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| Identifier: | 05NDJAMENA405 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NDJAMENA405 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ndjamena |
| Created: | 2005-03-17 13:57:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PREF PHUM CD SU Darfur Policy and Rebels |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 PERC-00
DS-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
L-00 VCE-00 M-00 AC-00 NEA-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OES-00 OIC-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 PM-00
GIWI-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 IIP-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00
PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /000W
------------------CCBBD8 171403Z /38
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1154
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USLO TRIPOLI
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000405 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM, USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels SUBJECT: CHAD'S CHANGING TACTICS ON DARFUR Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Chadian President Idriss Deby's latest move to break the current impasse in Darfur involves working with the Sudan Liberation Movement. Currently, the Chadian Government is hosting a number of leaders and field commanders from the SLM in N'Djamena for discussions about the movement's leadership and organizational problems. This change in tactics represents a recognition that other approaches, such as the creation of an alternative rebel movement, have failed. SLM members here in N'Djamena are cautious because Deby's objectives are not clear and he remains susceptible to manipulation from Khartoum. Non-Zaghawa members of the SLM view the discussions as an effort by the Chadian Government to back SLM's Zaghawa leadership. Still others charge that Deby is trying to coopt malleable SLM leaders to divide and weaken the movement. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - INVITATION TO CHAD - - - - - - - - - - 2. (C) After the February 16-17 Joint Commission meeting, President Idriss Deby invited Sudan Liberation Movement leaders and members to discuss SLM's leadership and organizational problems. According to Dr. Sharif Harir, the Chadians apparently want to repair strained relations with the SLM. Harir arrived three weeks ago. He said the Chadians invited Mini Minawi and Abdelwahid Nour at least two or three times. Field commanders, mostly Fur, have been in N'Djamena for over a week. The assembled members of the SLM in N'Djamena were welcomed by President Deby on March 11. Deby told the SLM members that he wanted to improve his government's strained relations with the SLM and help the movement better organize itself as an institution. Harir said that the consultations were also aimed at selecting a negotiating team and SLM's goals for the Abuja talks. SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nour is in Libya and General Secretary Mini Minawi is in Rome. (Comment: Mini fears coming to N'Djamena and Abdelwahid Nour is awaiting a report from his field commanders already in N'Djamena. End Comment.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SLM CHAIRMAN ALLEGES CHADIAN DIRTY TRICKS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. (C) On March 9, SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nour sent the Ambassador a fax and called P/E officer regarding the well-being of his field commanders in N'Djamena who he claimed were being detained and possibly beaten by Chadian security agents. The fax also alleged that the Chadian Government lured his field commanders to N'Djamena by saying that Abdelwahid was on his way to Chad. Abdelwahid also told P/E officer that he believes the Chadian Government is attempting to pay off some of his commanders to overthrow him as SLM's leader. He requested that the U.S. Embassy check into the safety of Ahmed Kubur, Sulieman Marajan, Dr. Saleh, and Mohammed Harin. 4. (C) P/E officer met several times with a group of Fur members of SLM in N'Djamena in an effort to locate the "Fur four". They did not know the whereabouts of the four commanders mentioned in Abdelwahid's fax and were concerned because they had heard rumors that some of the commanders were being badly treated. Initially, SLM's Joint Commission representative based in N'Djamena, Adam Shogar, told P/E officer that they were at a Chadian Government guesthouse under "tight security" on March 10. Chad Mediation Team members General Mahamat Ali and Presidential Advisor Allam-mi were surprised by P/E officer's request to see the four commanders and asked if the U.S. thought the commanders had been thrown in jail. P/E officer insisted and Ali and Allam-mi relented, giving "permission" to visit the guesthouse to see that the Fur commanders are being "well cared for". Arrangements are being made for the contact. 5. (C) The claims of Abdelwahid and others that Chad is attempting to manipulate the SLM's leadership appear to be supported by recent activities in Chad. For example, the separation of the four Fur commanders from the other Fur SLM members and the evasive behavior of the Chadians and Shogar over the location of the field commanders. Dandjo members of SLM informed P/E officer that the Chadians are coopting SLM's Zaghawa members and key Fur commanders to remove Abdelwahid from SLM's leadership. During several recent discussions, Harir and Shogar floated a number of ideas that we had previously heard from the Chadian Government, including the idea of a safehaven zone for Sudanese refugees inside Sudan. P/E officer quickly discredited the idea. Sudanese money-man Hassan Birgo's presence in N'Djamena is also likely related to the current discussions over SLM leadership issues. Adam Shogar, without transport or money for transport or Thuraya cards for a year, now has access to car. - - - - - - - - JETTISONING JEM - - - - - - - - 6. (C) The Government of Chad has completely written off the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and ignored their request to hold an "urgent" Joint Commission meeting. JEM's Joint Commission members are in London and Libya. Ahmed Lissan Tugod has called P/E officer, SLM members in Chad, and the Chad mediators regarding various communiques. He also informed the Chadians that the JEM is pulling its members from the Cease-fire Commission. (Note: It is not clear if this has happened. End Note.) The Chadian Government makes no secret about it dislike for JEM's leadership and its support for the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) as an attempt to split and weaken JEM. Over the past weeks, there have been signs that the Chadian Government also realizes that the NMRD option has outlived its utility and may not have been money well-spent. In addition, the Sudanese refugees in camps in Chad were not interested in taking advantage of the idea of "safehaven zones" inside Sudan. In a telling comment, Ali told P/E officer on March 14 that the NMRD is finished. 7. (C) The Chadians believe that divisions over Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's Islamic agenda and ties to Turabi are becoming more pronounced and harder to deny. Ali and Harir speculate that fired field commander Mohammed Saleh and other secular members of JEM will eventually join ranks with SLM. (Comment: Upon receiving news of his dismissal prior to his return to the field, Saleh said he would be mobilizing like-minded commanders that could resist Khalil's money to leave JEM. End Comment.) 8. (C) Saleh also told P/E officer that JEM does not have enough positions on the ground to verify and can no longer deny its connections to Turabi after Khalil gave orders to field commanders to assist in the failed coup attempt in Sudan. Saleh also alleged JEM listed Turabi and/or his associates as JEM political prisoners. N'Djamena-based and visiting SLM members share Ali, and Allam-mi's conviction that JEM's continued inflexibility and habit of negotiating by communique from Asmara will ultimately undermine the prospects of a joint-negotiating position with SLM. - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD'S CURRENT GAME PLAN - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9. (C) Harir explained that some SLM members are willing to take the risk of talking with the Chadians because a better working relationship is in the interest of longstanding familial ties. However, Harir said SLM is being cautious because of concerns about Deby's vulnerability to the Government of Sudan's influence. First, Deby is genuinely preoccupied with the possibility of Sudanese support for an Arab, Islamic government in N'Djamena. Deby knows that leadership changes in Chad begin in Darfur. As Army Chief, Deby helped put Hissein Habre into power in 1982 from Darfur, where he took refuge, and in 1990, when Deby himself came to power. Second, Chadian authorities are concerned about Chadian rebel groups located inside Sudan and jandjaweed members who are Chadian and who have been well-armed by Sudanese officials. Finally, according to Harir, even if Deby takes a position contrary to Khartoum's wishes, his position can easily be undermined by payoffs to those under the President. Deby also may be turning to the SLM for domestic reasons. He may be giving in to pressure from family members to provide support for the SLM, especially since the public referendum on removing term limits is coming up in June. - - - - COMMENT - - - - 8. (C) Chadian authorities recognize that SLM's leadership and organizational issues are hampering the peace process. Chadian officials appear to want a stronger, better organized SLM that can be manipulated and that can diminish the power of leaders, such as Abdelwahid, whom they as an obstacle to a peace settlement. Also, the Chadians may calculate that the SLM needs to be able to better able to articulate its political positions and implement its commitments. SLM could also diminish JEM's presence and positions in the talks if it is better organized. The key problem remains Chad's ulterior motives, which SLM rightfully does not trust. If Chad divides SLM's leadership and coopts Zaghawa members, it then alienates other ethnic groups, weakening the movement and its ability to negotiate. This tactic would be short-sighted. SLM members point out that it is worth talking to the Chadians because Deby has enough at stake in the situation and he will not let Chad be sidelined. In addition, the SLM is learning more about Chadian motives as the discussions progress. 9. (C) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. CASEBEER NNNN
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