US embassy cable - 05PARIS1580

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NP/CBM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2025 
TAGS: PARM, FR, JA, CH, MTCR 
SUBJECT: FRENCH POSITION ON THE JOINT EU-CHINA STATEMENT ON 
NONPROLIFERATION:  A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK 
 
REF: TOUNGER/DURHAM CONSULTATIONS 25 FEBRUARY 2005 
 
Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (C), (D), AN 
D (H). 
 
1.  (S)  Following a demarche delivered on 01 March on a 
separate matter, French Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) Point of Contact David Bertolotti provided EST Officer 
comments on the French position regarding the joint European 
Union-China statement on nonproliferation issued o/a October 
2004.  Bertolotti's comments shed light on the Government of 
France's (GOF) perspective on the statement. 
 
2.   (S)  According to Bertolotti, the Dutch EU 
representative negotiated the joint nonproliferation 
statement without prior consultations or coordination with EU 
partners, an approach that irked the French.  The GOF 
expressed to the Dutch EU representative its dissatisfaction 
regarding the portion of the joint statement that addressed 
China's bid to join the MTCR, arguing that it would give the 
Chinese unrealistic expectations regarding their short-term 
prospects for joining the group.  The Dutch EU representative 
told the French that he had included the MTCR language under 
Chinese pressure, and that he had concluded that the value in 
having a joint EU-Chinese statement on nonproliferation 
warranted some compromise on the MTCR portion of the final 
text.  He assured the French that he had explained to the 
Chinese that the statement regarding MTCR membership should 
not be interpreted as a signal that China would soon gain 
admittance to the MTCR, as several EU and other MTCR partners 
still had significant concerns about China's export control 
system and nonproliferation activities.  Bertolotti noted to 
EST officer that he could not confirm the Dutch 
representative's claim to have tempered China's expectations, 
and indicated that he had doubts as to the veracity of the 
Dutch official's claims. 
 
3.      (S)   Bertolotti further commented that while the GOF 
did not have major problems with the bulk of the EU-China 
nonproliferation statement, during EU meetings in November 
and December 2004, the GOF had formally raised their 
objections and concerns regarding the MTCR portion of the 
text.  According to Bertolotti, the French were the lone 
dissenters both times; they had formally raised their 
objections and the French were pressured to join EU consensus 
on the joint statement.  He added that he had been 
particularly surprised by the mild reaction to the MTCR 
portion of the statement on the part of the United Kingdom 
(UK).  He added that in private conversations, the UK's EU 
representative had remarked to him that the statement was 
only an EU text, and that individual EU MTCR partners would 
be at liberty to raise objections on their own in the future. 
 Bertolotti noted that this approach highlighted a 
fundamental difference in philosophy between the UK and 
France regarding the significance of EU statements.  To 
further make his point regarding French objections to the 
MTCR portion of the statement, Bertolotti said that France 
was leading the EU charge to lift the arms embargo on China, 
and that in contrast to its position on the arms embargo, the 
GOF had taken a strong stance against the overly optimistic 
statement regarding MTCR membership for China contained in 
the EU-Chinese nonproliferation text. 
 
4.   (S)  Bertolotti also informed EST officer that during 
his January 2005 EU visit to Beijing to discuss export 
controls, the French delegation made it clear to the Chinese 
that several EU members, including France, as well as other 
MTCR members, such as Japan, had serious concerns regarding 
China's export control system, and that wide-ranging, 
meaningful improvements would have to be made to this system 
before China would have a realistic chance of joining the 
MTCR.  Bertolotti added that the French delegation was 
careful not to make promises or suggest specific quid pro 
quos regarding China's MTCR membership bid, and that its 
intention had been to propose general markers for China to 
shoot for in the near-term. 
 
5.   (S)  Bertolotti also noted that during a private 
conversation, his Chinese government counterpart in Beijing 
had candidly asked Bertolotti if U.S. government objections 
to China's bid for MTCR membership were the primary reasons 
that China's application was being held-up.  The Chinese 
official also asked Bertolotti if Russia's zealous support 
for China's MTCR membership bid had in fact worked against 
China's efforts to join the group.  Bertolotti told EST 
officer that he had made it clear to his Chinese counterpart 
that several MTCR partners had concerns about China's export 
controls and other nonproliferation activities, and that U.S. 
government objections were shared by many in the group. 
Bertolotti also admitted to the Chinese official that 
Russia's approach had not been well-received by the majority 
of the MTCR partners, and had been largely counter-productive 
to China's bid for membership in the group.  Bertolotti added 
that what had particularly struck him about the Chinese 
official's questions was his strong grasp of internal 
dynamics and debates within the MTCR, which suggested that 
China might have an unauthorized window into private MTCR 
deliberations. 
Leach