US embassy cable - 05CARACAS742

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, US 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: VP'S SON SOUNDS US OUT 
 
 
Classified By: DCM STEPHEN G. MCFARLAND REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Jose Vicente Rangel Jr., mayor of Caracas' 
Sucre district and son of Venezuelan Vice President Rangel, 
met with DCM March 11 primarily to discuss bilateral 
relations.  Rangel declined to support President Chavez' 
claims that the USG sought to kill him, but otherwise 
defended the GOV's record.  He insisted that the USG was 
giving Chavez the ammunition to attack the US, and he 
concluded that the opposition was feeding the USG erroneous 
information about Venezuela.  He asked at the end if there 
was a particular message for the GOV.  DCM said the message 
was that the USG remained concerned about democracy, regional 
issues such as the Colombian guerrillas, and conflicting 
signals on oil; that the USG was convinced that the GOV had 
not responded positively to USG efforts to improve bilateral 
communication; that the relationship was getting steadily 
worse, and that the USG concluded that the GOV wanted it that 
way.  Rangel listened carefully.  He said that no bilateral 
issue should be excluded from conversation; he asked if the 
USG was going to signal some flexibility.  DCM responded that 
the USG had sent its signals; the issue was if the GOV was 
going to respond, privately or publicly.  Rangel said he 
would relay this message back to the GOV (including to his 
father).  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  The conversation centered on USG-GOV relations.  The 
DCM asked Rangel point blank if he really believed that the 
USG was trying to kill Chavez.  Rangel, like the other two 
Chavista officials DCM met with this week, avoided saying 
yes.  Instead, he excused the President's claim as a) a way 
of pressing the USG to crack down on anti-Chavez plotters in 
Miami, and b) tit for tat in response to senior USG criticism 
of Chavez.  DCM noted that Chavez was doing more than this; 
every day brought forward a new false accusation.  We had no 
problem with governments who disagreed with us or even 
criticized us, but false accusations indicated a lack of 
interest in a serious relationship. 
 
3.  (C)  Rangel made several points:  first, the USG's public 
statements were out of touch with reality, so much so that he 
had to believe that it was the opposition that was advising 
senior USG officials directly.  Second, that the USG's direct 
criticism of Chavez both pushed him towards a more 
confrontational policy, and also boosted him outside 
Venezuela.  Third, that the GOV's principal challenges laid 
within rather than outside Venezuela.  Fourth, that the 
Embassy should try to have more contact with non-opposition 
elements.  Rangel underscored Chavez' democratic electoral 
victories, his 60  approval rating, and his uncanny ability 
to connect with the poor (he observed, with a mix of 
admiration and chagrin, that while he as mayor got criticism 
for continued poverty, Chavez as President got none). 
 
4.  (C)  The DCM countered that the GOV needed to understand 
that the USG had valid concerns about democracy and human 
rights; obviously our two governments disagreed on the 
subjects, but the USG would continue to express its opinion 
on them.  In our opinion, we had not pushed Chavez towards 
confrontation; rather, he had chosen that path for his own 
reasons, domestic and international.  Finally, we were 
interested in having contact with all sectors in Venezuela, 
but it was increasingly difficult to have contact with the 
GOV. 
 
5.  (C)  Rangel asked if there was a special message for the 
GOV.  The DCM said that it was: 
 
a)  the USG had serious concerns about Venezuelan democracy 
and human rights, regional issues including the Colombian 
guerrillas, and conflicting GOV statements about Venezuelan 
oil exports to the U.S. 
 
b) that the USG had made an effort to improve communications 
with the GOV after the August 15, 2004 referendum, and the 
arrival of Amb. Brownfield.  Our conclusion was that while 
some in the GOV, such as VP Rangel, appeared interested, the 
GOV's message to the USG was that it was not interested. The 
message was manifested in the reduced contact with Amb. 
Brownfield, as well as in such issues as opting out of the 
CNIES military/drug trafficking intel exchange system. 
 
c) bilateral relations were bad and were getting worse. 
 
d) in response to Rangel's query about a possible USG 
statement or action to clear the air now, DCM said that we 
had made our message clear; if the GOV wanted to give us a 
response, in private or in public, we would listen. 
 
 
6.  (C) Rangel said he understood the message and would pass 
it on. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment: Another source told us that Vice President 
Rangel knew ahead of time about the meeting.  Rangel Jr. will 
certainly pass the gist of the conversation on to his father. 
 Rangel Jr. conveyed a sense of frustration that bilateral 
relations were in a downward spiral, and an interest in 
seeing some improvement.  Ironically, he looks to the USG to 
do something about this, an attitude shared by Venezuela's 
opposition, as opposed to looking to the GOV to take a 
positive step.  While he (and other Chavistas) do not agree 
with some of the specifics of Chavez' recent accusations, 
neither can they do much about them in terms of confronting 
Chavez. 
 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA00742 - CONFIDENTIAL