US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1085

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TAIWAN REACTS NEGATIVELY TO ANTI-SECESSION LAW

Identifier: 05TAIPEI1085
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI1085 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-03-14 10:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW Cross Strait Politics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN REACTS NEGATIVELY TO ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
 
REF: A. 3/12/05 AIT-EAP/TC E-MAIL 
 
     B. TAIPEI 773 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Taiwan issued a strong formal reaction to the 
PRC National People's Congress (NPC) March 14 passage of the 
Anti-Secession Law.  Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman 
Joseph Wu, speaking for the government, condemned the PRC 
move as "provocative" and in violation of the will of the 
Taiwan people and international community.  Taiwan officials 
dismissed late revisions made to the final text as 
insufficient and insincere.  President Chen Shui-bian did not 
offer an immediate reaction on March 14.  However, on March 
12 he called on Taiwan's people and opposition parties to 
join a March 26 demonstration to protest the new law. 
Officials say the rally is being organized in order to 
pre-empt potentially destabilizing alternative proposals, 
such as a referendum or countervailing law.  Nevertheless, 
Chen administration officials express concern that the rally 
could be hijacked by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to 
promote Taiwan independence themes that would exacerbate 
cross-Strait tensions.  The opposition offered mixed 
reactions to the PRC move.  While People First Party (PFP) 
Chairman James Soong and the KMT Spokesman credited Beijing 
for toning down the final version of the text, other senior 
Pan-Blue officials, including KMT Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou 
and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, blamed Beijing for 
fueling tensions.  However, the volume and tone of Taiwan 
reaction was clearly divided along partisan lines.  End 
Summary. 
 
MAC: Strong Condemnation 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) MAC Chair Joseph Wu issued a statement on March 14 
urging the international community to "Strongly Condemn" the 
PRC over its enactment of the Anti-Secession Law earlier in 
the day.  Wu's statement served as the Chen administration's 
formal response to the PRC legislative move, but MAC and 
National Security Council (NSC) officials tell AIT that 
Premier Frank Hsieh is expected to make a further official 
comment on March 15.  The MAC statement, using often 
emotional language, accused Beijing of "hurting the feelings 
of the Taiwan people" and warned that the new law will "have 
serious consequences for security in the East Asia region." 
 
3. (C) Taiwan officials dismissed revisions made to the final 
text of the Anti-Secession Law as insufficient and insincere. 
 National Security Bureau (NSB) Director Hsueh Shih-min 
publicly accused Beijing of playing word games in order to 
distract public attention from the seriousness of the text. 
National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for 
cross-Strait affairs Chen Chung-hsin told AIT that most 
officials (himself excepted) viewed the changes over the 
conditions for resorting to "non-peaceful measures" as a 
change for the worse.   MAC Senior Secretary Jan Jyh-horng, 
who shared the text of Taiwan's response with AIT on March 12 
(AIT translation sent to EAP/TC, Ref A), said that the PRC's 
late revisions had no impact on the government's planned 
strong reaction to passage of the law. 
 
Chen's Next Step 
---------------- 
 
4. (C) President Chen Shui-bian did not immediately respond 
to the passage of the Anti-Secession Law.  However, Chen had 
strongly criticized the law during a March 12 speech to the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  Chen accused Beijing of 
planning to use force to destroy Taiwan's democratic 
achievements and urged one million people to take to the 
streets in protest on March 26.  Presidential Office 
Secretary Liu Shih-chung told AIT shortly after the March 12 
 
SIPDIS 
speech that Chen will wait several days before issuing any 
further statements.  Liu said that the substance and tone of 
Chen's formal response will depend heavily on how he assesses 
"domestic and international reaction" to the new law. 
 
Pan-Blue Takes Its Own Road 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Attempts by the Chen administration to forge a united 
front on the PRC law appear to be faltering.  KMT Spokesman 
Chang Jung-kung expressed regret over the PRC's law, but 
credited Beijing for moderating language in the final text. 
Taipei Mayor and KMT Vice Chairman Ma Ying-jeou convened a 
press conference on March 12 to register opposition to the 
PRC law on behalf of local leaders in Taiwan.  However, Ma 
used considerably milder language than the MAC statement and 
urged leaders in Taiwan to avoid actions that could 
exacerbate the situation.  PFP Chairman James Soong issued a 
statement along the same lines.  Like Ma, Soong's remarks 
were as critical of Taiwan independence activists as they 
were of Beijing.  Soong called on President Chen to stick to 
the joint Chen-Soong policy platform (Ref B) announced on 
February 24 in order to stabilize the situation. 
 
6. (C) Soong's comments are likely to exacerbate negative 
reaction from pro-independence elements of the Pan-Green base 
to the PRC's new law.  MAC's Jan told AIT the government is 
particularly concerned about attempts by the TSU to hijack 
the themes for the March 26 rally.  Jan said if the March 26 
rally is dominated by calls to change the name of the country 
or enact a new constitution, Beijing will likely react with 
more pressure.  The NSC's Chen said that he has urged 
academic and media contacts on the Mainland to cease open 
criticism of the rally in order to help the government in 
Taipei keep control of the event. 
 
7. (C) The TSU's reaction to the PRC move was predictably 
theatric.  After burning a PRC flag, TSU leaders announced 
the start of a 24-hour hunger strike to protest the 
Anti-Secession Law.  A number of leading DPP pro-independence 
figures, including legislator Trong Chai, joined the TSU in 
its public protests.  The TSU also renewed their call to hold 
an anti-China referendum and for the enactment of an 
Anti-Annexation Law.  MAC's Jan expressed concern that the 
text of the TSU's draft law was not as radical as expected. 
While the government does not endorse enacting countervailing 
legislation, Jan cautioned that the TSU's text may appeal to 
many DPP legislators. 
 
Comment: Preventing a Downward Spiral 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) As expected, Taiwan's formal position on the 
Anti-Secession Law is being driven by domestic political 
calculations.  Unsurprisingly, the camps that espouse 
independence are reacting more heatedly than those that do 
not.  Chen's dark Green supporters were already upset over 
his February 24 cohabitation agreement with the PFP's Soong. 
Passage of this law, and the Pan-Blue's relatively muted 
reaction to it, is likely to only harden their demands for 
the President to take a tougher line against Beijing.  The 
Pan-Blue's soft response is likely to further pressure from 
Chen's deep Green base to take harder measures towards 
Beijing.  The PRC's public diplomacy in the coming two weeks 
could also influence the course of events in Taiwan.  Taiwan 
officials say PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's March 11 
dismissal of Taiwan as a local government helped hard-liners 
at the MAC win an internal debate over how to craft Taiwan's 
initial response to the Anti-Secession Law (Septel).  By a 
similar token, moves by Beijing to soften its public line in 
the coming days could bolster the hands of moderates in 
future policy battles.  Nevertheless, the PRC's enactment of 
the law has already handed pro-independence activists a major 
PR victory and setback efforts to inject moderation into 
Taiwan's cross-Strait policy debate. 
PAAL 

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