US embassy cable - 05CARACAS729

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MVR DEPUTY ON PLAN COLOMBIA: REDUCING FARC PRESENCE ON BORDER

Identifier: 05CARACAS729
Wikileaks: View 05CARACAS729 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Caracas
Created: 2005-03-10 19:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER VE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, VE 
SUBJECT: MVR DEPUTY ON PLAN COLOMBIA: REDUCING FARC 
PRESENCE ON BORDER 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASONS 1.4 (d 
) 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) Deputy Saul 
Ortega, President of the National Assembly International 
Relations Commission, said increased counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism cooperation would be an excellent basis for 
improved US-Venezuela relations, in a meeting with poloff 
March 2.  He also pointed to increasing trade between the two 
countries as a sign that our political relations should 
improve. Ortega asserted that the two governments were bound 
to disagree, however, on Cuba and Colombia.  Ortega 
volunteered the observation that Plan Colombia was reducing 
the presence of the FARC on the Venezuela-Colombia boarder, 
and criticized FARC violence against Venezuelans, while 
refusing to call them "terrorists."  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
US-Venezuela Relations 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) Deputy Saul 
Ortega, President of the National Assembly International 
Relations Commission, talked to poloff about Venezuela-U.S. 
relations March 2. Ortega posited that there is no 
anti-Americanism in the Bolivarian Revolution, rather a 
political conflict with the government. He said nobody who 
wanted to construct a true democracy could ignore American 
history, and pointed out that President Hugo Chavez had 
recently started quoting Thomas Jefferson. Asked about 
government to government communications, Ortega said that 
there were some areas where we shared interests and worked 
together, and others where we would inevitably disagree. 
 
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Cooperation 
----------- 
 
3.  (C)  Ortega noted that counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism were two areas where we shared interests. 
He complained that we gave Venezuela no credit for its 
efforts to stop drug smuggling, although, according to him it 
is one of the most active countries in Latin America. He said 
Venezuela had never had so many arrests or seizures as now, 
noting that further cooperation in this area would be an 
excellent area for improved relations. Discussing 
counter-terrorism, Ortega said that the GOV had no interest 
in having "those people" here, and that given information 
that terrorists were operating in Venezuela, the Venezuelan 
authorities would act. He objected, however, to broad 
statements about terrorists in Margarita, for example, 
without specific proof. He said Venezuela had a large Arab 
population, and while he did not doubt there might be some 
terrorists, most were legitimate businessmen and should not 
be stigmatized as a group. 
 
4.  (C)  Ortega also highlighted growing economic ties 
between the U.S. and Venezuela, noting that commerce between 
the two countries had grown from 17 billion bolivares last 
year to 24 billion this year.  He stressed that this was not 
just Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S., but also imports of 
goods from the U.S. to Venezuela.  He argued that this 
healthy economic relationship should serve to create better 
political relations. 
 
----------------- 
Cuba and Colombia 
----------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Ortega gave Cuba and Colombia as two examples of 
areas where the GOV and USG would inevitably disagree. Ortega 
said the GOV would maintain close ties to Cuba. He said Cuba 
had excellent health care and education professionals, and 
that Venezuela needed their help to improve living conditions 
for poor people. Communism was not destined to grow in Latin 
America, Ortega said, and he wondered personally why the 
Cuban government did not allow elections, given the support 
he believed it enjoyed. 
 
6.  (C)  Discussing Colombia, Ortega said the key fact in 
Colombia is that the FARC controls half the country and 
cannot be defeated without some kind of negotiation.  He 
claimed the Uribe government ruled only in the cities due to 
military occupation.  Ortega gave his interpretation of 
Colombian history, under which the Colombian "oligarchy" has 
always prevented a political solution by assassinating 
Colombian left wing political leaders. Ortega said he hoped 
nothing of the kind would happen to the leaders of the "Polo 
Democratico" in Colombia today.  Ortega also said he did not 
understand USG insistence on blaming the Colombian situation 
on President Hugo Chavez. He insisted that the conflict long 
pre-dates Chavez, and that Colombians were responsible for 
solving their own problems.  Poloff pointed out that 
President Alvaro Uribe enjoyed high levels of support in 
Colombia, and that U.S. aid was intended to extend the 
effective control of the state over the whole country, and 
not to favor of any specific government. 
 
------------- 
Plan Colombia 
------------- 
7.  (C)  Ortega objected to defining the FARC as terrorists, 
asserting that no one had called the FARC terrorists when 
Raul Reyes had an office in the Venezuelan MFA, under the 
governments of Carlos Andres Perez and Rafael Caldera.  At 
that time, according to Ortega, the FARC killed Venezuelan 
soldiers, kidnapped ranchers, and extorted businessmen. 
Ortega said it was the Colombian government's fault for not 
controlling its borders.  As for Plan Colombia, he called it 
an example of U.S. misunderstanding of Latin American 
reality. However, Ortega said that one good side-effect had 
been a reduction of the FARC presence on the Venezuelan 
border, as the guerrillas retreated to their bases.  Poloff 
suggested that there was a shared interest between the USG 
and the GOV to help Colombia establish control over its 
territory, and that the USG would welcome active GOV 
collaboration. 
 
--------------- 
Nationalization 
--------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Ortega asserted that the GOV believed there were 
over two million Colombians in Venezuela, and the GOV did not 
know who they were. He said the GOV naturalization drive, 
which he said had given 400,000 of these people ID cards, 
would help identify guerrillas and other criminals in 
Venezuela.  He said the recent agreement between Chavez and 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to share information through 
the two Defense Ministries should help avoid a repetition of 
the dispute over the capture of the FARC leader Rodrigo 
Granda, and increase cooperation.  He said it now seemed 
likely that one of the Colombians arrested recently in 
Bolivar State for kidnapping the mother of a major league 
baseball player was a member of the FARC, and that if his 
identity was confirmed, the GOV would extradite him to 
Colombia. Poloff commented that this would be an excellent 
step to show Venezuelan resolve to cooperate with Colombia in 
combating the FARC. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C)  Ortega nicely summarized the position of Chavista 
"moderates" on relations with the U.S.:  Good economic 
relations plus cooperation in the wars on drugs and terrorism 
should add up to U.S. neutrality vis-a-vis Venezuela. 
Ortega's admission that Plan Colombia was helping the 
Venezuelans on the border challenges the usual rhetoric that 
combat operations are pushing guerrillas into Venezuela. 
Taken at his word, U.S.-Venezuela interests in Colombia do 
not appear that far apart.  Unfortunately, Ortega is unlikely 
to greatly influence Chavez or other GOV officials who find 
value in maintaining an anti-U.S. hard line. 
Brownfield 

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