US embassy cable - 05CARACAS759

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION IN CARABOBO STATE 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(d 
) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Movimiento Quinta Republica's (MVR) Carabobo State 
coordinator Luis Medina told poloff the selection of MVR 
candidates by the people is a sign the Bolivarian Revolution 
has evolved and is becoming more democratic.  By 2007 
President Hugo Chavez's supporters would unite under the MVR 
party, he said, or become a "new opposition" that understood 
and supported the Revolution but not Chavez himself.  Medina 
scorned Carabobo Governor Acosta and said his recent official 
entry into the MVR was a sign the retired General would learn 
to play by "the rules."  Former Governor Henrique Salas 
Roemer also criticized the Governor citing alleged lack of 
popular support and disputes within the regional MVR 
leadership.  Independant Mayor Francisco Cabrera disapproved 
of Acosta for his inability to control land invasions and 
disrespect for private property.  Separately, a Bolivarian 
Circle member denied the Circles had political party 
affiliations, and defended the "unbiased" judicial system and 
Chavez's take on the FARC and "new socialism."  End Summary. 
 
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The Revolution Evolution: Next Steps 
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2. (C) Luis Felipe Medina, Movimiento Quinta Republica's 
(MVR) regional coordinator in Carabobo State told Poloff 
March 3 that Venezuela's revolution had evolved and it was 
now time for the "democratization" of the political party. 
He said the registration drive for the MVR that ended March 6 
was the first step in increasing membership and 
participation.  (Note: National Assembly President Nicolas 
Maduro told the media more than 1.5 million new members 
registered with the MVR by March 6.)  The next step is to 
allow MVR members to vote for candidates for the local 
council and parochial elections slated for August 7, said 
Medina.  He also predicted that supporters of President Hugo 
Chavez would win 90-95 percent of the local and parochial 
elections and about 70-75 percent of the National Assembly 
seats in the December elections. 
 
3. (C) Medina predicted that after the presidential elections 
of 2006 Chavez's supporters would consolidate into one party, 
the MVR.  Medina said the consolidation would help eliminate 
the "business of political parties" which led to corruption 
and a power struggle.  Leaders of political parties 
supporting Chavez, like Patria Para Todos and Podemos, would 
voluntarily unite when Chavez asked, forfeiting their power 
to remain part of the Revolution, Medina said.  Otherwise, 
Medina asserted, they could become the "new opposition" which 
the Revolution needed to survive and grow.  Medina said any 
future opposition that emerged would understand "the 
Revolution," would formerly have supported Chavez, and would 
work to bring changes within "the new structure" rather than 
to destroy it altogether as the former opposition wanted to 
do.  It would then be obvious that the Bolivarian Revolution 
was not about one man (Chavez) but about changing a system, 
he noted. 
 
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Regional Tension: MVR criticizes Governor Acosta 
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4. (C) Medina spoke disparagingly of Carabobo Governor Luis 
Felipe Acosta Carlez. He cited Acosta's lack of understanding 
of "the process," his incompetence, and lack of will and 
inability to stop land invasions in Carabobo.  Noting the 
tension between several MVR party leaders, including Medina 
and Acosta, poloff asked why then Acosta had registered 
officially as a member of the MVR party February 24.  Guacara 
municipality Mayor Jose Flores said that accepting Acosta 
into the MVR meant Acosta had moved into the MVR house and 
would now have to follow the "house rules" or leave.  Medina 
asserted that Acosta could become "opposition" if he decided 
to split with the MVR, continuing on his theme that any 
future opposition would come from within. 
 
5. (U) Separately, the criticism of Acosta became public when 
Argenis Loreto, mayor of Carabobo's Libertador municipality, 
also told the press that the Governor was hostage to 
Colombians, Arabs, and Dominicans who acted as his advisors 
and encouraged him to act against the Revolution for economic 
(primarily construction) interests.  Loreto, like Flores and 
Medina, asserted that upon joining the MVR as a military man, 
Acosta knew he would have to heed the party, respect the 
hierarchy, and take orders. 
 
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Salas Roemer: Watch Acosta Sink 
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6. (C) Former Carabobo Governor and founder of Proyecto 
Venezuela Henrique Salas Roemer told Poloff March 3 that 
Governor Acosta lacked popular support because it is commonly 
known that he had stolen the election.  Salas said internal 
disputes with the MVR party leadership, including personal 
problems with Francisco Ameliach, national coordinator for 
the MVR and former National Assembly President, hampered 
Acosta.  Salas claimed MVR leaders had instigated the land 
invasions to gain Acosta's cooperation, force compromises, 
and force him to grant the MVR some positions of power. 
 
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Rotten Politicians Are Nothing New in Venezuela 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7. (C) Francisco Cabrera, the independent mayor of Carabobo's 
capital Valencia told poloff March 3 Chavez's supporters had 
been able to steal some of his votes, but not the election 
because of his popularity and reputation for getting the job 
done.  He criticized Acosta for doing nothing to stop 
invasions of private or public land in Carabobo, noting there 
was little protection for private property.  Cabrera claimed 
to receive very little cooperation or funding from Acosta. 
He was making no effort to procure such funding or support, 
he said, because friends and advisors alike had counseled him 
to maintain his distance and keep his hands clean.  Cabrera 
said he responded to Acosta's accusation that the mayoralty 
did not donate land for construction of low-income housing by 
publishing a list of land Valencia had designated for public 
projects, housing, or volunteered to donate to the State. 
 
8. (C) Cabrera called Chavez increasingly dictatorial and 
said the GOV acted with complete impunity.  However, while 
his family and associates were increasingly nervous, he 
planned on working and "riding it out" just as he had every 
other government before in the past 25 years.  The ride would 
be long, he said, because he could foresee no way out of 
Chavez in the near future.  Opposition political parties were 
dead, Cabrera asserted, and were now fronts that sold their 
support for a price. 
 
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Bolivarian Circles 
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9. (C) Juan Jose Rodriguez Aguilar, member of a Bolivarian 
Circle in rural Carabobo and member of the Boston Group 
Carabobo, claimed that members of the Bolivarian Circles have 
no direct party affiliations.  They must "watch over" 
government and elected officials from every party, he told 
Poloff March 3.  (Note: Medina said Rodriguez is a Tupamaro, 
an extreme and sometimes violent group that supports Chavez. 
Rodriguez admitted he was part of a group that seized a rural 
mayor's office in Carabobo State two or three years ago, but 
he was not convicted of any wrongdoing.)  Rodriguez said his 
only option was to move forward with "the process."  He 
defended the judicial system saying those formerly in power 
were not used to being held responsible for their actions and 
so were calling it unbalanced power.  Rodriguez asserted that 
if political bias became apparent in the judicial system, 
then the people, including the Bolivarian Circles, would 
speak out. 
 
10. (C) Rodriguez also defended Chavez's decision not to 
declare the FARC a terrorist organization, saying it 
preserved his ability to act as a mediator.  Rodriguez told 
poloff that Chavez's "new socialism," which would combine the 
best of "old" capitalism and socialism, was not communism, 
but instead a new way to eliminate poverty.  He touted the 
Boston Group as a neutral place for Chavez supporters and 
opposition to dialog and begin building confidence in one 
another. 
 
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Comment 
 
11. (C) Medina depicted the Bolivarian Revolution as a 
fragile but unstoppable "process," a peaceful revolution. 
While admitting it had faults like appointed candidates or 
undemocratic courts, he saw the problems as growing pains 
that would be resolved as the revolution matured.  Medina's 
insistence on the need for a new opposition to grow from 
Chavismo acknowledged the fissures in Chavez's political 
movement. 
 
12. (C) The power struggles and inner-party backstabbing 
appear more evident in Carabobo than in Caracas where most 
politicians and players aligned with Chavez tout the party 
line.  There are reports that Acosta and the regional MVR 
leadership will meet to work out some of their differences. 
Medina's scorn for Acosta and attitude of "play by our rules 
or get out" make it unlikely any real compromises will be 
reached unless Acosta is willing to make some concessions and 
acknowledge regional party leaders.  The meeting could just 
be a definition of the MVR's "house rules" for the Governor. 
Brownfield