US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO557

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TPHY, EAID, CE, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS WITH 
PRESIDENT KUMARATUNGA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead FOR REASON 1.4(D). 
 
 This cable contains an action request - see para 7. 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador told President Kumaratunga that 
reconstruction effort was running into problems, especially 
on transitional shelter, with monsoon season looming.  There 
was a risk of major problems that could cost Sri Lanka the 
international good will it had achieved in the emergency 
phase.  Problems included slow pace of land acquisition and 
customs duties/slow clearance of reconstruction goods. 
100/200 meter exclusion zone was also causing problems. 
Kumaratunga promised to try to resolve land and customs 
problems, but was adamant on maintaining exclusion zone. 
Ambassador also said organization of reconstruction effort 
was a problem, since only President seemed to have authority 
to make decisions and enforce them, suggesting she appoint a 
Ministerial-level person to be in overall charge.  President 
said she would consider this.  Ambassador said we were not 
aware of threatening geological activity near Sri Lanka, and 
promised to get Kumaratunga more information on this.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead called on President Kumaratunga 
on March 17.  As Ambassador arrived, Kumaratunga was engaged 
with Education Secretary Tara De Mel.  After a short 
discussion (lament) on the comparative costs of paying for 
children's college education--Kumaratunga has two children in 
the UK--Ambassador said that he had requested the meeting 
because of our concerns about some aspects of the 
reconstruction program.  He was raising these issues as a 
friend, and knew that we all shared the same goals of an 
efficient reconstruction effort.  He was not speaking on 
behalf of other donors, but knew that they shared many of our 
concerns.  Sri Lanka had done very well during the emergency 
phase, sheltering and feeding people and averting the medical 
disaster that everyone feared.  This had been in large part 
due to a "get it done attitude" in which officials bypassed 
normal procedures. We were very concerned now about what was 
happening in the more difficult reconstruction phase, 
especially in the transitional shelter program.  It was 
moving very slowly, in part because officials seemed to be 
reverting to normal bureaucratic procedures.  If the people 
now under tents and in other unsatisfactory shelter were not 
given something more substantial before the monsoon started 
(probably end-April), we would likely face an outbreak of 
disease (which we managed to stave off during the immediate 
relief phase).  The good will which Sri Lanka had earned from 
the world could quickly turn sour as the media reported 
problems. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador said that one of the major hindrances in 
the temporary shelter program was inability of the system to 
make land available. As an example, USAID had funded one NGO 
to build 4,000 shelters, but it so far had only received land 
for 250.  The land problem was compounded by uncertainty 
about the 100/200 meter buffer zone. Perhaps some flexibility 
in application of the zone might be possible, at least in the 
provision of transitional shelter. 
 
4.  (C) President Kumaratunga replied that she was aware of 
the problems and was working hard to resolve them. One cause 
was an early and erroneous decision by the government to go 
straight to provision of permanent shelter. They now realized 
that was a mistake. She knew that land was a problem, but 
thought that sufficient land was now identified and would be 
allocated soon. At her request, Ambassador gave her a 
spreadsheet detailing USAID projects. 
 
5.  (C) With regard to the 100/200 meter exclusion zone, she 
said that she had made that decision personally and it was 
"completely scientific."  In fact, she said, the zone should 
be as much as 500 meters, but that was not practical.  She 
said that most of the populace within the 100 meter zone were 
eager to move--"only 5-10 percent don't want to go." 
(Ambassador politely demurred.)  The Opposition UNP party was 
stirring up trouble among the exclusion zone inhabitants, but 
that was purely political. The fishermen were afraid for 
their boats and nets, she knew, and therefore the government 
would construct lockable boat shelters, and the fishermen 
could take turns guarding them at night. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador said that it might be more practical to 
allow people to remain and rebuild closer to the shore, but 
provide a good warning system so they could evacuate in case 
of a threat.  This was the system followed in Hawaii, for 
instance.  Kumaratunga said that was practical for the US, 
where buildings could be constructed to withstand a tsunami, 
but not for Sri Lanka, where the buildings would be 
destroyed. In Tamil Nadu, she said, there was a pre-existing 
500 meter exclusion zone, and this had saved many lives when 
the tsunami hit. 
 
7.  (C) Kumaratunga added that Sri Lanka was in greater 
danger now because the chance of a nearby earthquake had 
increased. Ambassador said that after the President had 
mentioned this during her conversation with former Presidents 
Bush and Clinton, and specifically the existence of a new 
fault line 300 kilometers east of Sri Lanka, we had contacted 
the US Geological Survey.  Geologists there had told us they 
knew of no such new fault line, but would look into it 
further, and had sent us a map detailing the faults in the 
area off the coast of Sumatra.  Ambassador presented 
Kumaratunga a copy of the map.  Kumaratunga was quite 
interested, and asked if we could get any further 
information, which Ambassador promised to try to do.  ACTION 
REQUEST: Would appreciate if Dept could work with USGS and/or 
other applicable USG agencies to provide some material for 
President Kumaratunga. 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador said that another problem slowing up 
reconstruction was imposition of customs duties on 
reconstruction supplies and slow clearance from the port.  He 
had discussed this several times with Finance Secretary PB 
Jayasundera, and some progress had been made, but the 
situation was still not satisfactory.  USAID grantees, for 
instance, were still having problems clearing their goods and 
were being asked to pay VAT, in contravention of a 
decades-old agreement between our two governments. 
 
9.  (C) Kumaratunga said she was aware of this problem also. 
Some of the duties imposed were correct, she said. For 
instance, with the rice harvest about to begin in Sri Lanka, 
they would not allow duty-free entrance of rice.  She asked 
Ambassador to send her a letter detailing the specific items 
which USAID grantees were unable to clear, and she would see 
that they were taken care of.  Ambassador responded that he 
would send such a letter, but the real issue was not specific 
items, but the overall policy. 
 
10. (C) Ambassador then said that the course of the 
conversation had highlighted a major organizational problem 
in the reconstruction effort.  There were a number of GSL 
agencies involved--TAFREN, TAFROR, the line Ministries, the 
Government Agents in the field--but there was no one person 
in overall charge except the President.  She had mentioned a 
number of cases where she had to make the decision. There was 
no way that she could spend all of her time on reconstruction 
and still run the country.  Donors could not call her three 
or four times a week, every time they needed a problem 
resolved.  President acknowledged the problem, but said that 
donors should contact TAFREN head Mano Tittawela when they 
had overarching problems.  Ambassador responded that Mano, as 
competent as he was, could not give orders to others such as 
Finance Secretary Jayasundera.   Perhaps she could appoint 
someone with Ministerial rank in overall charge who could 
make things happen.  Kumaratunga thanked Ambassador for 
raising this and said she would think about appointing 
someone--musing that perhaps it should be Finance Minister 
Amunagama. 
 
11. (C) Ambassador then discussed issue of a "joint 
mechanism" with the LTTE for reconstruction efforts in North 
and East.  Report follows Septel. 
 
12. (C) COMMENT:  Our guess is that this is the frankest 
assessment CBK has received from anyone.  Entire discussion 
was held in a friendly, cooperative and problem-solving 
manner.  We hope President will now intervene to see that 
land for transitional shelter is allocated more quickly. 
Unfortunately, she seems adamant on 100/200 meter exclusion 
zone.  Appointment of a Ministerial-level figure with some 
political weight as a "reconstruction czar" would be useful, 
if she does it--and if she appoints the right person.  We are 
not sure the Finance Minister has the assertiveness needed 
for the role. President needed to hear these points, and she 
has.  We will now see what she does with them. 
 
 
LUNSTEAD