US embassy cable - 05DUBLIN321

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KAWC, KPAO, ETTC, PTER, KPAL, EUN, ICTY 
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHES ON MARCH 16 GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 39909 
     B. STATE 44531 
     C. STATE 44309 
     D. STATE 44486 
     E. DUBLIN 254 
     F. STATE 34900 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
1.  (U) On March 11, post delivered ref A demarche to Gerard 
Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU Correspondent. 
On March 14, post followed up with Keown on points in refs B, 
C, and D on China, Croatia, and Iran. 
 
China: Increased U.S-EU Dialogue Useful 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) EU Special Representative Gianella's March 14-15 
visit to Washington will help to promote useful U.S.-EU 
dialogue on the China arms embargo, observed Keown.  He 
stressed that the EU had not yet taken a decision on the 
embargo and that Gianella sought to explain, not negotiate, 
the criterion for a decision, particularly in the context of 
the Code of Conduct.  He noted that the Code of Conduct had 
been reinforced to include references to the interests of 
friendly nations and to the Asian military balance. 
Reiterating GOI views expressed previously, Keown observed 
that the EU's aim in considering the lifting of the embargo 
was not to increase arms sales to China.  Rather, a number of 
Member States regarded the embargo as an instrument that did 
not serve the EU's best interests in its overall relationship 
with China.  Keown said that the Member States understood the 
strength of feeling with which the U.S. Executive Branch and 
Congress viewed the embargo issue.  He added that the EU 
looked forward to reactions to Gianella's presentations in 
Washington and also to the outcome of Secretary Rice's March 
20-21 visit to China. 
 
3.  (C) Regarding Ireland's national views, Keown noted that 
the GOI espoused the position that EU interests in China were 
not best served by the embargo.  The GOI, moreover, would not 
stand in the way of an EU consensus to lift the embargo, 
though Ireland had nothing to gain from such a decision, 
since it neither produced nor traded arms.  (Note: Ireland is 
seeking to expand trade and investment relations with China 
and would benefit from closer EU-Chinese ties, though it does 
not sell arms.)  By the same token, Ireland hoped that the 
embargo would not become a serious trans-Atlantic row and 
that both sides would take advantage of every opportunity for 
dialogue in resolving differences on the issue.  In 
particular, Ireland favored President Bush's suggestion 
during his European trip for a strategic dialogue covering 
U.S. policy on China and the Pacific region's military 
balance.  Regarding the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing, Keown noted that ref C talking points appeared to 
focus on the Member States that would host the visit.  He 
believed, however, that Li's visit would flesh out objectives 
on human rights and security that the United States and the 
EU shared. 
 
Croatia: Zagreb Should Reflect on Likely Disappointment 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  (C) Ireland anticipates that the March 16 GAERC will 
decide to postpone the start of EU accession talks for 
Croatia, said Keown.  He noted that Ireland had originally 
hoped that accession talks would begin March 17, in line with 
the EU decision last December.  The GOI acknowledged, 
however, that the failure to apprehend Ante Gotovina did not 
leave a basis for affirming Croatia's full cooperation with 
the ICTY, the condition for beginning the talks.  Keown 
expressed Ireland's hope that the GAERC's decision to 
postpone would be couched in firm but positive terms and 
would give Croatia cause for serious reflection on its record 
of cooperation with the ICTY.  He added that Ireland welcomed 
the recent voluntary transfer of Kosovo Prime Minister 
Haradinaj to The Hague as a sign of progress on regional 
cooperation with the ICTY. 
 
EU-3 Diplomacy and Iran: A Welcome USG Gesture 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5.  (C) Europe welcomes the USG decision to drop its 
opposition to Iran's application to the WTO and to consider, 
on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts for 
Iranian civilian aircraft, said Keown.  In February 
discussions with President Bush in Brussels, EU leaders had 
pressed for USG support of EU diplomacy with Iran.  The 
economic platform of the Iran-EU 3 talks had identified 
Iran's interest in the WTO and aircraft parts, and President 
Bush's positive gesture would hopefully demonstrate for 
Tehran the value of the negotiations in pursuing these 
objectives, Keown observed.  He noted that Ireland had no 
particular national position on Iran beyond finding a 
diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, a goal shared by 
all Member States. 
Human Rights: EU Will Co-table Belarus Resolution 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
6.  (C) The March 16 GAERC discussion will develop EU 
priorities for the UN Commission on Human Rights, said Keown. 
 He remarked that the EU intends to co-table the Belarus 
resolution, a measure supported by Ireland. 
 
The Middle East Peace Process/Hizballah 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The March 1 London meeting with the Palestinian 
Authority was positive and highlighted years of EU assistance 
to the Palestinian community, said Keown.  The Member States 
hoped that Mahmoud Abbas would be able to carry out the 
security, infrastructure, and administrative reforms 
discussed in the meeting and thereby secure buy-in for his 
program from ever larger portions of the Palestinian 
population.  Israel's February 21 release of 500 Palestinian 
prisoners would help Abbas to demonstrate continuing change 
on the ground, observed Keown.  He noted that the EU welcomed 
U.S. support for Abbas and looked forward to USG efforts to 
move Israelis and Palestinians ahead in the peace process. 
 
8.  (C) Keown reiterated the GOI's ref E request for written 
copies of USG materials presented in ref F demarche on 
Hizballah's designation.  He also repeated that it was 
important for the USG, in pursuing Hizballah's designation, 
to address the question: why now.  Keown noted that the 
situation in Lebanon, where Hizballah held Parliamentary 
seats, had become fragile and that this should be a factor to 
consider in the U.S. push for designation.  Given the size of 
public demonstrations in Beirut, there remained the 
possibility of destabilization and a resort to communal 
violence.  Keown commented that Ireland would support a 
likely GAERC conclusion condemning the murder of Prime 
Minster Hariri and calling on all sides in Lebanon to show 
restraint.  He added that the EU also supported UN Envoy 
Roed-Larsen's efforts to clarify the Syrian time table for 
withdrawal. 
 
Sudan: Ireland Favors Referral to ICC 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The EU continues to fund and provide logistical 
support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 
remarked Keown.  The Commission, and Member States 
bilaterally, were focused on a variety of hygiene/medical 
problems facing the Darfur refugees and appreciated the 
opportunity to coordinate with the United States on these 
issues.  The EU maintained its position, however, that human 
rights abuses in Darfur should be referred to the ICC, which 
had been established precisely to deal with such cases, said 
Keown.  He recalled that Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern 
had voiced Irish support for the ICC's role in Darfur during 
discussions with UNSYG Annan in New York on February 6.  He 
also noted that the U.S. draft UNSC resolution on Sudan did 
not clearly address the question of accountability. 
 
Russia/Moldova: An Increasing EU Concern 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) There were no substantive differences in U.S. and EU 
perspectives on Russia/Moldova/Transnistria, which was 
becoming a significant EU concern, observed Keown.  He 
remarked that the new Ukrainian Government was playing a 
constructive role in the Transnistrian issue by improving 
border control.  The EU was also about to appoint a new 
Special Representative to Moldova, who was likely to be a 
Dutch national.  In Ireland's view, said Keown, a major 
difficulty in resolving the Transnistrian conflict was 
convincing the Russian Government that the EU could make a 
positive contribution to ongoing diplomacy.  The outcome of 
events in the Ukraine, however, had made the Russian 
Government suspicious of EU efforts and had reinforced the 
Russian view that Transnistria was a "diplomatic game of 
winners and losers."  Keown conveyed the Irish view that a 
resolution for Transnistria would need to take account of 
Moldovan sovereignty, appropriate protections for 
Russian-speakers, and the need for Russian troop withdrawals. 
 
Russia/Georgia: Disappointment on BMO 
------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Ireland shares the EU's disappointment that the 
OSCE's Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) is finished, said 
Keown.  He explained that this development, as with Moldova, 
was symptomatic of Russian reluctance to countenance a 
diplomatic role for Western Europeans "east of Vienna."  The 
EU was concerned about the tightening of pressure on Georgia 
and would consider ways to engage on the border question. 
Keown agreed with U.S. talking points that there remained a 
role for the OSCE to train Georgian border guards inside 
Georgia.  He noted that Germany was also conducting such 
training on a bilateral basis. 
BENTON