US embassy cable - 05PARIS1716

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GOF CONTINUES TO ADVISE IRAN AGAINST INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI POLITICS

Identifier: 05PARIS1716
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS1716 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-03-15 14:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL ASEC IZ IR FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, IZ, IR, FR 
SUBJECT: GOF CONTINUES TO ADVISE IRAN AGAINST INTERFERENCE 
IN IRAQI POLITICS 
 
REF: STATE 41597 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) We discussed reftel points on Iranian interference in 
Iraq with MFA Iraq desk officer Renaud Salins March 11. 
Salins confirmed to us that the GoF continued to regularly 
remind Iran of its responsibilities of non-interference in 
Iraq and the need for Iran to play a constructive role as 
Iraq's neighbor.  Salins affirmed the GoF view that Iran has 
the greatest nuisance capacity of any of Iraq's neighbors, 
but concluded that the Iranian government had shown restraint 
and "could have done much more" to cause problems in Iraq. 
That said, the GoF had no problems raising the 
non-interference issue with the Iranian government, and would 
continue to do so. 
 
2. (C) Salins observed that additional factors, such as 
Iranian government connections to many of the Iraqi Shi'a 
"List 169" political leaders and ties between Iranian and 
Iraqi Shi'a clergy, would make it difficult to limit Iranian 
influence over the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). 
Salins commented that during his earlier diplomatic posting 
in Tehran in the mid 1990's, he recalled that Dawa leader 
Ibrahim Ja'fari was active in soliciting support from 
Tehran-based diplomats for a local NGO to assist Iraqi 
refugees in Iran -- an activity presumably backed by the 
Iranian government.  Salins recalled meeting Ja'fari's 
Canadian-born wife in Tehran at an event organized by the 
NGO, and was suprised to find that she would not shake his 
hand, presumably due to strict religious beliefs.  Salins 
also cited the ties between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a clergy as 
another "vector of influence" for Iran over Iraqi affairs. 
He noted that during the recent out-of-country voting (OCV) 
for Iran-based Iraqis, the highest vote totals -- some 15,000 
-- were among Iraqis based in Qom.  He speculated that this 
15,000 figure, some 5 percent of Qom's estimated population, 
represented in large part Iran-based Iraqi Shi'a clergy, 
since Qom had no notable industry or commercial activity 
apart from serving as Iran's theocratic base.  Salins added 
that the January 2005 OCV election data provided the first 
concrete basis on which to estimate the number of Iraqi Shi'a 
clergy still residing in Iran. 
 
3. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
Leach 

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