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| Identifier: | 05OTTAWA800 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05OTTAWA800 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ottawa |
| Created: | 2005-03-17 15:17:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ASEC ECON OPRC PREL CA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 171517Z Mar 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000800 SIPDIS E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, ECON, OPRC, PREL, CA SUBJECT: TAKING STOCK OF U.S.-CANADIAN RELATIONS -- AN END OF TOUR ASSESSMENT U.S.-Canadian Relations ----------------------- 1. My core message as I depart Ottawa is that our relationship with Canada has changed fundamentally in the last four years, and we as a government need to catch up with this new reality. Canada is the front line of our efforts to protect the U.S. homeland. There is no priority in the hemisphere, in the world greater than that, and we will have to make sure that we are properly set up in Canada to address this priority. 2. The complexity of U.S.-Canadian ties, and of Canada's internal political and social reality, has played out visibly during my four-year tenure here. When I arrived, Jean Chretien was in his third term as Prime Minister and Canada was in the process of disengaging from its former middle power status and withdrawing from the global stage. The bruising debate over Quebec separatism was largely over but the fissures it left in the country had not healed, and there was extreme caution in political decision-making. More recently, Chretien's replacement by Paul Martin, followed by elections which yielded a minority government, further restricted bold initiatives. U.S. Canadian relations during this period were complicated, with increasing economic integration and strong support in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, but also growing negative reactions to festering trade disputes such as BSE and softwood lumber, and strong popular disagreement over the U.S. operation in Iraq. 3. Mission Canada has made broad strides over the past four years to strengthen all areas of the bilateral relationship, but most significantly in the realm of security, as manifested specifically by the Smart Border Action Plan and our daily support to implementing the programs and providing support to those in Washington pushing our policy agenda related to the plan. We have also helped prod Canada to increase defense spending and have improved our cooperation on multilateral issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and curtailing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We did come up short on missile defense and military support for Iraq, but Canada has compensated in part by managing the international observer mission for Iraqi elections, contributing 300 million dollars to Iraqi reconstruction and supporting first Iraqi police training and now NATO's Iraqi army training. On the economic side of the relationship Mission Canada has supported the policy and structural framework of deepening our economic ties. In many ways we have reached the natural limits of the current NAFTA-led construct, as "border risk" has become a major theme of senior Canadian officials -- for instance, Toyota decided to locate a new plant in the U.S. because of concern with border crossings. There are two sets of issues -- those related to border processing and delays, and the deeper issues related to failure to resolve trade disputes such as softwood lumber and BSE. The Ambassador's Role --------------------- 4. Overwhelmingly, the bilateral relationship occurs across the U.S.-Canadian border between individuals, businesses and communities who do not check in with Ottawa and Washington. Even at the government-to-government level, a great deal of interaction takes place directly between government agencies. In this unique environment, I have found it effective to assume a high profile in Canadian public discourse for three key reasons. 5. First, we enjoy excellent working relations with the Government of Canada, and Canadian government officials, especially in law enforcement and the Canadian Forces, fully understand our current concerns and issues. The same, however, cannot be said of the Canadian public, especially the media. Moreover, Canadian political leaders are often reluctant to make the public case for close U.S.-Canada cooperation on controversial issues -- missile defense being the most recent case in point. 6. Secondly, while Canadians understand us better than perhaps any other country, they don't understand us as well as they think. Canadians have long described their public discourse as a "dialogue of solitudes," in which they largely listen to each other. Canada needs to hear from Americans directly on our views, impending decisions, and courses of action taken. There is no American in Canada in a more authoritative position to communicate our views than the Ambassador of the United States. 7. Finally, it has been necessary to interpret Canada and to serve as a first alert for those in Washington who are immersed on issues of interest in all other parts of the world. Canada believes it has a hard time getting Washington's attention. This sometimes occurs through our own indecision but more often it is the result of our inability to bring to closure issues that are relatively small for us but that loom large for Canadians. 8. My public role has meant traveling widely throughout this vast and diverse country. The fundamental message to all audiences has been highlighting the scope, depth and strength of the bilateral relationship; and emphasizing the need for Canada and the U.S. to continue to work together to ensure our mutual security and prosperity, across the globe as well as on the North American continent we share. I have been able to explain our views directly, at a retail level, to a broad group of opinion leaders, including in civic and business organizations, think tanks and universities. The importance of our bilateral relationship has also ensured that my remarks have received wide dissemination in the Canadian media. The Centrality of Public Diplomacy ---------------------------------- 9. Obviously, our public diplomacy efforts here and elsewhere need to include more than the Ambassador. We were fortunate to have a steady stream of visitors from the Executive Branch, including the President, who each time helped advance our agenda and put forward the face of the U.S. as partner and friend. Our few public diplomacy program dollars consistently prove their worth as Canadians who ought to know us better are predictable in their surprise at our dynamism, our diversity, and our friendship. Yes, even in Canada, exchanges, speaker and visitor programs are invaluable, especially with the uniformly positive reception for our outreach efforts in diaspora communities of Haitians, Middle Easterners, and South Asians. 10. Through all of this, I do not accept the notion that America and Canada are growing apart. But I do believe that our economic ties and mutual prosperity could be greater, our security enhanced, and Canada could take a more active part in solving global problems, if we focused more consistently on tending this relationship. Following are my thoughts on where we need to engage Canada in the coming years, and what I have learned about how best to do so. A Checklist of Opportunities for Enhanced Bilateral Engagement --------------------------------------------- --------------- -- 11. There are a number of excellent opportunities to better engage the Canadian government on global issues, economics, and security in the coming years: -- First, Canada is searching for a greater role to play in the world and might be willing to commit more resources and possibly even troops to the right missions, or might be willing to lead certain international processes. There is general embarrassment here over the slippage in Canada's international position, and many Canadians would accept a more assertive. We should quietly urge, and openly support Canada to fully take stewardship of a hemispheric or international problem such as Haiti. -- Second, in the short-term we should continue to increase our law enforcement and border engagement. We have achieved substantial coordination with Canada in information sharing and law enforcement liaison but need to continue to develop our programs and increase personnel to ensure a seamless flow of information and close operational coordination. We also need to continue to develop the physical infrastructure on the border to allow for faster and more secure movement of goods and people. Specifically, we want to support the new DHS staffing for the Container Security Initiative, but find ourselves looking at reducing support staff at the same time. -- Third, over the long-term we should continue to pursue a new framework for economic and security integration with Canada and where possible with Mexico which will help solve the two largest problems of border delays and business costs. A package of policies that includes enhanced border infrastructure (physical and technical), improved economic productivity, and shared security measures would strengthen security while expanding trade. If such a partnership is to succeed, we need to see it as a source of real change in a long-term, strategic framework, and not shy away from addressing issues that may require legislative changes. -- Fourth, we need more visitors. I have been surprised by how little interest there is in Canada by the U.S. Congress. This is unfortunate. We have excellent Executive Branch Agency-to-Agency ties and strong State-Provincial contacts, but the crucial middle link between the Congress and Parliament is largely missing. It would help us on a number of levels if we could increase the volume of U.S. Senators and Representatives who are knowledgeable about Canada based on their travel here. It would also help us immensely to have more visits and exchanges on the crucial issue of energy, which has similarly been shortchanged. -- Fifth, we need to guard against the narrow protectionist tendencies that are clouding this very beneficial trade relationship. Allowing narrow interests in the U.S. to dominate certain markets and issues, e.g. softwood lumber, increases the cost of products to American consumers and harms the larger economic relationship while also making it more difficult for Canadian leaders to deliver on political issues of concern to us. Canada wants to work with us to solve trade disputes, but the legalistic path we have pursued over the past several years has eroded Canadian faith in NAFTA, and that erosion may have long-term costs for us. We should explore ways to focus trade remedy actions in a manner which yields resolution, whether we like it or not. The Fight for Resources ----------------------- 12. Protecting the 5,000 miles of American borders that we share with Canada is Mission Canada's highest priority. About 70 percent of our personnel resources are focused on law enforcement and border security. Yet the financial resources provided to us are clearly not commensurate with the importance and needs of the goals we have outlined in our Mission Performance Plan. As I depart Canada I leave behind a major funding problem that threatens to unravel much of the fine work we have accomplished since 9/11. Our State Program funding target is equal to the target we had two years ago even though the US dollar has depreciated almost 30 percent. We have enacted extreme travel restrictions, a hiring freeze and have squeezed savings out of every aspect of our operations. Yet we are faced with the strong likelihood of layoffs unless our funding level is significantly increased. To Watch For ------------ 13. I have found that one other role of an Ambassador is to sound an early warning to Washington on problems ahead. In a relationship so large and integrated, there is a certain sense of permanence to irritants. I remember when I first did my briefings for Congressional testimony, these items included Pacific salmon, PEI potatoes and acid rain. Now, although the specific issues have changed, there is also a new feature: time. The time it has been taking to attend to these irritants seems to have been increasing. Neither side has total wisdom in these disputes, but our broader national interests have fallen victim to the concerns of an isolated, small group seeking specific protection. 14. No better example of this exists than softwood lumber, but there are also a couple of others on the horizon: BSE, Devil's Lake. Their cost to our overall bilateral relationship outweighs their potential and often narrow benefit. Over time, these relatively minor irritants fester, undercutting public support and undermining the ability of political leadership to support our policies. We need to recommit to solve disputes and not allow them to drag on with no hope of resolution. Closing ------- 15. It has been an honor and privilege to serve my country these past four years. I have had but one consistent message for people all over Canada which is that the United States is a force for good around the world. I leave with this unshakable belief.
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