US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1482

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/TRA/OTP - DHAYWOOD AND EUR/SE 
ROME FOR ICE ROBERT STIRITI 
PARIS FOR TSA 
DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT, ECON, ETRD, PREL, PTER, PARM, TU 
SUBJECT:  SUSTAINING TURKISH COOPERATION IN MARITIME 
SECURITY 
 
REF:  State 38874 
 
1. (U) Reftel requested Embassy input on building 
international support for an improved global maritime 
security framework, an objective of the December 2004 
Presidential Directive on Maritime Security Policy. 
The Embassy and USG agencies work closely with the GOT 
on maritime security programs, including:  inclusion 
of the port of Izmir in the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI); and a U.S. Coast Guard's 
International Port Security Program (IPSP).  Several 
private companies also participate in the Customs 
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which 
does not involve the GOT. 
 
2. (SBU) We generally enjoy good cooperation with the 
GOT on maritime security, based on a shared experience 
of terrorism and the common objective of protecting 
citizens, property and sensitive infrastructure.  That 
said, Embassy has several observations on the Turkish 
approach to these issues: 
 
-- Preference for Formal Agreements:  The GOT often 
demonstrates a cautious and meticulous approach to 
security cooperation.  For example, the GOT believes 
it needs the approval of the Council of Ministers and 
perhaps Parliament for a CSI agreement, rather than a 
simpler Declaration of Principles.  On export 
controls, the bilateral umbrella agreement has been 
the subject of over two years of meticulous 
negotiation with numerous exchanges of text. 
 
-- Sovereignty Sensitivity:  The Turks are very 
sensitive about preserving their sovereign 
prerogatives and suspicious of foreign governments 
getting too involved in government processes.  For 
example, the presence of U.S. officials at port 
facilities was one of the Turks' major concerns about 
CSI, delaying GOT agreement to join the program. 
Similarly, there was considerable bureaucratic 
resistance to Turkey's endorsement of PSI due to 
concerns about the sovereign rights of vessels on the 
high seas. 
 
-- Bias Against a Private Sector Role:  The GOT 
rejected "Operation Safe Commerce", in part because of 
private contractor involvement.  One of the first 
questions the Turks raised in connection with CSI was 
whether the U.S. intended to station private 
contractors or U.S. customs officers in Turkish ports. 
 
-- Patchy Interagency Coordination:  The GOT's 
interagency process is often subject to gaps in 
communication and stovepiping that delay 
decisionmaking.  Although the key implementing 
agencies are the Maritime Administration and the 
Customs Undersecretariat, keeping MFA in the loop 
helps the Turks to keep their process on track. 
 
-- Cost and Competitiveness:  Although GOT 
interlocutors do not stress funding as a barrier to 
implementing maritime security programs, we understand 
that some Turkish companies are concerned that 
programs like CSI will impose costs on their exports 
that could hurt their competitiveness.  The Embassy 
has made the argument that CSI should enhance, rather 
than harm competitiveness for Turkish companies, but 
this is a concern that may continue to arise in the 
context of CSI's development, as well as with new 
programs and initiatives. 
 
3. (SBU) At Embassy Ankara, the Economic Section has 
the lead on maritime security issues and chairs 
coordinating meetings on an ad hoc basis with other 
interested sections and agencies at post.  These 
include the Pol-Mil and Consular sections, as well as 
Defense Attache Office, the Trade and Development 
Agency, Commerce, and the Office of Defense 
Cooperation.  ECON is the focal point for 
communicating with DHS offices related to transport 
with regional responsibilities for Turkey (ICE Attache 
Rome, Coast Guard Liaison Rotterdam, TSA 
Representative Paris).  Post's Mission Program Plan 
addresses maritime security goals in the paper on 
Prevention and Response to Terrorism. 
 
Edelman