US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV1454

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RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR URGES RESTRAINT IN PRESSING ABU MAZEN, ASSAD

Identifier: 05TELAVIV1454
Wikileaks: View 05TELAVIV1454 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2005-03-11 14:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KWBG IS LE SY GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

111411Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2010 
TAGS: PREL, KWBG, IS, LE, SY, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR URGES RESTRAINT IN PRESSING ABU 
MAZEN, ASSAD 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) Russian Ambassador Gennady Tarasov and the Ambassador 
reviewed Israeli-Palestinian progress in implementing the 
Sharm al-Sheikh commitments and Syria-Lebanon developments 
during a March 11 conversation.  In response to the 
Ambassador's question about whether Russian Middle East envoy 
Kalugin would visit Israel next week as part of the Russian 
delegation to the dedication of Israel's new Holocaust 
museum, Tarasov said Kalugin was not part of the delegation, 
and that he did not know anything about Kalugin's current 
activities or plans. 
 
------------------- 
Post-Sharm Progress 
------------------- 
 
2. (C) Tarasov noted Russian concerns that the Israelis and 
Palestinians appear to be "stuck" in efforts to transfer 
security authority in West Bank cities and in meeting other 
Sharm commitments.  The GOR, he said, understands the 
"predicaments" facing Abu Mazen -- e.g., the prospect of a 
strong Hamas showing in July's elections for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council -- and wants to avoid putting pressure on 
him.  The international community should help ensure the 
fulfillment of Sharm commitments to bolster Abu Mazen's 
position. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador concurred with Russian concerns, but 
stressed that Sharm spoke only to broad outcomes, not to 
implementation details.  Just as they often have in the past, 
the Israelis and Palestinians are now grappling with bridging 
differences over details that matter to each side.  Sharon, 
for example, worries that a terrorist attack resulting from 
inadequate security arrangements around an abandoned 
checkpoint could derail progress in the overall peace effort. 
 At the same time, the Ambassador commented, current 
differences between the Israelis and Palestinians -- for 
example, on the lifting of roadblocks around Jericho -- 
appear amenable to compromise.  Tarasov asked about Gen. 
Ward's role in bridging such differences.  The Ambassador 
replied that, while one of Gen. Ward's mandates was to help 
the sides resolve differences on security matters, Gen. Ward 
would be careful to avoid letting the sides turn to him too 
early and too often.  The sides need to try to resolve 
differences between themselves, to the extent possible. 
 
------------- 
Syria-Lebanon 
------------- 
 
4. (C) The GOR, Tarasov said, shares the international view 
that the time has come for Syria to leave Lebanon.  Less 
clear, he added, is how this should happen "pragmatically." 
Too much "frontal pressure" on Syria could lead to a 
counter-reaction.  SARG officials, Tarasov said, have told 
the GOR that they are ready to withdraw immediately from 
Lebanon, but need face-saving cover.  Tarasov stressed that 
the international community must closely monitor the impact 
of a Syrian withdrawal on Lebanon.  "It's easy to talk about 
democracy," he said, but one must account for Hizballah.  An 
unstable Lebanon would be the worst outcome.  Pointing to UN 
envoy Larsen's planned visit to Damascus on March 12, Tarasov 
said the GOR assesses that the SARG already understands the 
international message behind UNSCR 1559.  The U.S. concurs 
with Russia on the goal of a Syrian withdrawal, the 
Ambassador commented, but is not sure that President Assad 
appreciates the meaning of 1559 and the need to set forth a 
realistic and concrete withdrawal plan. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

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