US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO559

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CE, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  SHIFTING FOCUS FROM POST-CRISIS TO 
POLITICS AS USUAL 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 0532 
 
     B. COLOMBO 0487 
     C. COLOMBO 0458 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Several recent events indicate that the domestic 
political scene may be gearing down from the post-tsunami 
crisis mode of the last three months--in which more blatant 
displays of self-interest and short-sightedness had to be 
held in check--back to politics as usual.  Examples include 
delays on a mechanism to facilitate cooperation on tsunami 
relief with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga's toleration (if not 
downright encouragement) of personal rivalries within her own 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party; and her resuscitation of the 
question of a popular referendum on the term-limited 
executive presidency.  Although we are hopeful that the 
President will agree to the joint mechanism soon (septel), 
other signs suggest Kumaratunga may be calculating that 
post-tsunami sympathy and funding give her leeway to pursue 
her political ambitions.  End summary. 
 
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POST-MOURNING POLITICS 
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2.  (C)  As the end of the traditional three-month mourning 
period draws near, it appears that Sri Lankan politics may be 
reverting from its brief post-disaster moratorium on 
intriguing, backbiting and partisan plotting back to form. 
In particular, President Chandrika Kumaratunga seems to be 
shifting focus from post-disaster crisis mode to politics as 
usual, allowing her personal political imperatives to compete 
with issues of national importance, like the peace process 
and the delivery of tsunami assistance.  Recent examples 
include: 
 
--her bombshell reference in a March 7 speech to a possible 
referendum on devolution of power to the north and east. 
This was followed by local press reports on March 14, citing 
unidentified party sources, of a planned May referendum on 
devolution and the abolition of the executive presidency; 
 
--her apparent tolerance (if not outright encouragement) of 
infighting within her own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). 
Possible moves to sideline two of the most powerful and 
popular members of the SLFP, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse 
and Media Minister Mangala Samaraweera, have the rest of the 
hierarchy scrambling to reconfigure alliances and secure 
positions. 
 
--her protracted deliberations over a joint mechanism with 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to facilitate the 
delivery of tsunami aid in Tiger-controlled areas.  Some 
valid Government concerns are delaying the agreement, and she 
has assured the Ambassador that, once those are satisfied, 
she is ready to sign (septel).  Nonetheless, the lengthy 
delay, coupled with increased violence in the north and east 
(Ref A), has many observers wondering whether the Government 
is ready to take advantage of the political space provided by 
the tsunami to re-engage with the LTTE. 
 
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DEVOLUTION ANNOUNCEMENT: 
A DIVERSIONARY TACTIC? 
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3.  (C)  Since the President's unexpected reference to a 
possible referendum on devolution (which she asserted would 
pass with 80 percent of the popular vote), there has been no 
further official notification from the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) of any preparations for such a vote.  (The 
Election Commission denied to us local press reports that it 
had been directed to prepare for a referendum.)  Subsequent 
press reports of an omnibus referendum on a number of 
possible constitutional amendments--devolution, abolition of 
the executive presidency in favor of an executive prime 
ministership, and changes to the electoral system--appear 
equally unfounded.  That most key players, including 
ultra-nationalist coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) and the LTTE, have not offered a detailed response to 
the President's statement suggests that few are taking the 
suggestion seriously. 
4.  (C)   Some observers are interpreting the allusion to a 
referendum as a trial balloon.  Before the tsunami, the 
President was said to be actively considering a referendum on 
abolishing the executive presidency that would allow her to 
stay in power as Prime Minister past the mandated two-term 
Presidential limit, and no one believes she has given up the 
idea since.  Resurrecting discussion of a referendum 
now--albeit one on which her political self-interest is less 
blatant--may be a way of signaling that the idea, while 
temporarily on the back burner, is still cooking.  Others see 
it as another example of Kumaratunga's tendency to let 
impulse dominate her extemporaneous speech without adequately 
thinking through the implications of what she says.  Still 
others offer a less charitable construction:  that the 
President invoked devolution to deflect growing criticism at 
the lack of progress on the peace front and/or delays in the 
delivery of tsunami aid. 
 
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NO HEIR APPARENT 
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5.  (C)  Any sign that the President is once more considering 
a referendum--and thus postponing the need to choose a 
successor--exacerbates rivalries within the SLFP.  (Her 
tendency to micro-manage, her unwillingness to delegate 
decision-making authority and her penchant for secretiveness 
are also aggravating factors.)  So far, the President has not 
indicated any heir apparent.  Affable, popular and 
politically savvy, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse is widely 
considered the obvious choice, but the President's exclusion 
of him from anything other than ceremonial functions has 
garnered him little practical experience in policy-making and 
left him only limited patronage to dispense.  Moreover, 
despite (or perhaps because of) his strong southern base, 
Rajapakse has seen her circumscribe his influence on tsunami 
reconstruction to his home district of Hambantota (Ref B). 
Tourism Minister and older brother Anura Bandaranaike may 
have the lineage, but his party-switching past, his emotional 
instability and his reputed poor health make him politically 
unreliable.  (The President's assertion in her March 7 speech 
that there are "lunatics" in every family did little to boost 
his position.)  Meanwhile, rising star and Media Minister 
Managala Samaraweera, whose closeness to Kumaratunga predates 
her rise to power in 1994, seems to be in eclipse for now, in 
part because of his closeness to the perpetually troublesome 
JVP and her dissatisfaction with recent coverage in the 
state-owned media. 
 
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JOINT MECHANISM: 
NOT YET IN FIRST GEAR 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Initial optimism ran high that the need for the LTTE 
and the GSL to work together on tsunami could help 
re-energize the peace process.  Since then, protracted delays 
on the GSL side (although for valid concerns), along with a 
string of killings in the north and east, are dampening that 
enthusiasm.  While we understand the GSL's need to consider 
implications of the agreement carefully, the reasons for the 
continued delay are less clear to the general public, 
especially since JVP opposition to a joint mechanism is far 
less vociferous than to a full-blown interim administration. 
The President's announcement of a special commission to 
investigate the February 7 killing of the LTTE's political 
wing leader for Batticaloa (Ref C) has done little to assuage 
widely held suspicions within the Tamil community of GSL 
involvement in the slaying.  Tamil interlocutors (both pro- 
and anti-LTTE) have long expressed skepticism that the 
Sinhalese south, made complacent by the ceasefire, is serious 
about pursuing a permanent negotiated solution.  These 
contacts now fear that the GSL may use the disaster as yet 
another pretext to defer politically difficult decisions on 
the peace front. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) Post-tsunami goodwill and sympathy have undeniably 
helped Kumaratunga politically.  She runs the risk, however, 
of overestimating how long that goodwill may last if she 
allows her personal political ambitions to dominate the 
agenda.  We are encouraged to learn that she hopes to sign 
the joint mechanism agreement soon (septel).  That step will 
send an important and much-needed signal that she is willing 
to make the politically risky decisions necessary to expedite 
reconstruction and to re-energize the peace process. 
LUNSTEAD