US embassy cable - 05ACCRA464

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A GHANAIAN ANALYST'S VIEW OF THE TOGO CRISIS

Identifier: 05ACCRA464
Wikileaks: View 05ACCRA464 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Accra
Created: 2005-03-08 14:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: GH PGOV PREL TO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: GH, PGOV, PREL, TO 
SUBJECT: A GHANAIAN ANALYST'S VIEW OF THE TOGO CRISIS 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF SCOTT TICKNOR FOR REASONS 1.5 D AND E. 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  James Gbeho, one of Ghana's most prominent 
foreign policy analysts and a former Foreign Minister, 
recently presented a paper in Accra on the Togo crisis.  He 
was cynical about the motives of Faure Gnassingbe and the 
Togolese military.  He saw the possibility of civil war, with 
significant implications for Ghana and the region.  He 
privately told Pol FSN that Nigeria had threatened Gnassingbe 
with military force.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U)  In a February 24 public presentation in Accra, 
Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, one of Ghana's leading foreign 
policy analysts, a retired senior diplomat and Foreign 
Minister under former President J.J. Rawlings, offered a 
crisp analysis of the situation in Togo.  He described Faure 
Gnassingbe and his government as "past masters at deception 
and prevarication who will play for time while they dig in 
and contrive illegal moves to perpetuate their authoritarian, 
corrupt and illegal seizure of power." He offered the 
following analysis: 
 
Origins of the crisis:  The crisis stems primarily from the 
Togolese military's desire for self-preservation and 
perpetuation of benefits enjoyed during 38 years of Eyadema. 
The predominantly northern, ethnically Kabiye Togolese army 
is afraid that giving up power will expose them to revenge 
and endanger their personal safety and misbegotten wealth. 
When they took power, Gnassingbe and the military acted 
according to a prearranged game plan. 
Implications for Togo:  Any outbreak of violence would set 
Togo on a path of civil war.  Neighboring countries 
considering invading Togo to oust the Gnassingbe junta should 
think again, given the potential for spurring more broad 
based violence.  Togo could split along north-south lines. 
Civil war would make Togo a magnet for illegal arms smuggling 
in the region. 
 
Implications for Ghana:  Because Ghana and Togo share almost 
all major tribes, instability in Togo could spur ethnic 
violence in Ghana.  Ghana-Togo relations, currently the best 
in four decades, would be strained.  Ghana's eastern border 
would be destabilized by movements of fighters, flows of 
illegal arms, and refugees.  Ghana could not support a 
meaningful refugee program by itself and would need 
assistance.  Civil war would also destroy Ghana's overland 
trade to Benin and Nigeria and disrupt cross-border economic 
activity. 
 
Implications for the Region:  A destabilized Togo would 
damage the economies of West Africa.  Traders from Ghana and 
Benin have already slowed down commercial activities as they 
keep a watch on the Togo crisis.  Conflict in Togo would 
attract some of the hundreds of young mercenaries in the 
region, including child soldiers.  The Togo situation could 
embolden militaries in other regional countries, most notably 
in Guinea.  ECOWAS has done admirable work in responding to 
the Togo crisis, but failure in Togo would likely spell doom 
for the organization. 
 
Solutions:  An imperfect solution is preferable to full blown 
civil war.  The current, biased constitution is not a good 
document from which to build democracy in Togo and needs to 
be revised.  The Electoral Commission and National Assembly 
are partisan and need reforming.  Elections should not be 
held for six months or a year, allowing time to amend 
capricious laws, create a new voter register, and prepare for 
the elections.  Togolese should be prepared to indemnify 
perpetrators of abuses in the interest of peace and national 
unity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
3.  (C)  Some other private think tank analysts here share 
the suspicions that Gnassingbe and the Togolese military are 
insincere and trying their best to buy time.  They concur 
that an ethnic conflict in Togo could fuel a flow of illegal 
arms and mercenaries in the region.  While Gbeho's 
presentation was before elections were called in Togo and 
Gnassingbe resigned, much of his analysis is still relevant 
as the perspective of an influential private Ghanaian analyst 
with excellent access in the GOG and academia.  Ambassador 
Gbeho told Pol FSN privately that ECOWAS Chairman Chambas (a 
former colleague) informed him that Obasanjo had threatened 
Gnassingbe with a Nigerian military invasion if he did not 
bend to ECOWAS demands.  He also confirmed information which 
Pol FSN has heard from other sources that the Ghanaian 
Embassy in Togo is heavily staffed by Ghanaian intelligence 
officers. 
 
 
 
 
YATES 

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