US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO547

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 
TAGS: PTER, EAID, PGOV, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  BISHOP OF JAFFNA SEES POPULAR 
FRUSTRATION RISING 
 
REF: COLOMBO 487 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a March 16 meeting with poloff in Colombo, Thomas 
Savundaranayagam, Catholic Bishop of Jaffna, reported that 
initial post-tsunami coordination among the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
NGOs and the Catholic Church ran smoothly.  Since then, 
however, the absence of a joint coordination mechanism 
between the GSL and the LTTE is impeding swifter delivery of 
aid.  GSL delays in adopting such a mechanism will only 
reinforce long-standing suspicions of Government corruption 
and anti-Tamil discrimination among people in the north, the 
Bishop warned.  Agreement on a joint mechanism could also 
help defuse rising discontent in the north at the stalled 
peace process, he noted.  Recent anti-GSL protests in Jaffna, 
"partly spontaneous and partly instigated" by the LTTE, point 
to a growing restiveness he likened to "a dynamite keg."  The 
LTTE, which is reportedly enforcing a 400-meter exclusion 
zone in some areas, is facing difficulty in building 
permanent shelter in Mullaitivu because of the paucity of 
unoccupied GSL land.  A long-time Embassy 
contact,Savundaranayagam generally can be counted on for a 
moderate, studiously neutral view of events in the north. 
His skepticism about GSL intentions toward post-tsunami 
coordination thus offer a sobering view of how northern 
Tamils likely perceive the Government.  End summary. 
 
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IMMEDIATE DISASTER RESPONSE: 
COORDINATED, EFFECTIVE 
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2.  (SBU)  On March 16 poloff met with Dr. Thomas 
Savundaranayagam, Catholic Bishop of Jaffna, in Colombo to 
discuss post-tsunami aid delivery and recent events in 
Jaffna.  The Bishop estimates that his diocese includes about 
75,000 Catholics (down from about 150,000 before the 
conflict) in Jaffna and Mullaitivu districts.  Because 
Catholics tend to settle in coastal areas in the north (there 
are 35 churches along the 70-mile coastal belt), members of 
his diocese were disproportionately affected by the December 
26 tsunami, he asserted.  In the days immediately following 
December 26, the local population, the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
NGOs and the Catholic Church worked quickly and effectively 
together to set up camps for Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and to distribute relief, he reported.  Three joint 
committees, headed by the GA and the pro-LTTE Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) were rapidly established to 
coordinate the distribution of aid in Jaffna and Mullaitivu, 
he said, although the TRO really made most of the decisions, 
at least in the early days, about where aid went, the Bishop 
acknowledged.  Initially, he said, the GSL bureaucracy proved 
ill equipped to deal with the emergency and had to depend 
upon local residents, the LTTE and NGOs for the disaster 
response expertise they had gained from surviving for more 
than 20 years in a conflict zone.  (The Bishop added 
caustically that many local residents already had the benefit 
of long-term experience as IDPs thanks to the insurgency.) 
Besides, he noted, GSL representatives were grappling with 
their own tsunami-imposed limitations at the time.  For 
example, he said, the Mullaitivu Government Agent (GA), whose 
office was destroyed in the disaster, did not even have a 
chair or a pencil--even as the GSL was clamoring for her to 
provide data on the dead and displaced. 
 
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CROWN LAND HARD TO COME BY 
IN LTTE-CONTROLLED TERRITORY 
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3.  (SBU)  In Savundaranayagam's view, in the initial 
emergency response phase coordination generally ran smoothly, 
despite occasional problems caused by one or the other 
player--usually the TRO--wanting to claim credit for relief 
work.  (He described the TRO as "quite persistent" in 
demanding credit.)  While the LTTE and its affiliated 
apparatus may have dominated the initial emergency response 
phase in the north, now that the reconstruction phase is 
beginning, the GAs are playing a more prominent role, 
according to Savundaranayagam.  He reported participating the 
past week in a foundation-laying ceremony for new permanent 
houses for tsunami victims in an all-Catholic village in 
Jaffna.  The GSL had provided the land and had committed to 
building 100 houses.  (This is in addition to a commitment 
from CARITAS to build 2,000 houses in the diocese.)  While a 
sufficient amount of unoccupied GSL land ("Crown land") is 
available to relocate tsunami victims in Jaffna, the Bishop 
noted, there is no such land in LTTE-controlled territory in 
Mullaitivu.  Thus, although the LTTE has approached INGOs 
about providing temporary shelter in the hard-hit district, 
the permanent housing effort there is not yet off the ground, 
he reported.  In fact, the LTTE had asked the Church to 
donate some of its land in Mullaitivu, a request the Church 
is resisting.   Complicating planning is the LTTE's 
insistence on a 400-meter coastal exclusion zone in some 
areas (100 meters for "a natural conservation zone" and 300 
meters for a bund), according to the Bishop.  As in the 
south, uncertainty persists about how strictly enforced the 
unpopular exclusion zone will be.  When asked if, given the 
relative scarcity of vacant land in Mullaitivu, the LTTE 
expects to stick to the 400-meter rule, the Bishop replied, 
"Things are not clear yet." 
 
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AGREEMENT ON JOINT MECHANISM: 
NOT AUTOMATIC 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU)  The challenges of the reconstruction phase make 
agreement on a joint GSL/LTTE mechanism to coordinate aid 
distribution all the more crucial, the Bishop said.  For 
example, in addition to the lack of permanent housing, the 
Bishop said, the LTTE so far has proven unable to replace the 
3,000 Mullaitivu fishing boats damaged or destroyed in the 
tsunami.  GSL suspicions about possible dual usages for the 
 
SIPDIS 
vessels may be impeding this effort, he suggested.  Moreover, 
with no coordination mechanism in place, the LTTE and GSL are 
both obstructing the timely delivery of building supplies and 
other important materials, as each side imposes its own 
separate and laborious clearance procedures.  In an effort to 
expedite the movement of foreign NGO workers into 
LTTE-controlled areas, the Tigers have moved staff from their 
political wing in LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi to 
government-controlled areas in Vavuniya to handle the 
paperwork, Savundaranayagam reported.  In general, as long as 
the LTTE is notified in advance, there is little to no delay 
in obtaining the necessary permission, the Bishop said. 
 
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POPULAR DISCONTENT IS "DYNAMITE KEG" 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Most important, however, the joint mechanism could 
help allay northern suspicions regarding GSL intentions, 
demonstrate GSL commitment to transparency in aid 
distribution, and offer hopeful signs of life in a peace 
process that many northerners view as moribund, 
Savundaranayagam observed.  Recent disturbances in the north 
point to a deep "undercurrent" of discontentment at the 
status quo, which, if neglected, could leave the GSL "sitting 
on a dynamite keg."  Besides the violent demonstrations of 
March 4 (Reftel), on March 11 Jaffna residents threw stones 
and burned tires after another Sri Lanka Army vehicle hit and 
injured a second female pedestrian.  Efforts by police to 
quell the angry mob with tear gas failed; the crowd dispersed 
only after police led a baton charge against the 
demonstrators.  On March 14 a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
MP led a march through the streets of Jaffna to protest the 
alleged attempted rape of a female civilian by an Army 
soldier.  The protests are "partly spontaneous and partly 
instigated" by the LTTE, in the cleric's estimation, but 
nonetheless point to strongly felt and long-standing popular 
grievances against the GSL.  Tamils in the north feel they 
have nothing to show after three years of a ceasefire, 
Savundaranayagam cautioned, and have already begun to doubt 
the sincerity of GSL claims to want to achieve a permanent 
resolution to the conflict. 
 
6.  (C)  The joint mechanism could offer a safe, ostensibly 
apolitical avenue for resumed GSL/LTTE engagement, the Bishop 
observed, divorced from the harsh, vitriolic rhetoric 
associated with the Tigers' controversial Interim 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal.  Besides building 
confidence between the LTTE and the GSL, cooperation on a 
joint mechanism could also build confidence between the GSL 
and Tamil civilians who fear tsunami aid will evaporate as 
quickly--and with as little discernible benefit to them--as 
the aid promised previously to victims of the conflict, he 
said.  A joint mechanism could help ensure transparency in 
aid distribution, he noted, an important commodity to a 
distrustful and suspicious population.  IFIs and multilateral 
aid organizations could play a key role as well, the Bishop 
suggested; if the GSL fears the aid will be misused by the 
LTTE, it could invite the World Bank or the UN to coordinate 
aid implementation.  He indicated that the GSL's continued 
delay in agreeing to the mechanism raises questions about the 
Government's commitment to efficient, equitable aid 
distribution. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C)  A long-time Embassy contact, Savundaranayagam can 
generally be trusted to provide a moderate, studiously 
neutral view of events in the north.  That he is expressing 
many of the same frustations cited by card-carrying partisans 
like the TNA and Peace Secretariat spokesman Puleedevan 
should be of some concern to the Government.  Although no fan 
of the LTTE, he is also deeply skeptical of GSL intentions 
regarding the peace process.  Northern Tamils we have spoken 
with, whether "establishment" figures like the Bishop, local 
NGO workers or academics, describe themselves as doubly 
victimized--first by the conflict and second by the tsunami. 
In their collective view, the GSL has done little to redress 
the wrongs they endured from the conflict.  They are 
understandably suspicious of GSL promises to make things 
right for them now.  Concluding a joint coordination 
mechanism with the LTTE (which, whether the GSL likes it or 
not, earned substantial credit locally for its early disaster 
response), could send a clear signal of GSL commitment to the 
peace process and to equitable aid distribution. 
LUNSTEAD