US embassy cable - 05QUITO590

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OFFICIAL INFORMAL 
 
WHA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGER NORIEGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SNAR, PTER, EC, CO, KICC 
SUBJECT: OPENING ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 98 FRONTS 
 
REF: 04 QUITO 3028 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) DEAL REMAINS FAR OFF:  With Guinea-Bissau's February 
2 signing, 99 countries have reached Article 98 agreements 
with the United States.  Regrettably, we doubt it's Ecuador 
that cracks the century mark.  Despite our numerous and 
varied overtures, the GoE continues to consider Article 98's 
political costs greater than its material benefits.  Since 
our last update in December (Reftel), Ecuador's Congress has 
refused to consider the issue in serious committee or plenary 
debate.  Media requested and received our Article 98 and ICC 
fact sheets, yet maintained their negative and inflammatory 
tone in the few stories surfacing since.  The Foreign 
Ministry continues to dodge our calls.  And President 
Gutierrez talks a good game but shows no willingness to risk 
his mandate over the issue. 
 
2.  (C) ASPA PAIN REAL:  American Servicemember Protection 
Act sanctions have begun to hit hard.   Especially impacted 
is "soft" assistance, where we and Ecuador most feel ASPA's 
bite.  The International Military Education and Training 
program (IMET), for example, represents perhaps the most 
cost-effective manner to influence Ecuador's armed forces. 
ASPA mandated we suspend IMET in Ecuador, and while Milgroup 
has utilized other training programs to maintain outreach, 
theirs is at best a stop-gap alternative.  We are concerned 
that other nations, especially China, have rushed to fill the 
gap. 
 
3.  (C) BUT SO IS THE PRESIDENT'S:  Strife between Gutierrez 
and the opposition continues at a fever pitch, limiting the 
GoE's room to maneuver on Article 98.  The president gained 
the upper hand in November, fighting off an impeachment 
attempt and initiating an impressive counterattack.  Yet his 
majority remains wafer-thin and his focus self-preservation; 
little of substance is occurring now in Ecuador, save the 
ongoing debate on restoring legitimacy to its highest courts. 
 Gutierrez agreeing to serious Article 98 negotiations would 
present his enemies a potent weapon to use against him in the 
battle for public opinion. 
 
4.  (C) ANOTHER EMBASSY TACK CHANGE COMING:  We center our 
hopes on two recent developments.  First, formal announcement 
of Nethercutt Amendment sanctions would propel Article 98 
back into headlines, for better or worse (and we can't do 
worse than not talking at all).  USAID programs here are well 
received, and imminent cutbacks might spur the GoE to 
reconsider their "ignore them, they'll go away" strategies. 
They might also spawn sanctions blowback, however, as we're 
using the same big stick to spur movement on TIP.  We 
understand that Nethercutt guidance, currently under 
deliberation in Washington, might soon be released to posts, 
and will await its arrival before proceeding. 
 
5.  (C) Ecuador's naming of former Finance Minister Mauricio 
Pozo to head its DC embassy was a positive development.  We 
enjoy excellent relations with the pragmatic, intelligent 
Pozo; he in turn has access to Gutierrez and is well known in 
Washington.  At lunch March 8, I pressed the 
ambassador-designate for movement on Article 98.  While we 
understood the political risks that visible Quito 
negotiations entailed, I told him, we encouraged that he 
engage early with key DoS and DoD interlocutors in the United 
States, to determine what sort of text might mutually 
satisfy.  Assuming successful agrement, we are seeking Miami 
consultations for Pozo at Southcom HQ.  I have suggested to 
Ecuador's military leaders that they concurrently lobby their 
newest envoy for movement on Article 98. 
 
6.  (C) AND HOW YOU MIGHT HELP OUT:  Another option to throw 
out for your consideration:  Secretary Powell, in Quito last 
June for the OAS General Assembly, discussed Article 98 with 
President Gutierrez.  The Secretary referenced his earlier 
correspondence, which the Ecuadorian leader had not yet 
answered.  Gutierrez told Powell a response was in the works; 
first, however, he was seeking a Congressional opinion on the 
legality and appropriateness of Article 98 negotiations. 
Congress has refused to give its opinion, preferring to let 
Gutierrez shoulder all the political risk.  A follow-up piece 
from Secretary Rice to President Gutierrez, making reference 
to the "unanswered Article 98 mail," might spark the GoE to 
re-engage.  Any such letter should of course cover other 
components of the bilateral relationship with Ecuador, both 
positive and negative. 
 
7.  (C) A "deliverable" or two also might help in the fight 
for 98.  Coming first to mind is the extradition/deportation 
portfolio where, despite some recent progress, we've seen 
none of the "corruptos" sent back (we will provide a summary 
of cases and statuses Septel).  I realize they are complex 
undertakings and understand that our legal system provides 
detainees necessary protections.  But watching a crook like 
Padre Carlos Flores, suspected of embezzling perhaps $10 
million, extend his stay at Krome to fifteen months by 
switching attorneys incessantly (and now requesting asylum) 
both riles me and damages the bilateral relationship.  We 
argue that a interagency full- (or fuller) court press on 
deportations is vital. 
 
8.  (C) You might help us with Pozo as well.  Agrement is 
going slow, mostly for bureaucratic reasons.  This would 
present no problems except that media allege we are stalling, 
reasoning we "have something" on the capable official.  We 
expect the Pozo request to reach the White House by March 18, 
and would much oblige your intercession on his behalf. 
 
9.  (C) Last up, and hardest to tackle in this time of 
competing priorities, are the imminent cutbacks in 
Ecuador-bound USG assistance, especially from the Andean 
Counter-drug Initiative (ACI) account.  We depend heavily on 
ACI to fund Embassy activities on Ecuador's northern border, 
imperative if we hope to prevent Colombian conflict 
spillover's destabilizing effects.  NAS sees its counter-drug 
funding nearly halved in out-years, for example.  Ecuadorian 
media, perhaps tipped off by the GoE's Washington embassy 
regarding USG budget requests, have already talked of the 
coming assistance drop-off, "proof" that Washington's only 
Andean cares lie in Colombia.  A re-look at Ecuador aid might 
tone down their vitriol. 
 
10.  (C) FINAL WORDS:  Any and all elements of our action 
plan might kick-start stalled Article 98 talks.  But our 
bottom line?  We'll keep pushing, but prospects are limited 
until Gutierrez gets closer to the end of his term (January 
2007).  Ecuador's constitution prohibits sitting presidents 
from running for re-election, and a lame-duck Gutierrez just 
might be amenable to inking an accord. 
KENNEY