state --and has generated 
Turkish frustration and anger over a perceived lack of U.S. 
action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish separatism 
and designs on Kirkuk, and attacks against Turkish truck 
drivers.  Bilateral relations were poisoned by grossly 
distorted Turkish media coverage of and irresponsible 
statements by senior GOT officials about  the Fallujah 
operation late last year and incessant criticism of US 
actions--and inaction (such as against the PKK)--in Iraq. 
The EU decision on December 17 to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, may have 
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible 
positive shift in relations.  A series of high-level 
Administration and military visits at the beginning of this 
year pushed the Turks to stand up for the relationship, 
despite policy differences over Iraq.  While government 
officials still refrain from publicly supporting US policies 
or actions in Iraq, they have been adding less fuel to the 
fire.  In meetings with DepSecState Armitage and General 
Abizaid, both Turkish government and military officials 
reaffirmed the importance of our bilateral relationship and 
called for close dialogue on issues of mutual interest. 
 
5. (S) Despite the continued public opposition to our 
operations in Iraq,  Turkey has provided valuable assistance. 
 Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base tankers 
to refuel aircraft on support missions for both Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on rotation 
out, and permits the transit (via Habur gate) of supplies for 
our forces and humanitarian goods.  Turkey is active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for 
Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni 
political groups and, as its main contribution to the NATO 
training mission, Iraqi security forces. 
 
6.  (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) by the military and other elements of 
the secular elite, Prime Minister Erdogan long appeared 
unassailable; with a two-thirds majority in parliament and a 
high personal popularity in the heartland.  Erdogan,s 
frequent trips abroad and discontent and corruption in the 
party and Cabinet signal that AKP has peaked and is in a 
stall.  With the political opposition virtually non-existent, 
the only opposition is in effect, the military.  However, TGS 
Chief Ozkok, while a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior 
commander, is reluctant to take on the government publicly 
for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and thereby 
losing popular support for the military.  Deputy Chief of 
Defense General Basbug,s (in line to become CHOD in 2008 
after General Buyukanit), repeated emphasis on the breadth, 
depth, and importance of relations with the U.S. during his 
January 26 televised press conference(the first such 
conference to be televised), might signal a subtle shift in 
this TGS reluctance to confront the government publicly. 
General Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try to bring more 
modern thinkers into senior ranks, but left-nationalist 
sentiments are strong at lower ranks. 
 
7.  (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of around 8-9 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity 
structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, and 
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the 
overall macroeconomic improvement.  Turkey remains too 
reliant on Russian energy sources (a point the Russians are 
trying to use as leverage for political gain). Macroeconomic 
success has also bred a sense of complacency about the need 
to persist with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and 
reform of the banking, social security and tax systems. 
These reforms are being addressed in the new three-year 
standby program that the IMF and GOT have just agreed to. 
 
8.  (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in 
the wake of the EU,s December decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October.  However, this is 
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of 
structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of 
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder 
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession 
will affect nearly every aspect of their lives, and that it 
may in the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU 
directives in environmental protection and other areas. 
 
------------------------- 
Iraq Dominates the Agenda 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (S) The Turkish Government shares the goal of a unified, 
prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its 
neighbors, and contributed to international pressure on the 
Sunnis to participate in the elections.  However, the Turks 
worry about long-term US staying power in Iraq, that events 
there could spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be 
faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they 
assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified 
movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from 
northern Iraq, or both.  Although not a naval theater, 
Turkish Military leaders may still seek your assurance that 
our military remain committed to ensuring a stable -- and 
unified -- Iraq. 
 
10.  (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five 
Turkish policemen en route to Baghdad to take up security 
duties at the Turkish Embassy shocked the country.  After 
being admonished by the Charge, the Turkish government and 
military (General Ozkok sent a personal note of thanks to 
General Myers), made a point to thank the US for the swift 
TFO response, including killing or capturing of some 
insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the bodies of 
the policemen killed.  Additionally, the Turkish military was 
quick to tell the mission that Turkish First Army Commander 
General Tolon's accusations of US responsibility did not 
reflect the Turkish General Staff position.  Turkish press 
reporting on the incident was generally factual.  The 
November establishment of trilateral (US/TU/IZ) talks on 
Turkish truck driver safety, with the participation of 
Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I), opened the door to 
cooperative information sharing and other efforts to support 
the drivers. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand 
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's 
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their 
agreement to host the January 2005 trilateral PKK talks was a 
positive sign that they will work together with the Iraqis on 
this shared problem.  Still, they, and the public at large, 
remain bitter over their perception that the US has taken no 
steps in Iraq to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge 
that that country will no longer be a base for terrorist 
operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain 
engaged in the effort.  Some in the Turkish military harbor 
the belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's 
presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports 
of US/PKK meetings.  (NOTE:  We also know that the military 
uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the 
current AKP Government.) 
 
12.  (S) If confronted with this issue, you should remind the 
Turks about our longstanding efforts that make us Turkey,s 
number one ally against the PKK:  our listing of the PKK and 
all successor groups as terrorist organizations; our 
successful campaign to get the EU to do the same; and our 
assistance in rendering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.  You 
should refer back to the trilateral talks where, with the US 
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks 
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for 
actions against the PKK, including establishing an 
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts 
meeting after the government is in place to discuss issues 
related to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in 
northern Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who 
are arrested.  MNF-I is in the process of posting Tier I list 
of PKK terrorists on CENTRIX. This is a small but an 
important step by MNF-I and, once executed, should be 
appreciated by the Turks. 
 
----------------------- 
Global War on Terrorism 
----------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Turkey took command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan in February 2005, 
and will contribute over 1,600 troops.  Ankara renewed its 
offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan, but location was again a problem -- Turkey wants 
to take over a PRT in the north, while the Alliance needs 
PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion requirements. 
 
14 (S) On the other hand, the current government has 
disbanded the anti-terrorism coordination center in the 
National Security Council which used to bring together the 
three main intelligence services (TNIO, Jandarma, and 
National Police), which otherwise have a spotty record of 
coordination.  The absence of a coordination center raises 
severe questions about the direction of the Turkish 
anti-terrorism effort. 
 
15.  (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey 
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
improving their abilities to protect important energy 
transport routes.  Turkey subscribes to every arms control 
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which it is 
considering hosting an exercise in 2006. We had hoped that 
the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given 
their own Operation Active Endeavor-like Operation Black Sea 
Harmony and their leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR 
organization on prevention of trafficking.  However, they 
have been reluctant to facilitate non-littoral states' 
operations in the Black Sea (see para 17 below) and the PSI 
exercise looks likely to occur in the Mediterranean.  The AKP 
government has also been mildly supportive of international 
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA, 
and they publicly back the EU-3 process.  The elected AKP 
government is more inclined to accommodate Iran rather than 
press it; the military and some in the Turkish bureaucracy 
are more cognizant of the dangers of Iranian nuclear weapons. 
 The latter have also taken seriously information about 
Turks' involvement in the AQ Khan network and is moving 
toward prosecution of these individuals.  Turkey,s stance on 
Syria has been disappointing.  The government has 
consistently been behind the curve on pressuring Syria to 
withdraw from Lebanon.   The government and many in the 
military view Bashar Assad as a would-be reformer contending 
with old-line Ba,athists.  Their policy assumption is that 
Assad represents "stability" and the possibility of gradual 
change. 
 
16.  (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace 
Training Center in Ankara provides counterterrorism and other 
training to personnel from PfP partner countries.  The 
military has established a NATO Center of Excellence-Defense 
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), that will provide more 
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner 
nations and Allies.  Currently the TRADOC LNO, a U.S. Army 
Major, stationed here in Ankara, is serving part time. The 
U.S. Navy has offered to provide a Navy Captain as the Deputy 
Director/Project Officer, and the Joint Staff has recently 
agreed to staff two additional US positions (one 04 and one 
E6) at the center.  The TGS has also offered training at the 
COE-DAT as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training 
mission. 
 
----------------------- 
Turks and the Black Sea 
----------------------- 
17. (C) The Turks are committed to increasing their naval 
engagement and cooperation with other Black Sea littoral 
nations, but they fear a robust NATO or U.S. presence in the 
Black Sea  might anger the Russians and make them pull away 
from  participation in BLACKSEAFOR.  However, we believe 
their chief motivation for holding the US and NATO at bay in 
the Black Sea is pride of place: a desire to stand alone as 
the guarantor of peace and security in the Sea, and to be the 
unchallenged maritime leader in the region. 
 
18. (C) The Turks have proposed to their BLACKSEAFOR 
colleagues to multilateralize the Turks, BLACK SEA HARMONY 
operation, in which Turkey monitors suspicious sea traffic 
and reports the data to NATO.  In Turkey,s concept, all the 
Black Sea littorals would monitor traffic and report the 
results to each other as well as the Alliance.  This is a 
positive development (in essence a mini-OPERATION ACTIVE 
ENDEAVOR on the Black Sea), but is also an attempt to 
forestall a greater NATO role in the Black Sea. 
 
19. (C) While we need to continue to engage with the Turks to 
seek a cooperative relationship on the Black Sea, we should 
not aggressively seek an enhanced U.S. role.  This would only 
increase Turkish resistance and, given the limitations of the 
Montreux Convention (which many Turks--especially in the 
military--believe we are anxious to amend or scrap 
altogether) ,  our naval presence would perforce be limited 
anyway.  We should encourage their efforts to work with the 
other littorals while reminding  them that we have an 
interest in what they are doing and would appreciate being 
able to observe BLACKSEAFOR exercises or BLACK SEA HARMONY 
operations. 
 
------------------ 
CYPRUS and NATO/EU 
------------------ 
 
20. (C) The European Union at the December 17, 2004 Summit 
agreed to open accession talks with Turkey in October, 
marking a major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and 
in our strategic vision for Turkey and the region.  However, 
before talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol 
extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU 
members, including the Republic of Cyprus.  Turkey is 
dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with 
several European leaders indicating publicly that extending 
the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill 
its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots 
following their vote in favor of a settlement last April.  As 
a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into 
nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all 
its members.  Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North 
Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is 
blocking Cyprus from participating in NATO-EU fora, 
effectively stymieing dialogue between the two organizations. 
 While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and 
the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy 
has won out over alliance management considerations within 
the GOT.  Last month, General Buyukanit was on television 
announcing that Turkey will not withdraw one soldier from 
Northern Cyprus until the situation was fairly resolved. 
 
21. (C) The mission believes any ship visit to southern 
Cyprus before the above situation is resolved will evoke a 
strong reaction from the Turks.  This reaction will be even 
stronger and potentially more damaging to relations if a 
ship,s previous or next port of call is in Turkey.  ADM 
Ornek's staff has heard that a visit to southern Cyprus has 
been under consideration and may raise the possibility with 
you. 
 
--------------------------- 
Security Cooperation Issues 
--------------------------- 
 
22. (C) Major Security Assistance programs are as follows: 
 
The Turkish Air Force (TuAF) requested an LOA for a major 
upgrade of their entire F-16 fleet of 217 aircraft. 
Budgetary constraints have forced the TuAF to reduce the 
original scope of the upgrade to 118 aircraft.  LOA is valued 
at approximately $1B.  SAF/IA and the TuAF held a final 
configuration meeting in December 2004 and it is anticipated 
a final LOA will be presented to Turkey in April 2005. 
 
Turkey awarded a contract for four Boeing 737 Airborne Early 
Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft ($1.2B) in June 2002, 
with an option to buy two more aircraft for $700M.  In 
December 2002, Turkey signed an LOA to provide FMS-only 
hardware. 
 
In 2002 Turkey became a Level III partner during the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) System Design and Development (SDD) 
Phase at a cost to Turkey of $175M over seven years. 
Turkey,s projects a requirement of 100 aircraft with 
delivery starting in 2013 . 
 
------------ 
Turkish Navy 
------------ 
 
23. (S)   For its part, Turkish Navy leadership generally 
tends to be more pro-Western in its orientation and less 
xenophobic than that of the Turkish Army, or even the Turkish 
Air Force, which tends to share many of the Turkish Army's 
suspicions of U.S. initiatives in the region.  Within the 
limits placed on it by the Army-dominated Turkish General 
Staff, the Turkish Navy seems to be more eager than the other 
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces for engagement with the 
US, and welcomes opportunities to train with and host visits 
by the US Navy.  In this sense, the Turkish Navy may be 
considered the biggest advocate of the US within the Turkish 
Armed Forces.  However, this does not apply in the Black Sea, 
where even the Turkish Navy views with suspicion any 
engagement initiatives by the US Navy -- particularly those 
that do not include Turkey.  In fact, Turkish Navy attitudes 
regarding Black Sea maritime security are currently more 
aligned with those of Russia, which joins Turkey in resisting 
any naval presence by non-littoral countries in the Black 
Sea, specifically the navies of the US as well as non-Black 
Sea NATO nations. 
 
24. (C) Naval Relations:  You may want to praise our naval 
cooperation in the NATO context and bilaterally, although you 
may be asked to explain the reduced number of ship visits in 
the last few years.  Although Turkish Navy officials profess 
to understand many of the factors which have combined to 
hamper US Navy engagement with Turkey, such as lack of 
assets, the country-wide Force Protection Condition Charlie 
and the decision to limit bilateral exercises, there remains 
a persistent perception of a deliberate disengagement by the 
US Navy.  This perceived disengagement, when combined with 
what appears to the Turks to be US Navy efforts to bypass 
them in the Black Sea in favor of Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Ukraine, convinces the more conspiracy theory-minded 
individuals in TGS and the Turkish Navy that the US is trying 
to control the Black Sea for its own purposes (i.e., 
domination of the Middle East and access to resources). 
 
25. (C) Turkish Navy modernization goals have been hampered 
by lack of funding stemming from the 2000/2001 economic 
crises.   The Turkish Frigate 2000 has been placed on hold. 
An RFP/RFQ was published last fall for the MILGEM (national 
ship) corvette.  This would be a commercial venture with a 
Turkish shipyard; however funding of this procurement remains 
an issue. 
 
26. (C) The Undersecretary for Procurement (SSM) is currently 
in commercial contract negotiations with Sikorsky for 12 S-70 
helicopters.  Turkey previously procured eight of these 
helicopters from Sikorsky.  Contract negotiations have been 
ongoing for over a year; both pricing and the terms and 
conditions to include: delivery schedules and parts support 
have been an issue.  Additionally, Turkey intends to use the 
remaining $324M from the EXIM Bank Loan for this procurement. 
 This loan was extended previously for this procurement and 
due to the delay in contract negotiations; Sikorsky 
anticipates that they will likely need a further extension on 
the loan.  ADM Johnson during his trip last fall told ADM 
Ornek that the loan could not be extended.  This may be a 
discussion item or request during your meetings. SSM has not 
yet responded to Sikorsky's "best and final offer."  Sikorsky 
has asked the Ambassador to ask SSM and/or the government 
whether there is still a commitment to purchasing these 
aircraft from Sikorsky or fold them into a future 
multi-service tender for utility helicopters.  You might 
sound out ADM Ornek as to how urgent he sees the need for 
these 12 additional S-70s. 
 
27. (C) The Turkish Navy has expressed interest in obtaining 
four Osprey Class MHC,s (mine hunters are one of their 
priorities) and one Spruance Class Destroyer.  OPNAV is 
currently staffing the transfer of two MHC,s (one grant/one 
sale) and two Spruance Class Destroyers (one grant/one sale). 
 The Spruances would be as a package deal, Turkey would not 
have the option of taking only one.  Turkish Navy understands 
that these transfers are still being staffed, but the 
transfers may come up in discussions. 
 
29. (C)   Turkish Navy has identified the 
procurement/upgrading of their Harpoon missiles to the Block 
II as one of their modernizations goals.  Within the last 
couple of weeks, Turkish Navy submitted a Price and 
Availability request to upgrade 120 missiles, Harpoon Weapon 
Station and Block II upgrades to their Kilic, Mekos and Perry 
class ships. 
 
30. (C) A bright spot in Turkish Navy,s modernization has 
been the Genesis Project.  This project upgrades the Combat 
Information Centers on the Perry class ships by replacing the 
current equipment on these ships with SUN workstations under 
an open architecture system.  This is a commercial venture 
with Raytheon as the prime US contractor.  A working system 
is currently being tested in Port Hueneme, CA and the first 
ship installation should start early next year.  Long range 
plan is for Turkey to market this system to other countries 
that have Perry Class Frigates. 
 
31. (U) Last CNO counter-part visit was almost 16 years ago. 
You may get invited by ADM Ornek to come back to Turkey once 
you relieve as the CNO for an official counter-part visit. 
The mission would enthusiastically support this request. 
EDELMAN