US embassy cable - 05SANAA602

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/15/2010 
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PTER, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: TURNING SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: YEMEN'S CHIEF OF 
STAFF RECEIVES HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON SA/LW 
 
REF: A. A) SANAA 580 
     B. B) SANAA 564 
     C. C) STATE 39726 
 
Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
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Summary: 
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1. (S) During a 3/15 meeting with General Gassemi, Chief of 
Staff of the armed forces of Yemen, DCM, DATT and OMC 
presented Gassemi with recently released photos and serial 
numbers of the weapons found on two of the Jedda Consulate 
attackers in December. DCM briefed Gassemi on the 
conversations the Ambassador and DCM had earlier in the week 
with President Saleh on the urgency of stemming the flow of 
illegal weapons in and out of Yemen. Gassemi confirmed to DCM 
that he had received his instructions from President Saleh 
and that he wanted to cooperate fully with us to end this 
chapter of Yemen's history and open a new page of cooperation 
with the USG in the GWOT. Gassemi asked for any copies of any 
MOD End User Certificates (EUCs) so he could track recycled, 
forged and new ones being issued (presumably without his 
knowledge). We also talked to Gassemi about the inauguration 
of a Civil Affairs project in Saada, the DATT's credentials 
and the use of 05 FMF allocations. End Summary. 
 
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This practice cannot continue: 
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2. DCM reiterated to General Gassemi what the Foreign 
Minister and President Saleh have already heard: There is 
concern at the highest levels in Washington that officially 
ordered weapons (SA/LW) are ending up in the hands of 
terrorists and that the U.S. is prepared to take unilateral 
steps to stop this practice. DCM said that this concern is 
not new, but is being reinforced with new information and a 
new sense of urgency that Yemen could not be allowed to 
continue being an arms bazaar for the region. "You have 
always put us off in the past," said the DCM, "by asking for 
information on specifics. We are now ready to share 
intelligence with you to prove that our fears are well 
founded." DCM also advised Qassemi of President Saleh's 
suggestion to buy back and dispose of weapons from Yemeni 
souks with American and Saudi help. "This idea can only 
work," said the DCM, if it's part of a three-pronged approach 
to cut off the inflow of weapons at the source, introduce new 
controls on MOD stocks and finally outlaw weapons bazaars and 
collect excess weapons from the streets." 
 
3. Gassemi then looked at the photos of the two weapons from 
the Jedda attack and their serial numbers and passed them to 
an aid. He then called for a copy of the orders he had just 
received from President Saleh. DCM viewed the instructions 
and verified that they were indeed the same as the letter 
Saleh had given us the day before. Gassemi then said that he 
and his colleagues realize the damage this practice is doing 
to the reputation of Yemen and the ever increasing risks of 
acts of terrorism in the region and inside Yemen. "We are 
convinced and we want to change this situation." Gassemi 
asked about the arms dealers who are presenting these MOD 
EUCs and shook his head in sarcasm when told it was mainly 
Faris al-Manna' and two or three more arms dealers. He then 
asked us for copies of any such documents that we can lay our 
hands on so that he could track and find out what percentage 
were recycled from old orders, how many were forgeries and 
how many were still being issued without his knowledge. DCM 
replied that we would do our best to supply him with the 
information he needs. "As long as there is transparency 
between us and an agreement on principles", said the DCM, "we 
can work out the details and help one another stamp out this 
practice and turn a new page in our relationship." 
 
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Other items on the agenda: 
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4.  Other topics of conversation included the credentialing 
of the DATT, which has thus far been held up by the ROYG on 
the pretext of not having received our paper work. Upon 
further probing, it turned out that MOD is smarting from a 
perception that we had deliberately held up their previous 
DATT in Washington for six months without proper 
credentialing. DCM assured Gassemi that the visa problem of 
last year would be avoided with their new DATT (yet to come 
forward with a visa request) by ensuring that he received the 
right visa from the beginning. On the Saada trip, we assured 
Gassemi - who had balked at the high level delegation we 
planned to send to inaugurate a military CA built school - 
that the we intended the trip to symbolize a return to 
normalcy in the north and to offer further assistance in 
reconstruction efforts after last summer's fighting in that 
region. 
 
5. On use of FMF funds, we were able to clear up ongoing 
confusion at MOD on previous year funds, orders for the use 
of which have already been placed with DOD, and FY 05 money 
($14.9) for which we needed ideas and priorities. The DATT 
and OMC Chief agreed to set up a working level meeting in the 
near future in which to detail, for the record, what has 
already been requested with a projected timeline for 
execution and to discuss how to implement the priorities of 
MOD - to whit, equipping and training five new special forces 
battalions and border patrols and forces. 
 
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Comment: 
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6. We sense a new found will at the highest levels of the 
ROYG to change years of old and bad habits where it concerns 
the arms trade. Even at MOD, where much of the corruption has 
hitherto centered, there seems to be a realization that they 
cannot continue with business as usual. Having witnessed 
false starts before, we are not yet ready to cash in our 
well-founded skepticism only to replace it with false 
expectations. The challenge before Saleh and his MOD generals 
is to bite the bullets), wean themselves and their supporters 
away from what has thus far been a lucrative business and 
quickly adapt to a new culture and a new way of doing this 
when it comes to weapons procurement and weapon controls. We 
are convinced that our willingness to stop the recent Serbian 
sale has much to do with this new-found resolve in Yemen. We 
should now follow-up with other European vendors and ask 
their help in keeping Saleh honest. The pressure has to 
remain if this new political will is to survive; a will that 
is, after all supported by a liberal minority within the ROYG 
on principle. Unfortunately, this minority has not so far 
been able to press their point home to the real decision 
makers in their government. Perhaps this situation can now 
change, with a little help from their friends. End comment. 
Krajeski