US embassy cable - 05AMMAN1957

S E C R E T AMMAN 001957 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EB/ESC/TFS FOR NELSON 
EB/EPPD FOR THOMPSON 
S/CT FOR KUSHNER 
IO/PSC FOR SCHWEITZER 
NEA/ELA FOR MEYER/BARON 
TREASURY FOR ZARATE/GLASER 
OFAC FOR WERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2015 
TAGS: KTFN, KVPR, EFIN, PTER, ETTC, PREL, CVIS, JO 
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: 2005 UPDATE NO. 2 - EMBOFF ROLE 
 
REF: STATE 32688 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. Post provides replies to reftel queries as follows: 
 
2. (C) Over the past two years, the GOJ has not reported the 
seizure of any funds belonging to 1267-designated individuals 
or entities, though it has sent out freeze orders after each 
1267 designation.  (They did, however, freeze hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of Iraqi assets, $250 million of 
which has been transferred to the DFI.)  Jordanian banks are 
not allowed to perform any banking services for listed 
individuals or entities subsequent to their being listed.  If 
1267-designated funds were to be found in Jordan's financial 
system, the GOJ would freeze them under the regulatory 
authority of the Central Bank of Jordan.  The GOJ has legal 
authority to act because UN Security Council Resolutions 
override domestic laws. 
 
3. (C) The GOJ has historically been supportive in 
co-sponsoring designations upon our request.  If in the 
future, however, the U.S. were to ask for GOJ co-designation 
of an individual or entity who in the statement of case was 
described as having links to a Palestinian terrorist 
organization, the GOJ might balk at co-sponsorship for 
domestic political reasons (Jordanian citizens of Palestinian 
origin are estimated to represent more than 60% of total 
population). 
 
4. (C) Recent events have sparked an intense interest within 
the GOJ in improving its anti-terrorist financing regime. 
The GOJ would readily accept any assistance offered it in 
this field, including an assessment of training needs.  The 
GOJ's current priority needs center on the creation of a 
financial intelligence unit in the Central Bank, which will 
need to be set up in the most effective possible manner and 
whose staff will need to be trained to effectively operate 
the unit. 
 
5. (S) Jordan is a high-risk country both for significant 
fund raising and significant banking services.  The former 
risk is based on the presence of a large and relatively 
high-income Palestinian-Jordanian community, much of which is 
sympathetic to Palestinian militants operating next door, and 
of a large, relatively high-income, and predominantly Sunni 
Arab expatriate Iraqi community.  Fund-raising risk is 
mitigated by the relative ease of detection by Jordan's 
General Intelligence Directorate, which has proven to be 
highly competent in detecting conspiracies involving 
Jordanian extremists operating in Jordan and has made HAMAS 
and other Palestinian groups high-priority targets.  More 
worrisome is the risk that significant banking services will 
be available to terrorists.  There is evidence (for example, 
the recent results of an OCC investigation of Arab Bank's New 
York City branch) that services have inadvertently been 
provided to terrorists by Jordanian banks in the past; again, 
Jordan's proximity to areas of operation for terrorist groups 
is a primary reason for the risk.  Jordanian banks have by 
far the most extensive branch networks in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, hold banking licenses in Iraq or stakes in Iraqi 
banks, have large numbers of expatriate Iraqis as customers, 
and are now expanding on a small-scale basis into Syria. 
HALE