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| Identifier: | 05AMMAN2044 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05AMMAN2044 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2005-03-10 18:03:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON PGOV JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 101803Z Mar 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 002044 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2015 TAGS: EFIN, ECON, PGOV, JO SUBJECT: FORMER PM'S LICENSE APPLICATION IS A TEST FOR CENTRAL BANK REF: AMMAN 538 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), a nd (e) 1. (C) SUMMARY: The announcement by former Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb that he has applied for a new banking license has stirred up considerable interest in the Jordanian business community, but also provoked controversy and a war of words between Abul Ragheb and another former prime minister, now also a bank chairman. The furor is further smearing a reputation already besmirched by accusations concerning Abul Ragheb's activities while in political office. If handled incorrectly, it could damage the credibility of both the CBJ,s independence as a regulator and of the GOJ as a whole. END SUMMARY. --------------- A BANK IS BORN? --------------- 2. (SBU) Jordanian press reports are feeding a belief that the long frustration of Jordanian investors who have been clamoring for a new banking license is at an end. On February 22, trucking magnate and former Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb formally applied for a new banking license; he expects it to be granted "very soon." He explained that the time was ripe for Jordanian banks to expand regionally, but few had the capital or the ambition to do so; Abul Ragheb is very interested in the opportunities presented by what he feels are unexploited markets in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, Sudan (where Abul Ragheb's family owns three factories), and Iraq (where he has strong business relationships dating back before Saddam's fall). According to Abul Ragheb's statements to the press, the proposed new bank will have an initial capitalization of JD 100 million - the third highest paid-up capital of any bank in Jordan (total shareholder equity, however, would initially be equivalent to a mid-sized bank). Half of this capital would be raised from a group of 60 private investors that Abul Ragheb has assembled; the other half would come from an IPO prior to the bank's launch. 3. (C) Based on what Abul Ragheb told us and on rumors in the marketplace, the 60 private investors would include a veritable "Who's Who" of Jordan's major businessmen who are not currently major shareholders of any existing commercial bank. Besides the Abul Ragheb family, which would contribute 5-7% of the bank's startup capital, and the Social Security Corporation (SSC), which is supposedly interested in taking 10%, the investors would prominently include Samir Ka'war (uncle of Jordan's current ambassador to the United States) and Omar Khalid Shoman (nephew of Arab Bank Chairman Abdulmajeed Shoman and cousin of Arab Bank CEO Abdulhameed Shoman), who in February 2004 sold off his father's 11% stake in Arab Bank in a complex deal involving the SSC and the late Rafiq al-Hariri. Most intriguingly, the Iraqi Bunniah family - longtime friends of Abul Ragheb - are contributing JD 1 million for 1% of the bank; Abul Ragheb told us that he views this as the most important element of the ownership structure because it creates a strong alliance with one of Iraq's top business families. Left unmentioned by Abul Ragheb was the participation of the Iraqi Khawam family in the consortium, a fact that has created some buzz among banking insiders. 4. (C) Abul Ragheb told us that had he wished, he could have found twice as much money, and that he has been receiving calls for weeks from people who want a piece of the new bank; his friends are "upset" that they are not being given larger shares or any shares at all. At least one friend of Abul Ragheb, however, turned him down flat. Sabih al-Masri (strictly protect) told us that Abul Ragheb had recently come to him to ask him to participate in the bank,s founding group. Masri told us that while he considered himself to be a good friend of Abul Ragheb, he felt that it was not a good idea to go into business with friends and that to invest in a third bank after already holding large stakes in two others (Arab Bank and Cairo-Amman Bank - ref A) was not a good idea. Masri added, however, that a third reason for his reluctance to join the consortium was that while Abul Ragheb was rich, Masri did not consider him to be a businessman. ------------------------------ A PR STORM BREWS AND CBJ FUMES ------------------------------ 5. (C) The developing Abul Ragheb banking consortium has been an open secret among financial insiders for months. It emerged publicly, however, only on February 25, when Jordan Kuwait Bank (JKB) Chairman, and former Prime Minister, Abdulkarim al-Kabariti made a speech at the JKB,s annual General Assembly meeting denouncing Abul Ragheb,s plan for a new bank and casting aspersions on the sources of Abul Ragheb,s wealth. News of the speech, whose transcript has not been released by JKB, was quickly picked up in the press. Abul Ragheb hit back aggressively and publicly, highlighting the large (estimated 90%) majority of Jordanian ownership of his proposed new bank and making an implicit comparison to the majority Kuwaiti ownership of JKB. Abul Ragheb has, however, been most effective in his tactic of convincing markets that his banking license is a fait accompli to which the sector must adjust itself. Many bankers are already beginning to talk about the positive benefits that a new bank could bring. The deputy CEO of one major bank to whom we talked even believed that the license had been awarded one month ago and expressed surprise when told that it had not yet been awarded at all. 6. (S/NF) Whether or not CBJ approval of the license is indeed a fait accompli is a subject on which there are many widely varying points of view. Abul Ragheb told us that feedback from the CBJ on the application had been "very positive." According to a close friend of Abul Ragheb, on the other hand, the story is a bit more complicated: the former PM had received the King,s blessing prior to making an initial application for a banking license in the summer of 2004. The CBJ, however, refused this application. Abul Ragheb had returned to the King, and convinced him that the creation of the bank was vital to the furthering of the King,s vision of Jordan as a banking center. The King then reportedly told Abul Ragheb to proceed in setting up his consortium even without prior CBJ approval of the license ) because that approval would definitely come when Abul Ragheb again applied for the license. (COMMENT: Although this story is circulating in Amman, we have no hard evidence confirming the King's involvement. The accusation focuses not on a suggestion of personal profit by the King, but of unorthodox and non-transparent intervention which undercuts efforts to project a reformed, investor-friendly image. END COMMENT.) 7. (S/NF) The CBJ has yet another version of the story of the Abul Ragheb license. CBJ Deputy Governor Faris Sharaf (strictly protect) confirmed to us that there is support "at the highest level" for Abul Ragheb's application, but noted that the CBJ was far from ready to approve the application and had in fact stated publicly as recently as mid-January that it would not be granting applications for new banks. Sharaf voiced his strong personal opposition to issuance of a new banking license at this time, saying that given what he termed a "human resources" bottleneck in the Jordanian banking sector, licensing a large extra bank right now would only dilute the quality of decision-making in Jordanian banks. As an example of this constraint, he noted that in order to hire a competent branch manager, recent sector entrant Bank Audi had been forced to offer a salary four times the going rate. Pointing to the high liquidity of Jordanian banks, Sharaf argued that pouring more investment capital into the banking sector would not be particularly useful; what Jordanian banks needed was a more sophisticated understanding of how to evaluate their opportunities. This was precisely why the CBJ had in 2004 given licenses to three good foreign banks to operate in Jordan. 8. (S) The Abul Ragheb consortium, however, did not even approach the standards set by the 2004 licensees. Sharaf noted that few of the primary promoters of the application were bankers and that he doubted the commitment of Abul Ragheb to be in the bank for the long term. Sharaf also noted that the precedent that would be set was a bad one, given the number of other domestic businessmen trying to get a license. These include one group led by yet another former Prime Minister, Fayez al-Tarawneh, and Mufleh Aqel (Industrial Development Bank Chairman and Banking Association President), who had provided the technical expertise for the Abul Ragheb bid but has recently fallen out with him. An even more advanced consortium is led by Zuhair Khoury, a former chairman of Jordan's Housing Bank, and Khalid Shahin, a wealthy and well-connected Jordanian businessman. The latter is locally famous for his unconventional relationships with Jordan's banks, which have in the past included several defaults by various Shahin companies on large loans and, most significantly, Shahin's alleged looting of the Philadelphia Investment Bank (PIB), in which he had held a controlling stake. 9. (S) Sharaf expressed his frustration at both Abul Ragheb and Kabariti. He explained that the CBJ had done its best to accommodate Abul Ragheb's desire to be a major participant in a bank while adhering to its position on minimizing the number of banks in Jordan. Sharaf claimed that the CBJ had done its best to present Abul Ragheb with alternate options ranging from a takeover of an existing bank (such as PIB) to the conversion of the license of the Industrial Development Bank. Abul Ragheb, however, had failed to come to an arrangement with any of these banks. Kabariti, by bringing the subject into the public sphere, had only made it more difficult for the CBJ to "bury" Abul Ragheb's application. In fact, Sharaf claimed, Abul Ragheb had not yet even filed an application; he had only sent a letter to the CBJ announcing his intent to apply for a license. As it is, the furor over the license has forced Abul Ragheb to be more aggressive, cowed some of the members of the board tasked with evaluating the application who had initially opposed a new bank, and ensured that no matter what the CBJ decides, it will likely be charged with bending to political pressure. Sharaf said that he was trying to "stiffen" CBJ Governor Touqan to stand up against the application; ultimately, however, the principle involved in this matter is so important that if the bank were to receive a license without responding to his concerns, Sharaf would "go back to making money" in the private sector. ---------------------- MORE FUEL FOR THE FIRE ---------------------- 10. (SBU) The controversy over the license comes at a time when Abul Ragheb,s reputation is under attack from a different quarter. The General Intelligence Directorate,s Anti-Corruption Department concluded, on February 27, a six-month-long investigation of the Jordan Magnesia Corporation (JorMag), a GOJ joint-venture white elephant that in its initial phases financially benefited Abul Ragheb,s son. While the investigation cleared JorMag and all parties associated with it of any wrongdoing, Parliament has refused to accept its conclusions and on March 2 called for the appointment of a prosecutor-general to take the case to court. One parliamentary deputy, in the course of these hearings, directly accused Abul Ragheb of having rewarded Saleh Irshaidat with the post of Deputy Prime Minister in return for his complicity in the corrupt awarding of the tendered project to the consortium represented by Hassan Abul Ragheb. Irshaidat was at the time the Director-General of the then state-owned Arab Potash Corporation, through which the joint venture was formed. ------- COMMENT ------- 11. (C) While Abul Ragheb,s planned bank is at least as much a product of hype as of substance, the addition of another bank of its size could be good for the banking sector. Given the failure of local banks to fully serve the market and provide innovative products, it is difficult to maintain that Jordan is over-banked. Abul Ragheb is correct in his belief that both the Aqaba Special Economic Zone and Iraq-related trade are underserved, and his insistence on participation by Iraqis seems far-sighted. The CBJ is, however, probably correct that Abul Ragheb's consortium may not be the right group to attempt to deliver these services; Sabih al-Masri's decision to opt out of the consortium lends further credence to this judgment. 12. (C) Irrespective of the solidity of Abul Ragheb's business plan, optics will not be good for the CBJ if it grants a license to the Abul Ragheb consortium. There is already a belief in the sector and the wider public that "the fix is in." Abul Ragheb,s history will likely taint public perceptions of his dealings with the GOJ for a long time to come, and in this case perceptions appear to be at least partly accurate. The presence in the founding consortium of a large number of known (e.g., the Khawam family) and suspected violators of UN sanctions on Iraq adds yet another black mark on the bank. Finally, a failure by the CBJ to stick to its position on licensing of domestic banks will make it more difficult to say no to consortia with even weaker credentials and reputations, such as the Shahin-Khoury group. 13. (C) The timing of the Anti-Corruption Unit,s findings on Jordan Magnesia adds yet another disturbing twist to the situation. While the clearing of all parties involved in the Jordan Magnesia disaster may well be both accurate and unbiased, it will not appear that way to many Jordanians. A license award now will likely provoke further speculation that the investigation was a whitewash for Abul Ragheb, devaluing the GOJ,s anti-corruption credentials. 14. (C/NF) In sum, an emergence of Abul Ragheb as a player in the banking sector would likely blemish the sector even if, in a best-case scenario, it were to provide a needed spur to competition. The escalating war of words seems to ensure that an awarded license will further diminish the confidence of foreign investors in the transparency of the Jordanian financial system and the independence of the CBJ, as well as erode the confidence of ordinary Jordanians in the motivations of their leaders. Conversely, Sharaf's apparent determination to resist all pressures to grant this license is a welcome development. Sharaf, the son of a former prime minister of Jordan and a potential candidate for the post of CBJ governor, may have the necessary weight to resist this move; if so, it will be an encouraging sign for the future role of the CBJ. The emergence of this controversy comes amidst a spike of accusations of corruption connected with several other high-profile projects and personalities in the country. Regardless of the facts of the cases, the persistence of the accusations being made - unless effectively countered - risks tarnishing Jordan's reform credentials. HALE
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