US embassy cable - 05AMMAN2043

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, KDEM, KMPI, JO 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN 
 
Classified By: Charge David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) After a hopeful start, a well-publicized push for 
political reform announced by King Abdullah in late 2003 lost 
momentum as the GOJ struggled internally with unresolved 
questions on both the pace and extent of change.  Heightened 
security concerns have given a louder voice to officials wary 
of greater public freedoms, and contributed to a crackdown on 
Islamist political activity.  Eager to keep Jordan at the 
forefront of regional reform in Western eyes, the King is 
relying on two recent royal commissions to advance the reform 
agenda and to fulfill his stated desire to promote grassroots 
political participation.  Many Jordanians will remain 
skeptical of the King's controlled, top-down approach to 
reform, and he will need to make some tough decisions when 
the time comes to transfer real power to democratic 
institutions.  End Summary. 
 
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ALL ABOARD THE REFORM TRAIN! 
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2.  (U) After achieving significant progress in reforming the 
Jordanian economy, King Abdullah turned his eye toward 
political reform in late 2003.  In a public letter to 
incoming Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez in October 2003, the 
King laid out his vision for the new government and declared 
that political development should be "at the top" of its 
priorities.  He called for greater "political openness" and 
"active and real participation" of all segments of society in 
Jordanian political life, while highlighting the need for a 
new political parties law and a "more democratic" elections 
law.  The King reinforced his message of deep-rooted 
political reform in his address at the opening of Parliament 
on December 1, 2003.  Declaring that it was the duty of all 
Jordanians to create "a radical, positive transformation in 
our democratization process," he further noted that political 
parties established by "the grassroots" with comprehensive 
platforms were "vital and necessary" for the country. 
 
3.  (C) Such statements by the King and other GOJ officials 
initially encouraged public and private debate on policy 
issues.  Criticism of the government increased as Jordanians 
cautiously reacted to the apparent relaxation of some of the 
unwritten limits on public expression.  Meanwhile, the newly 
created Ministry of Political Development -- despite limited 
resources and a lackluster minister -- moved forward on an 
ambitious series of meetings between senior GOJ officials 
(including PM Fayez) and a variety of different groups to 
discuss elements of political reform.  The ministry also 
produced in May 2004 a draft strategy and plan of action for 
political development that was forthright in assessing the 
obstacles to the creation of a democratic culture in Jordan 
and that contained specific objectives including the adoption 
of new legislation on elections, political parties, and 
women's rights.  A large public opinion poll and a "national 
gathering" were planned to gauge popular expectations 
regarding the plan. 
 
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LOSING STEAM 
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4.  (C) While USAID-supported programs aimed at promoting 
educational and judicial reform continued to move forward, 
the GOJ push for democratization and political reform lost 
momentum as 2004 progressed.  The action plan created by the 
Ministry of Political Development, which had been developed 
without any parliamentary input, virtually disappeared from 
the public arena.  The pace of public meetings on political 
reform topics slackened.  A number of contacts increasingly 
told us that the government's emphasis on political 
development had "amounted to nothing."  Polling data 
indicated that Jordanians were at least as afraid to voice 
freely their opinions in public as they had been prior to the 
political reform campaign.  Government statements on reform 
shifted gears and put the need for administrative and public 
sector reform at center stage. 
 
5.  (C) Various factors contributed to the slow-down in 
movement on political reform.  Probably the most important 
reason is that the GOJ had never agreed internally on the 
pace, scope and mechanics of democratization.  After laying 
some groundwork for political reform as described above, the 
government simply did not know how to proceed further. 
Contacts painted a picture of a cabinet divided on this 
issue, with reform-minded ministers wanting to move forward 
while conservative, old-guard ministers (backed by the 
ever-cautious security establishment) were just as happy for 
political reform to inch along, if not cease altogether.  The 
reshuffling of the cabinet in October 2004 did little to 
alleviate this stalemate.  The Prime Minister's heart was 
with the conservatives, who also dominate parliament. 
 
6.  (C) The go-slow camp was strengthened by the disruption 
of a major terrorist plot in April 2004 aimed at GOJ targets 
and the U.S. Embassy.  This event, along with other security 
threats and the danger posed by the Zarqawi terrorist 
network, emboldened those who argued that too much openness 
and change could endanger national security.  Heightened 
security concerns and fear of extremism also contributed to 
government moves to reign in Islamist political activity. 
There followed a round-up of unlicensed mosque preachers, the 
brief detention of Islamic Action Front (IAF) members for 
giving "political speeches" after Friday prayers, the seizure 
of the Muslim Brotherhood's charitable fund-raising boxes, 
and a campaign to stymie Islamists' use of professional 
associations through vote-rigging and diversion of union 
dues. 
 
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THE KING STEPS IN 
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7.  (C)  Stalled progress on political development did not go 
unnoticed by the palace.  Stymied by his cabinet's lack of 
action, and conscious that Jordan's image as a regional 
reform leader was being eroded by developments in neighboring 
states, King Abdullah went around his ministers and 
parliament in December by appointing two royal commissions to 
push forward his reform agenda.  The first, mostly comprised 
of old-guard elements, will study the establishment of 
regional assemblies with devolved powers designed to move 
decision-making closer to ordinary citizens.  The second, 
which has a much more diverse membership, will bring together 
a wide range of civil society representatives and government 
figures to establish a broad-based "national agenda" to 
include political reform.  Palace officials also state that 
new legislation on elections and political parties will be 
unveiled with the release of the commissions' 
recommendations, probably around the end of the year.  (NOTE: 
PM Fayez told the press March 7 that the government had 
already "outlined" a new elections law, but would "slow down" 
moves to reform the electoral system pending the work of the 
royal commissions.  END NOTE.) 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C) Our reformist contacts outside government almost 
without exception express skepticism concerning the latest 
royal commissions, particularly the one focused on 
decentralization, as its members lack reform credentials and 
will reportedly conduct most of their work behind closed 
doors.  The King is insistent, however, that these 
commissions constitute "irreversible" steps toward 
democratization and that their final recommendations will be 
implemented.  Even if he is sincere in his desire to open the 
political system, the King's use of palace-appointed 
commissions indicates that he wants reform on his terms. 
This, in turn, prompts many to wonder -- how much 
democratization will the King and his advisors accept?  A 
vigorous political party system attracting a broad swathe of 
Jordanians, combined with a truly representative parliament 
with real decision-making powers and an engaged civil 
society, could eventually threaten the position of the 
regime's traditional backers.  The powerful security services 
are loathe to permit full freedom of expression and assembly, 
fearing it could imperil stability.  Many in the old-guard 
East Bank establishment, which dominates top levels of 
government and the security services, still suspect the true 
loyalties of the majority Palestinian-Jordanian population 
and can be expected to resist their political empowerment. 
How the King handles these anti-reform pressures, and his 
willingness to transfer at least some of his power to the 
people (who are more conservative and more opposed to U.S. 
foreign policy than the GOJ would like to acknowledge), will 
determine the future of political reform in Jordan. 
 
9.  (C) With dramatic political change and opening underway 
all around Jordan, leaders here are well aware that they need 
to do more or risk losing their reputation for being in the 
vanguard of Arab reformers.  A word of encouragement from 
senior U.S. officials to the King during his March 15-22 
visit to Washington can help strengthen his awareness that 
the time to move further on political development is overdue. 
 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
HALE