US embassy cable - 05PARIS1765

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, PTER, FR, UNSC 
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS ON LARSEN VISIT, LEBANON NEXT 
STEPS 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 816 (EXDIS) 
     B. BEIRUT 805 (EXDIS) 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  MFA and Elysee officials are stressing the 
need for continued insistence on a full Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon before elections, in the wake of UN Special 
Envoy Larsen's meetings in Beirut and Aleppo.  The GoF views 
a four to six-month Syrian withdrawal as too long.  According 
to Chirac's Middle East advisor, Larsen expressed worry to 
the GoF that Syria may seek to sow inter-communal violence by 
targetting Lebanon's pro-Syria camp, including a possible 
Nasrallah assassination.  Larsen also expressed a preference 
for delaying release of the Fitzgerald report, and criticized 
the Lebanese opposition for not being more pragmatic on the 
need for a new government.  French officials agree with 
Larsen that continued delays in forming a new Lebanese 
government could delay elections and full Syrian withdrawal, 
and view the "dump Lahoud" demands of the opposition as 
counter-productive.  French officials continue to commend 
U.S.-GoF cooperation on Lebanon, but suggest that we may 
eventually part ways on the Hizballah issue or regime change 
in Syria.  MFA officials also report that the GoF has no 
enthusiasm for an international force in Lebanon, that the EU 
may soon send election observer trainers to Lebanon, and that 
FM Barnier may attend the March 22-23 Arab League summit, 
where he will avoid contact with Lebanese or Syrian 
officials.  End summary. 
 
LARSEN VISIT 
------------ 
 
2. (S) UN Special Envoy for UNSCR 1559 implementation Terje 
Roed-Larsen visited Paris March 14 and had a working lunch 
with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Maurice 
Gourdault-Montagne, MFA A/S-equivalent for Near East 
Jean-Francois Thibault, and MFA IO A/S-equivalent 
Jean-Maurice Ripert.  We received readouts on Larsen's visit 
from Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche March 
16 and from MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian 
Jouret March 15.  Jouret stressed that the GoF opted to 
receive Larsen with maximum discretion and not at the 
presidential or ministerial level to avoid feeding 
perceptions that Larsen is controlled by the GoF and USG. 
Jouret said the GoF was encouraged by Larsen's meeting with 
Bashar and cautiously optimistic that Bashar would follow 
through on his commitments, but concluded that the lack of a 
timetable for full withdrawal was insufficient. Jouret 
described Larsen as optimistic (more so that the GoF) and 
determined, and convinced that Bashar understood the gravity 
of the current situation and the accusations against him on 
Hariri's assassination.  Both Jouret and Boche concurred that 
the four to six month full withdrawal suggested by Bashar to 
Larsen (ref b) was "too long." 
 
3. (S) According to Elysee Advisor Boche, Larsen stressed 
four additional points to the GoF: 1) the need for the 
international community to continue to insist upon a full 
(troops and security services) Syrian withdrawal before 
elections, to avoid giving the impression of being satisfied 
by Syrian steps so far; 2) worry that Syria may seek to sow 
inter-communal violence by assassinating a major figure in 
the loyalist camp, possibly Hizballah leader Nasrallah; 3) 
the need to delay release of the Fitzgerald report, to avoid 
the impression that it is linked to Larsen's visit; and 4) 
the need for the Lebanese opposition to be more realistic on 
the urgency of forming a new Lebanese government, without 
which full Syrian withdrawal and timely parliamentary 
elections would not be possible.  Boche stressed that the GoF 
shared the view that a forming a new GOL was imperative, and 
opined that a neutral, technical government might be a more 
feasible option than a national unity government, given GOL 
unwillingness to meet opposition demands to fire GOL security 
officials.  Boche added that the calls by some oppositionists 
for a Lahoud resignation were counterproductive, as Lahoud's 
dismissal would result in a further impasse that would serve 
Syrian interests. 
 
4.  (C) Jouret told us separately that FM Barnier, during a 
March 11 meeting with a visiting Lebanese opposition 
delegation led by Marwan Hamade, urged the group, to no 
avail, to show more flexibility in forming a national unity 
government with PM Karami.  Jouret described the delegation 
as unrealistic on its prospects for winning elections; the 
group expressed confidence that it could win at least 50 
percent of the vote if elections were free and fair.  Jouret 
also commented that the group did not appear to have a 
political plan beyond getting Syria out of Lebanon and 
clearing the GOL of pro-Syrian elements after their presumed 
electoral victory.  Jouret conceded that the massive March 14 
demonstration changed the dynamic in the opposition's favor 
since Barnier's March 11 meeting, and that the degree to 
which both camps could mobilize numbers in the street would 
affect the political jockeying now underway. 
PARTING OF WAYS OVER HIZBALLAH? 
--------- 
 
5. (C) Both Jouret and Boche commended GoF-U.S. cooperation 
on Lebanon and U.S. willingness to "listen to" French views; 
at the same time, they both speculated that our common 
approaches may diverge eventually over Hizballah, once full 
Syrian withdrawal is achieved.  Jouret described Hizballah 
dismantling as the real problem in UNSCR 1559 implementation, 
now that Bashar had already caved, in principle, to Larsen on 
full withdrawal.  Jouret asked rhetorically how we could 
achieve the dismantling of Hizballah, expressing doubt on the 
Lebanese army's capacity to do so.  He added that the 
Lebanese opposition, during their meeting with Barnier, 
stressed the view that Hizballah was a longterm internal 
question, not an international issue.  In the opposition 
view, dismantling of Hizballah could only come after 
Hizballah's full integration as a political player, and not 
the other way around, as previewed in UNSCR 1559.  The GoF, 
meanwhile, was trying to approach the Hizballah issue on a 
pragmatic basis, rather than an ideological one, which meant 
we should not expect a shift on EU Hizballah designation. 
Boche reiterated the latter point with us, and reiterated 
that the GoF wanted to avoid alienating Lebanon's majority 
Shi'a community, for which Hizballah remained the most 
credible political force.  Boche added that the GoF hoped 
that a Syrian withdrawal would make Hizballah realize there 
was no alternative to political integration, however he was 
not confident this was the case.  Syrian withdrawal would 
make Hizballah more dependent on Iran, whose intentions were 
unclear, though it had claimed to the GoF that it was playing 
a moderating influence on Hizballah in the current crisis. 
Boche opined that the Iranians had the tendency to see 
themselves as respected internationally only when they are 
perceived as dangerous. 
 
6. (S) Jouret and Boche also expressed concern on prospects 
for the fall of Bashar's regime, an outcome which the GoF was 
not deliberately seeking.  Jouret stressed the need for the 
U.S. and France to think about the implications of a  full 
Syrian withdrawal and whether it might result in Bashar's 
overthrow and replacement by a more hardline leader, a 
prospect which Boche viewed as entirely possible.  Boche 
described Bashar al-Asad as weak, lacking the experience and 
intelligence of his father, and losing control over the 
circle which surrounds him.  He cited Larsen's description of 
the Syrian leader's nervousness during the recent Aleppo 
meeting, and added that the fact that recent pro-SARG 
demonstrations in Damascus had rallied such low numbers -- in 
the 30,000 range -- showed that Bashar was being sabotaged by 
others within his security services, possibly his powerful 
brother-in-law, SMI Chief Asif Shawkat.  Jouret opined that 
he still viewed Bashar, despite all his weaknesses, as 
redeemable, but said the question remained whether the Syrian 
leader would rid himself of the circle around him, including 
the negative influence of FM Shara. 
 
NEXT STEPS: ARAB LEAGUE, UN, OBSERVERS 
-------- 
 
7. (C) On next steps, Jouret stressed that the GoF would 
continue to advise Larsen to issue a tough report in April, 
and would continue to seek maximum pressure from Arab 
governments on Syria for full withdrawal.  On the latter 
point, Jouret noted that next week's Arab League summit did 
not have Lebanon on the agenda, though the issue might be 
discussed in a smaller "group of seven" (NFI) within the 
gathering.  Jouret reported that FM Barnier was likely to 
attend the Arab League summit, at the invitation of Algeria, 
but that the French FM would studiously avoid any contact 
with Lebanese or Syrian officials.  On further UN action, 
Jouret said the MFA originally had been favorable to the idea 
of a PRST to follow the Larsen visit to Syria and Lebanon, 
but was overruled by the Elysee.  Jouret stressed that the 
GoF was entirely negative on the idea of an international 
force or expanded UNIFIL filling the void left by a Syrian 
withdrawal, and cited the French experience of losing troops 
in Lebanon in the 1980's as weighing heavily on GoF thinking. 
 On observers for the May elections, Jouret reported that the 
EU planned to send a small-sized team, to include two French 
nationals, to Lebanon to train Lebanese election observers in 
advance of the ballot and would not seek GoL permission to do 
so; the GoF was also intent on participating in an 
international observer mission, once the GoL relents on the 
issue.   Boche, meanwhile, stressed to us that the real 
determinant to whether elections would be free and fair was 
whether or not Syrian troops and security services fully 
withdrew prior to the ballot. 
Leach