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| Identifier: | 05NDJAMENA370 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NDJAMENA370 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ndjamena |
| Created: | 2005-03-08 17:42:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EAID PGOV PHUM PREL CD SU Darfur Policy and Rebels |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
081742Z Mar 05
ACTION FMPC-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
DODE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00
H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 CAC-00
VCE-00 M-00 NEA-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-00
OIC-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 GIWI-00 PRS-00 P-00 CFPP-00
SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00
G-00 SAS-00 /001W
------------------C6143D 081744Z /38
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1112
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000370 SIPDIS STATE PASS USAID FOR COMPTROLLER LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels SUBJECT: CHAD SEEKS HELP TO PAY FOR DARFUR MEDIATION Classified By: Ambassador Marc M. Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. Chad needs help to defray the expenses of its mediation effort on Darfur and is asking for U.S. assistance, according to President Deby's top foreign affairs and military advisors. In the meeting they requested with the Ambassador March 7, the two leaders of Chad's mediation team claimed Chad cannot afford to host meetings of the Joint Commission on the Darfur Humanitarian Ceasefire or support the visit of a verification team to Darfur. From our perspective, the African Union (AU), the Joint Commission's co-chair, could help ease some of the pressures by providing more logistical support. End Summary. 2. (C) The Ambassador called on Special Advisor for International Relations Alam-mi Ahmad and Special Advisor to the Presidency General Mahamat Ali March 7 at their request to hear an appeal for help in paying the bills for Chad's mediation efforts on Darfur. As French Ambassador Bercot waited in the reception room for his turn to receive the same pitch, President Deby's advisors told the Ambassador that Chad wants to serve the international community as well as its own people in helping to mediate an end to the Darfur conflict. But, they stressed, it simply does not have the means to continue doing so. 3. (C) Alam-mi said Chad has been exhausted by the conflict in Darfur. The mediation effort and additional security on the border has cost Chad almost USD 20 million, he claimed. Chad is paying exorbitant bills to house the rebel delegations in N'Djamena. It is stuck with transportation expenses. It has to shoulder the costs of meetings of the Joint Ceasefire Commission. To underscore his point, Alam-mi provided copies of communications with the Embassy concerning the bill for the charter flight U.S. representatives had promised to pay for carrying AU and rebel movement representatives to the ceasefire negotiations last March. 4. (C) Alam-mi and Ali said it is time to convene the next meeting of the Joint Ceasefire Commission, but Chad does not have the resources to host it. They had planned to send a verification team to determine troop positions in Darfur March 10, but Chad cannot afford that either. In conclusion, they urged U.S. help to defray the cost of Chad's mediation efforts. 5. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States has already committed over USD 80 million to the refugee relief efforts in eastern Chad. He said the United States is looking at proposals to expand support for Chadian populations directly affected by the refugee influx. He pointed to U.S. support for the AU's monitoring and protection force in Darfur. He promised to convey their request, but suggested that Washington might be more receptive to assisting in reinforcing the AU's capacity in this effort. 6. (C) In response, Alam-mi said he had discussed the matter in Khartoum recently with AU Darfur envoy Sam Ibok. He was not impressed with the AU's ability. Nor did he think rebel representatives would agree to shift talks under the auspices of the Joint Ceasefire Commission to Addis Ababa. Alam-mi and Ali said the African Union is already supposed to be providing assistance, but is not following through. Chad is being dictated to by "little bureaucrats" at the AU, Alam-mi observed. 7 (C) Comment: For a government as strapped for cash as Chad's, it is not surprising that it is having a hard time supporting diplomatic efforts on Darfur. The question not raised in this discussion was what should be Chad's role as a mediator, even if it has the financial means to do so. It is too implicated in the conflict in Darfur to be trusted as an honest broker by the belligerents. On the other hand, motivated by those interests and in the absence of any other competent regional party taking a day-to-day lead, it is at least doing what it can. Chad is desperate for a settlement. For the past year, Chadian officials have viewed the Joint Ceasefire Commission as their key mechanism to push the peace process. They are not likely to be willing to agree to a change in venue if it means giving up the chairmanship. It would ease some of the pressures on them if the AU was shouldering more of the logistical burden (e.g., paying hotel bills for the rebels, making transportation arrangements, installing a representative in N'Djamena charged with these tasks). 8. (C) We note again the unpaid bill for the charter flight to carry AU officials and representatives from the rebel movements to the talks in N'Djamena that resulted in the Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur last April. Our delegation agreed to pay the bill, but we have not done so. We understand it is now in the hands of the USAID Comptroller. We are ready to provide any additional information or documentation, but hope to resolve the matter as soon as possible. End Comment. 9. (U) Khartoum Minimize Considered WALL NNNN
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