US embassy cable - 05RANGOON334

S E C R E T RANGOON 000334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/ESC/TFS, EB/EPPD, S/CT, IO/PSC 
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015 
TAGS: EFIN, PTER, ETTC, KTFN, BM 
SUBJECT: FIGHTING TERRORIST FINANCING IN BURMA 
 
REF: A. STATE 32688 
     B. 04 RANGOON 384 (NOTAL) 
     C. 04 RANGOON 305 
     D. 03 RANGOON 859 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (S) The following responds to the questions posed in 
reftel regarding the GOB's efforts to combat terrorist 
financing: 
 
(A) The GOB has not seized, frozen, or forfeited any assets 
under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 or 1373.  However, 
the GOB issued its required UNSC Resolution 1455 report in 
May 2004 and outlined the legal framework in place to protect 
against, and punish, terrorist financing and money laundering 
in Burma. 
 
(B) Though the GOB has been generally cooperative on 
counter-terrorism initiatives, bilateral relations remain 
very tenuous.  Contacting GOB officials and getting their 
expeditious assistance on, or a senior-level commitment to, 
any matter can be difficult.  In addition, the embassy's 
primary liaison to the GOB on terrorism issues -- the former 
PM Khin Nyunt's Military Intelligence -- was dismantled in 
October 2004, and neither its successor organization nor 
other GOB entities have assumed these liaison 
responsibilities. 
 
(C) Due to U.S. law and policy, the USG may not offer any 
direct or indirect assistance to the GOB.  GOB officials 
tasked with combating terrorist financing, money laundering, 
and financial crimes have a very low-level of technical 
ability and have requested USG capacity building in the past. 
 There is a precedent set with the DEA providing limited 
information exchange on technical issues with Burmese 
counternarcotics police.  These efforts have proven quite 
successful in expanding local skills and cooperation with 
U.S. policy objectives. 
 
(D) "Low."  Due to an undeveloped banking sector and tight 
government controls on foreign trade and possession of 
foreign currency, Burma has a very large and active informal 
financial sector, including a vast "hundi" network (refs C 
and D).  It is thus a potential marketplace for terrorist 
financing and money laundering in general.  However, while 
money laundering is rampant, we have seen no evidence that 
any terrorist groups are using Burma's informal financial 
sector for raising or banking funds. 
Martinez