US embassy cable - 05MADRID1031

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, WHA/AND, WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP 
SUBJECT: SPANISH OFFICIALS DISCUSS VENEZUELA SALE WITH 
CHARGE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Spanish Deputy Defense Minister Francisco 
Pardo requested a meeting with Charge Friday, March 11 to 
explain Spain's plans to sell military equipment to 
Venezuela.  In the meeting, Pardo denied reports that Spain 
would sell "Corvette" gunships to Venezuela, said none of the 
equipment sold would be for offensive use and repeatedly 
insisted Spain wanted no misunderstandings with the U.S. on 
the issue of the sales to Venezuela.  Charge spoke again with 
Pardo March 15 to discuss Pardo's comments on the Venezuela 
sale to the Senate Defense Commission.  Pardo insisted again 
that none of the equipment included in the sale would be for 
offensive purposes, although he did say Spain planned to sell 
the Chavez government "oceanic" patrol boats.  Pardo also 
emphasized the ship sales were critical to the survival of 
state-owned shipyard Navantia.  On March 16, Spanish Foreign 
Ministry political director Rafael Dezcallar said Spain 
shares the USG's concerns about Chavez' negative influence in 
the region, and will work to check Chavez's destabilizing 
activities.  Charge told Pardo and Dezcallar that if Spain 
wants to improve bilateral relations with the U.S., Spain's 
high-level outreach to Chavez -- including these proposed 
sales -- is no way to go about it.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On Friday, March 11, Pardo asked Charge for a quick 
meeting later that day to explain the government of Spain's 
plans for military equipment sales to Venezuela. (NOTE: 
Pardo,s call followed March 10 meetings in Madrid U.S. 
Attorney General Gonzales had with Spanish Vice President 
Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega and FM Moratinos during 
which AG Gonzales expressed the USG,s concern regarding 
Spain,s policies towards Venezuela.  END NOTE.)  In the 
meeting with Charge, Pardo said he wanted us to know that, 
contrary to press reports, Spain is not selling Corvette 
gunships to Chavez, rather "defensive" items such as Coast 
Guard/Maritime patrol boats and transport aircraft.  He said 
Spain was willing to sell the same/similar equipment to 
Colombia. 
 
3.  (C) Throughout the meeting, Pardo repeatedly insisted 
that Spain wanted no misunderstandings with the U.S. on this, 
and said the sale was vital to Spain's quasi-governmental 
defense manufacturing company, Navantia (formerly called 
Izar).  Pardo said the company was about to collapse without 
such a sale.  Pardo also insisted the Spanish government 
sought to influence Chavez and that a meeting currently being 
worked out that would be in Venezuela with Chavez, Spanish 
President Zapatero, Brazilian President Lula de Silva and 
Colombian President Uribe was an effort, spearheaded by Lula, 
to apply joint pressure on Chavez.  Pardo concluded by saying 
the GOS wants to be completely transparent with the U.S. on 
the sale issue and wants the information the U.S. gets on the 
matter to come directly from the GOS, not from other 
potentially inaccurate sources. 
 
4.  (C) Charge replied that while we appreciated Pardo's 
transparency in informing us about the sale, that fact that 
we listened to the explanation in no way could be interpreted 
to imply that the USG approves or agrees with these sales or 
Spanish rationale for its outreach to Chavez.  Charge noted 
it was difficult to see how these overtures would influence 
Chavez to end his adventurism in the region and embark on 
true democratic reform.  Charge further stated that we do not 
understand the Spanish government's outreach to Chavez and 
what GOS hopes to gain by it other than helping Navantia. 
 
5.  (SBU) Pardo also told Charge he planned to inform the 
Spanish Senate's Defense Commission on Monday, March 14, 
about the Venezuela sale. 
 
6.  Pardo made his presentation to the Senate Defense 
Commission March 14.  Press reports the next day conflicted 
over what Pardo said and what, in fact, Spain was proposing 
to sell to Venezuela.  Charge thus telephoned Pardo to get 
some clarity.  Pardo said reports by national daily El Pais 
(close ties to Socialist Party) that Spain planned to sell 
Venezuela, among other things, a number of Corvette warships, 
were simply incorrect.  Pardo emphasized that nothing Spain 
would sell Venezuela would be for "offensive use."  Pardo 
said the deal would include civilian transport ships, 
military transport planes, coastal patrol boats and "oceanic" 
patrol ships.  He said none of the ships would include 
helicopter landing pads or cannons, despite press reports to 
the contrary.  Pardo declined to tell Charge how many ships 
and planes Spain planned to sell, but a press report (Europa 
Press internet wire service) which Pardo termed as "accurate" 
said the deal would provide jobs for 600 workers at Navantia 
for six years, and 300 jobs for the Spanish subsidiary of 
EADS aerospace firm for three years.  Pardo asserted again to 
Charge that the sale was important for Navantia's survival. 
He added that he would get Charge a transcript of the Senate 
proceedings so Charge could see exactly what Pardo said to 
the Commission.  Charge re-stated to Pardo that we failed to 
understand Spain's outreach to Chavez and said it would not 
be constructive for U.S.-Spain relations. 
 
7.  (C) In a March 16 conversation with Charge, the MFA's 
political director, Rafael Dezcallar, said Spain shares the 
USG's concerns about Chavez' destabilizing influence in the 
region.  Dezcallar assured Charge the GOS will work to curb 
potentially dangerous Venezuelan actions.  "Spain wants to be 
on the same side as the U.S. with respect to Venezuela," 
commented Dezcallar.  Specifically on the armaments sale, 
Dezcallar said the MFA has somewhat been at odds with the 
Defense Ministry on this issue and is trying to balance 
Navantia's needs with the impact the sale would have on 
Spain's relations with other countries, including the U.S. 
As such, the MFA is trying to pare back the sale a bit, 
though Dezcallar did not say in what way.  Dezcallar also 
said Spain would be very much interested in seeing any 
intelligence the U.S. has on Chavez' mischief in the region 
and would work with the U.S. to act on it. 
8.  (C) Comment:  Despite Pardo's assurances that none of the 
military equipment Spain plans to sell Chavez will be used 
for offensive purposes, Chavez can obviously use the 
equipment offensively if he chooses.  According to DAO 
Madrid, the oceanic patrol ships Pardo mentioned can displace 
anywhere from 1500 to 1600 tons (Spanish military sources 
told DAO the vessels will be similar to Spain,s Serviola 
class ships), are specifically designed to navigate the high 
seas and can be outfitted with 76 mm guns that can reach a 
target over 6 miles away. 
 
9.  (C) Comment continued:  Regardless of Chavez's true 
intentions, the Spanish government's approach with us on its 
policies toward Venezuela is either naive or disingenuous or 
both.  Embassy Madrid's concerns are twofold -- the effect of 
Spain's actions on our Venezuela/regional polices, and their 
effect on the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and 
Spain.  We have told the Spanish government over and over 
again that if it truly wants to improve bilateral relations 
with us (which senior GOS officials continually tell us), 
Spain's high-level outreach to Chavez (as well as to Castro), 
which is neither understood nor welcomed by Washington, is 
not the way to go about it. 
 
MANZANARES