US embassy cable - 05PARIS1823

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NP, AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, CH, FR, NATO, EUN 
SUBJECT: MOD ADVISOR UPBEAT ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; SEES 
RAPPROCHEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST; NO CHANGE ON EU CHINA ARMS 
EMBARGO 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 
.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Alliot-Marie's Diplomatic 
Advisor Bertrand Besancenot provided Political 
Minister-Counselor with a readout of the Minister's March 
9-10 visit to the United States.  He described at length the 
positive tone in the bilateral relationship, as reflected in 
Alliot-Marie's meetings at the NSC, the Pentagon, and the 
Department.  He also welcomed the convergence in our views on 
Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East.  He said the U.S. 
and Europe needed to better convince the Sunnis in Iraq to 
engage in the political process and for the Shi'ites to 
include them.  On Afghanistan, the French remain unconvinced 
about participating in PRTs, but continue to support the NATO 
ISAF mission.  In contrast, Besancenot maintained that U.S. 
concerns over the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China 
were misplaced, that further consultations were needed, and 
that as a result of Alliot-Marie's visit, Paris has a better 
appreciation of the intensity of U.S. opposition to an 
embargo lift.  Besancenot, however, did not confirm GOF 
support for consultations on the embargo as part of a 
strategic dialog on China.  End summary. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
2. (C) Bertrand Besancenot was very expansive and pleased 
with Alliot-Marie's meetings in Washington.  He said there 
had been an open exchange of views, reflecting the new and 
positive tone in the bilateral relationship.  Alliot-Marie's 
speeches at Harvard and SAIS, accordingly, emphasized the 
excellent dialog between the United States and Europe, each 
side "complementing" the efforts of the other in seeking 
solutions to world problems, without glossing over our 
differences.  By way of example, he turned to a discussion of 
the Middle East, noting that it was a region where our 
differences had been most prominent, but where we now are 
experiencing a general rapprochement of views.  On Lebanon, 
he noted that there is unity of purpose and action, even if 
our point of departure was not the same.  The original French 
focus was on strengthening Lebanese sovereignty, while the 
U.S. sought to ratchet up pressure on Syria.  Besancenot, 
nonetheless, stressed that now we need together to push for 
full implementation of UNSC 1559; Syria must depart Lebanon 
even if it will lose the economic and financial advantages it 
derives from being in Lebanon.  Turning to Iran and the EU3 
negotiations, Besancenot commented favorably on our shared 
non-proliferation goal for the region.  Iranians are sharp 
and devious, he observed, and they need to understand that 
the United States and the EU are not divided.  We have a 
division of labor with the EU demonstrating firmness at the 
negotiations and the U.S. flexibility, following the recent 
U.S. decision to more strongly support the EU3 negotiations. 
He made a similar point about the situation on the 
Palestinian territories and Israel, stating that we are in 
agreement on helping Abbas and Sharon, especially as Sharon 
faces pressures from the settlers and within his own party. 
 
Iraq/Afghanistan 
---------------- 
 
3. (C) We pressed Besancenot on French integration of its 
proposed bilateral training program for security forces with 
NATO's own training mission.  Besancenot responded that 
France was doing its share.  We both wish to see the 
successful stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, he 
stated, and then recited French contributions to date: 
support for the NATO decision to establish a training 
mission, support for a debt cancellation, substantial 
contribution to the NATO trust funds, and agreement to assign 
one French officer to the NATO "clearing house."  Alluding to 
the French decision not to allow French participation in 
Iraq, Besancenot stressed that France wanted to avoid having 
decisions on the NATO training mission adversely affect the 
improved bilateral relationship.  That said, the GOF did not 
intend to link its own bilateral training program (once stood 
up) with the NATO mission. 
 
4. (C) Regarding Iraq's future, Besancenot reiterated that it 
is in our mutual interest to help train security forces and 
to push the Iraqis to better integrate the Sunni community so 
that they have a stake in the country.  For success in Iraq, 
we need to see the Sunnis included in the emerging political 
structures, but the current signals to the Sunnis are not 
clear.  The U.S. and the EU need to help send a stronger 
political message to the Iraqis that the Sunnis must be 
brought into the political process.  He also observed that 
the U.S. and France have disagreed on the issue of Iraqi 
sovereignty and the timing for a withdrawal of foreign 
troops.  The Political Minister Counselor reminded Besancenot 
that the U.S. is currently focused on enhancing stability in 
Iraq, and providing the wherewithal for Iraqi forces to deal 
with security threats -- after which a withdrawal of foreign 
troops would become possible.  However, it would be premature 
and counter-productive to set a withdrawal date up front.  In 
response, Besancenot voiced uncertainty over U.S. long-term 
plans in Iraq, indicating that the French Embassy in Baghdad 
had learned from senior officials at our Embassy in Baghdad 
that the U.S. wished to maintain a long-term presence in 
Iraq, which, if true, would send the wrong message to the 
Sunnis. 
 
5. (C) We pressed Besancenot on further French contributions 
to ISAF in Afghanistan.  He said Alliot-Marie had signaled in 
Washington that France agreed in principle to the OEF/ISAF 
merger, but disagreed on the timetable.  France believes it 
could only happen when the terrorist threat had diminished. 
On ISAF expansion, Besancenot was noncommittal on French 
participation in PRTs or the Quick Reaction Force, and 
cryptically cited Secdef's alleged criticisms of the German 
PRT in Kunduz during his meeting with Alliot-Marie. 
Nonetheless, he was careful to emphasize French support for 
ISAF.  France, he stressed, will also reinforce its support 
for the Afghan elections (provision of combat planes and 
support staff) and increase its training of the Afghan army. 
 
EU China Arms Embargo 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Besancenot contrasted the excellent atmospherics of 
the minister's visit and our convergence of views on Middle 
East issues with our different perspectives on the EU arms 
embargo on China.  While praising the improved tone of the 
bilateral relationship that can only contribute to the 
current U.S.-EU discussions over the embargo, he volunteered 
that EU capitals have clearly misunderstood the intensity of 
the U.S. opposition to lifting the embargo.  The EU had 
concluded from the President's discussions with French 
President Chirac last February, that the Administration was 
against the lift, but that the "real problem" was with 
Congress.  Now, it has become clear that USG is firmly 
opposed to the lift, with Secdef, NSC Advisor Hadley, and the 
Secretary conveying this message firmly to  Alliot-Marie. 
 
SIPDIS 
Besancenot expressed the fear that we are headed for a 
"tsunami" on this issue.  The Political Minister Counselor 
reiterated the U.S. position that we remain opposed to the 
lift and had made clear for quite some time that lifting the 
embargo would lead to unacceptable technology transfers to 
China, which would threaten the regional strategic balance. 
Besancenot, recapitulated Alliot-Marie's often-stated message 
that France has the strictest export-controls on dual-use 
technology and that it would never sell technology or weapons 
that would be of concern to "our U.S. ally."  France, he 
added, is cognizant that the U.S. is a Pacific power with 
direct interests in the region, that it shares our concern 
not to see sophisticated technology in China, and that it is 
prepared to push its EU colleagues to tighten their own 
export control regimes. Besancenot further explained that the 
embargo only covers lethal weapons, and not dual-use 
technology, nor does it have any affect on China's principal 
arms suppliers, Russia, and other suppliers such as Israel. 
 
7. (C) Returning to Alliot-Marie's visit and her meeting with 
Senators and members of Congress, Besancenot said they heard 
three main arguments in the U.S. against lifting the embargo: 
China's inadequate human rights progress, adverse affect on 
the region, especially Taiwan and Korea, and concern over 
technology transfers.  Besancenot admitted that the human 
rights situation in China is not good, but added that it is 
better than it was in 1989.  He believes Europe is aware of 
the regional concerns.  He dismissed the technology transfer 
argument by emphasizing that Europe agreed with us on 
controlling dual-use exports.  The MOD has concluded that 
U.S. arguments are mostly invalid and that the only new 
argument presented by the Congress was an "emotional" one 
against lifting the embargo.  Along this line, he said one 
senior Senator, without agreeing with the French position, 
confided that the Congress was not fully informed of all the 
points of discussion on the embargo and asked the French for 
a paper, which the French Embassy subsequently delivered. 
Besancenot concluded that Europe needed to do a better job 
through an expansion of its contacts with the U.S. to explain 
the substance of its arguments and pointed to the visit to 
Washington of Solana nonproliferation advisor Annalisa 
Giannella as the latest EU effort.  He linked the Giannella 
visit to a proposed EU-U.S. strategic dialog on China, which 
the EU was awaiting U.S. views on.  The Political 
Minister-Counselor suggested that a strategic dialog on China 
should logically precede any EU discussion with regard to the 
arms embargo; it should not be conceived as merely a next 
step after a lift.  Besancenot took the point, but recalled 
that the EU had agreed at the December 2004 EU Council 
meeting to lift the embargo, which he still foresaw happening 
during the Luxembourg Presidency. 
 
8. (C) In defense of China, Besancenot took up the Chinese 
argument that blocking arms exports was incompatible with 
Western recognition of China's influence in the world as 
evidenced through its participation in the WTO and the 
Olympics Games.  He described China as an important player in 
a multipolar world, which should be treated as a responsible 
partner and not lumped in the same league as Zimbabwe and 
other countries on the embargo list.  He explained that 
multipolarity is not a concept designed to irritate the 
United States, but is simply the recognition of a reality: in 
20-30 years Brazil, China, and India, among others, will 
become serious powers.  Europe and the U.S., linked through 
the common bonds of history, must work together to ensure 
that they influence China's development.  Lifting the embargo 
would only make China a more responsible player, he stated. 
 
9. (C) Comment: The MOD has often been more supportive than 
other ministries of U.S. positions.  Senior officials are 
more forthcoming than their counterparts at the MFA, for 
instance.  Besancenot and his colleagues were clearly pleased 
with the Defense Minister's visit, are eager to put 
differences on Iraq behind us, and welcome our close 
coordination on Lebanon.  Besancenot's comments in defense of 
the planned decision to lift the arms embargo, while 
otherwise not new, included an awareness that they, and other 
EU member states, may have misread the President's and the 
Secretary's message during their meetings in Europe.  While 
 
SIPDIS 
senior MFA officials have previously voiced a desire for 
broad consultations with us on China, Besancenot, perhaps not 
wishing to exceed his brief, stopped short of supporting a 
strategic dialog before any further steps are taken with the 
embargo.  End comment. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Leach