US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV1455

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2015 
TAGS: IS, KPAL, PREL, XF, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: (S) ISRAELI VIEWS ON PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SECURITY 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S)  On instructions from Defense Minister Mofaz, BG 
Eitan Dangott briefed the Ambassador March 11 on the status 
of Israeli-Palestinian security negotiations and other issues 
discussed in the Sharm el-Sheik summit.  Dangott said that 
Mofaz and the Israeli security establishment are becoming 
increasingly frustrated with the Palestinians' negotiating 
behavior. 
 
2.  (S)  Dangott recalled Mofaz's meeting several weeks ago 
with Mohammed Dahlan in which Dahlan had laid down two 
principles that would be important for the Palestinians in 
the transfer of security responsibilities in the West Bank: 
Palestinians wanted not only the cities to be transferred, 
but also the areas surrounding the cities; and the 
Palestinians did not want the Israeli army to surround the 
cities as it had done in the summer of 2003.  Dangott said 
that Mofaz and Dahlan had discussed this in some detail and 
had agreed that these were achievable outcomes.  Dahlan had 
also understood from Mofaz that the focus was not going to be 
on areas A, B or C, and that the outcome would not be defined 
at this time as a return to the situation that existed before 
September 2000. 
 
3.  (S)  Since then, each time Israeli and Palestinian 
security negotiators have sat to discuss the transfer of 
security in Jericho and/or Tulkarm, they have approached 
agreement only to have the situation reversed when the issue 
was submitted to the Palestinian political level.  Dangott 
said the latest setback occurred this week when Hajj Ismail 
told his Israeli counterpart that his new instructions were 
to insist on Route 90 (in the Jordan Valley) being seen as a 
"international road" on which travelers from the northern 
West Bank would be free to move to the southern West Bank 
without any hindrance by Israeli security elements.  Hajj 
Ismail further said that the objective he was asked to 
achieve was to emphasize that the Jordan Valley belongs to 
the Palestinians. 
 
4.  (S)  Dangott said that Hajj Ismail's position is all the 
more disturbing in that it followed the meeting early this 
week between Mofaz and Palestinian President Abbas.  During 
that meeting, Abbas had emphasized the importance of 
achieving a successful outcome in the cities and had 
expressed confidence that agreements reached between military 
commanders would be acceptable to the political echelons on 
both sides.  Dangott added that the role played by Interior 
Minister Nasir Yousef in these meetings was less helpful, and 
that Yousef appeared very unfamiliar with the details that 
were under discussion between the military commanders. 
 
5.  (S)  Dangott said that Mofaz is insistent on trying to 
make this work, even though the Israelis are not persuaded 
that Palestinian security forces are ready to assume their 
responsibilities in the cities.  New commanders have not been 
appointed, and Palestinian forces have not started training 
in the Jericho area, which Israel had told the Palestinians 
would be permitted.  This has led to a suspicion on the part 
of Israeli analysts that Palestinians have become comfortable 
with the failure of the negotiations in that they are able to 
blame Israel for failure to implement the Sharm el-Sheik 
understanding. 
 
6.  (S)  The Ambassador suggested that Mofaz reach out to 
Palestinian Interior Minister Yousef to try to break the 
deadlock.  He noted that all of us have been seeking an 
empowered Palestinian security interlocutor, and we now have 
one.  Mofaz's insistence on meeting President Abbas earlier 
in the week was positively motivated, but it may have been 
seen by Yousef as undercutting his authority.  Thus, there is 
an opportunity now not only to help bolster Yousef's 
authority, but perhaps also to yield progress in the security 
negotiations.  The Ambassador said that if Mofaz agreed that 
the next step should be a meeting with Yousef, our Consul 
General and General Ward would meet with Yousef in order to 
frame the agenda and possible outcomes of the meeting in the 
best manner possible.  Dangott pushed back, saying that if 
the negotiations were not succeeding with President Abbas as 
an interlocutor, it was unlikely that Yousef's participation 
would help.  However, he undertook to raise with Mofaz the 
Ambassador's strong suggestion that an early meeting be 
sought with Nasir Yousef in order to give new impetus to the 
negotiations. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER