US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1153

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHEN COMMENTS ON ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
 
REF: TAIPEI 1085 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: President Chen Shui-bian used a March 16 
speech to an overseas Taiwanese group to make his first 
public comments on the Anti-Secession Law since its passage 
on March 14.  Declaring the PRC legislation an "invasion 
law," Chen provided a six point position that highlighted 
Taiwan objections and international criticism of the PRC 
legislation.  Like Taiwan's initial official statement on 
March 14, Chen's speech used often emotional language to 
criticize Beijing's recent legislative moves.  Presidential 
aides stress, however, that while Chen used "strong" language 
in his speech, he did not commit to specific retaliatory 
measures or state his intentions over attending the March 26 
mass protest.  The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) contacted 
AIT on March 16 to warn that if the USG does not take a 
harder public line on Beijing, the Chen administration may be 
unable to resist pressure for stronger actions.  However, the 
Taiwan National Security Council (NSC) has advised AIT to 
ignore such appeals, stating that only NSC Secretary General 
Chiou I-jen is authorized to request formal USG actions.  End 
Summary. 
 
Chen's Six Points 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) President Chen Shui-bian offered his first public 
comments on the PRC's enactment of the Anti-Secession Law 
during a March 16 speech to an overseas Taiwanese group. 
Chen used emotional language in his remarks, characterizing 
the PRC legislation as an "invasion law" that would serve to 
"setback human civilization."  Nevertheless, the six part 
speech, which was provided to AIT by the Presidential Office 
shortly before delivery, offered little in terms of 
substance.  Chen reiterated recent calls for the EU to 
reconsider its plan to lift the arms embargo against Beijing 
and restated his "three stage theory" (the "ROC" is a 
sovereign, independent country belonging to the 23 million 
people of Taiwan, any change in the "ROC's" sovereignty 
requires the approval of the Taiwan people). 
 
3. (C) Presidential Office Secretary Liu Shih-chung told AIT 
that the only substantive difference between Chen's March 12 
address to a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) meeting 
(Reftel) and his March 16 speech was the addition of the line 
"2,000 or so Chinese National People's Assembly Members 
cannot determine the fate of the 23 million people of Taiwan, 
only the great people of Taiwan can determine Taiwan's future 
of freedom, democracy, and peace."  Liu noted that while Chen 
reiterated his March 12 call for a mass rally on March 26, he 
did not explicitly state whether or not he would participate. 
 
4. (C) National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor Lin 
Jin-chang contacted AIT at the President's request to 
emphasize that Chen's speech intentionally left the door open 
to continued economic and political dialogue with the 
Mainland.  Lin noted that Chen re-emphasized that there has 
been no change in his policy of "compromise without retreat, 
firmness without confrontation" (Note: this is a euphemism 
Chen uses to describe his recent cross-Strait opening 
measures.)  Lin told AIT that the speech (which he and Liu 
co-drafted) was crafted to stay within the boundaries Taipei 
had set for Chen's public line.  The Presidential Office's 
Liu told AIT that Chen does not plan to go beyond the 
language used on March 16 in public before Secretary Rice's 
upcoming meetings in Beijing in order to avoid "complicating" 
her visit. 
 
MAC Panics 
---------- 
 
5. (C) While the NSC's Lin expressed appreciation to the USG 
over its recent public commentary on the Anti-Secession Law, 
MAC Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng contacted AIT on March 16 
to convey MAC Chair Joseph Wu's "deep concerns" over the 
"weak U.S. public response."  Jan said that Wu is worried 
about media and opposition characterizations that the USG 
statements did not contain any "substantive measures" in 
response to Beijing's legislative moves.  When pressed on 
what Wu expected, Jan said that the MAC Chief hoped the USG 
would state that elements of the Anti-Secession Law 
challenged the Taiwan Relations Act or reiterate former EAP 
A/S Kelly's April, 2004 formulation that the USG supports the 
status quo "as we (the USG) define it." 
6. (C) When asked for his personal assessment of reaction to 
recent USG commentary, Jan acknowledged that the USG line is 
about where he would expect it to be.  Jan added, however, 
that the media and governments on both sides of the Strait 
will always over-analyze USG statements, thus the cautious 
language employed by the State Department and White House 
spokesmen came as a disappointment to some in Taiwan.  Jan 
said that reporters and opposition politicians have been 
peppering Wu and Premier Frank Hsieh with questions about why 
Taiwan keeps stating that it will follow the USG public line 
when the USG's line is "so weak."  Wu, Jan added, feels that 
Hsieh has been repeatedly forced to back away from public 
comments about constitutional revision, referenda, and the 
cross-Strait status quo for the sake of maintaining this 
united front with the USG (Comment: AIT has on one occasion 
directly suggested the Premier clarify his public comments, 
but we suspect that the NSC has done so on its own several 
times as well.  End Comment.) 
 
7. (C) When AIT raised MAC concerns with the NSC's Lin, Lin 
replied that there is no government policy to request any 
further specific actions from Washington.  Lin added that if 
there is such a request, it would come from NSC Secretary 
General Chiou I-jen.  Lin emphasized that neither he, nor 
anyone else in the Taiwan government other than Chiou, is 
authorized to speak on the President's behalf on the subject. 
 
Comment: Good Cop, Bad Cop, Worse Cop 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Chen spoke March 16 in the emotional rhetoric he has 
often used with overseas Taiwanese groups.  Nonetheless, 
Chen's statement remained within the bounds of the NSC's 
guidelines on how the President will speak in public on the 
Anti-Secession Law.  There is a clear division of labor 
emerging within the government.  The DPP party apparatus and 
legislative caucus is taking the most assertive line, warning 
of (but not initiating) referenda and possible legislative 
countermeasures.  The MAC is taking a similarly vocal stance, 
but placing its statements within the broad framework of the 
government's "ROC" policy pledges.  NSC officials say Chen is 
playing the moderating role, and point to the March 16 
statement as an example.  Regardless of who is speaking, 
however, the overall tone from the government and ruling 
party continues to be sharp and negative, clearly calibrated 
to appeal to the President's Pan-Green base rather than 
broader domestic and international audiences. 
PAAL