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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI1783 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI1783 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-03-08 10:58:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | KSTC MARR MASS PGOV PREL IN NSSP |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001783 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2015 TAGS: KSTC, MARR, MASS, PGOV, PREL, IN, NSSP SUBJECT: INDIA SEEKS TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON MISSILE DEFENSE Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake Jr, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (S) Summary: During a highly-anticipated February 22 briefing on the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile defense system, GOI and USG representatives cited the exchange as evidence of the transformed Indo-US relationship. Throughout the session, GOI statements and questions indicated a keen interest not only in procurement, but opportunities for technology sharing to include collaboration and joint-production. Questions from the Indian delegation focused on PAC-2 performance parameters, shelf life, capabilities compared to Israel's Arrow system, US missile defense deployment plans, and possibilities for technology transfer and co-production. The GOI delegation was well aware that the briefing was limited to PAC-2 and posed few questions beyond that scope, although some specific technical questions will require follow-up. In separate follow-on conversations with MEA Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera Shankar and MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar on February 23, US representatives expressed their willingness to keep the PAC-2 dialogue open if the GOI has a continued interest. Shankar clarified the status of India's missile defense planning and specifically requested a MD technical collaboration agreement with the US. End Summary. Partnership Delivers PAC-2 Briefing ----------------------------------- 2. (SBU) In his opening remarks, head of the Indian delegation MOD Joint Secretary Gautam Mukhopadhaya heralded the PAC-2 briefing as the result of achievements in the Indo-US political relationship. He welcomed the briefing as an indication of both countries, willingness to "step into more advanced areas of defense technology; not limited to procurement, but also including joint development." While missile defense (MD) has "a certain cachet" in the press, Mukhopadhaya hoped this briefing would address the GOI's technical questions about such a system. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Director for Middle East, Asia and North Africa Ed Ross expressed appreciation for the "active and progressive" defense relationship that was developing between the two countries, and underscored that a briefing on "cutting edge technology" such as the PAC-2 is given only to "our closest friends." US Policy and Planning for Missile Defense ------------------------------------------ 3. (C) Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP Assistant for Missile Defense Policy, outlined the US approach to MD: field modest capabilities in 2004-05; add capabilities through research and development; and seek cooperation with allies. He noted that the addition of MD to the US defense posture has lessened dependence on nuclear forces for protection. In STRATCOM's plan for 2005, ten ground-based interceptors and up to 20 sea-based interceptors will be added, and other radars and laser systems added or upgraded. Another defense layer will be developed in 2006-08 by the addition of more ground- and sea-based interceptors and radars. US Combatant Commanders are currently undertaking operational planning for MD in their AORs and the services have begun to man and train for MD missions. David Kiefer of the Missile Defense Agency gave an overview of the US missile defense program,s goals, major components, current status and future plans. Patriot System Overview for India --------------------------------- 4. (S) Major John Eggert, US Army Staff, briefed the Patriot Configuration-3 Ground system and the PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile Plus (GEM ) missile. He enumerated improvements to Ground Configuration-3 over previous versions, to include upgraded radar and software, and remote launch capability. He gave a detailed depiction of system components and how they function and work together using "Track Via Missile" technology, and described a typical US Patriot battery. He also praised the long shelf-life and minimal maintenance requirements for the PAC-2 GEM missile. Eggert reported the perfect record of the Patriot system during OIF -- all nine theater ballistic missiles defined as a threat to protected assets were successfully intercepted. Finally, he displayed multiple diagrams showing PAC-2 GEM performance against missiles launched from different distances. In addition, the presentation also included GEM performance against fixed wing and cruise missile threats. (Note: Per standard guidance for such briefings, the Indian delegation was shown classified slides, but were not given hard copies of the briefing.) 5. (S) Questions from the Indian side included the following: -- What special waveforms does the system use to discriminate between decoys and warheads/re-entry vehicles? -- What is the maximum detection range and altitude? -- What is the maximum detection range and altitude in cued mode (i.e. when prompted by an outside detection system)? -- What is the minimum time and distance in which a missile threat can be engaged? -- What is the total area one Patriot battery defends? -- Has protection envelope data been verified by actual missile firings? -- What is the maximum range to hit a C-130 flying at an altitude of 5000-6000 meters? -- What is a PAC-2 GEM missile's time/range to self-destruction? -- How does Patriot handle multiple missiles launched at the same target? -- How does the missile complete its end game intercept, and can it do so without radar updates? -- What redundancies exist in case of radar failure? -- Can control of missile launchers be transferred if one battery goes down? -- How much time is required to pack up a Patriot battery, move it, and set it back up again? -- What is the "dead zone," or minimum range for the PAC-2 to detect/engage a threat? -- What Aegis radar upgrades are taking place (in relation to integration with Patriot)? -- What is the weight of the PAC-2 GEM warhead? -- How does Patriot compare to Israel's Arrow missile defense system? -- At this stage of the NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership), what kinds of information are you authorized to share? -- Has transfer of technology occurred with other countries buying Patriot? -- Has there been collaboration with other countries on PAC-3? -- Does the US have overarching missile cooperation arrangements with major partners, and does it involve technology sharing? -- Are other countries acquiring components of an overarching missile defense system? -- How effective is Patriot as a stand-alone system (i.e. without space-based cueing)? -- What is being developed beyond PAC-3? -- What is the status of MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System)? -- Will MEADS have a sea-based component? -- What is the time frame for MEADS to be deployed? 6. (S) An open-ended question and answer period allowed the Indian delegation to ask questions. They seemed satisfied with most of the answers, but did ask a few questions that were beyond the scope of the briefing, such as Patriot operation in "cued mode," Aegis integration, and a request for more information on "special wave forms" for target discrimination. The briefer did not have information to respond to a question about the weight of the PAC-2 GEM warhead, but offered to get the answer for the Indian side. FMS Process ----------- 7. (C) Following the briefing on PAC-2 capabilities, DSCA Director Ross highlighted differences and advantages of the FMS process over direct commercial sales, namely, that FMS includes USG engagement from the earliest stages of an acquisition. Not only does an FMS sale normally guarantee lifetime system support and a purchase price negotiated by, and at the same cost available to, the USG, but also, more importantly, it fosters a strong working relationship, which can facilitate acquisition of other sensitive technologies. He briefly outlined the initial steps in a successful FMS deal: 1) Notify DSCA early regarding requirements; 2) Submit requirements in a Letter of Request; then 3) USG reviews and responds in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with pricing and availability data. Follow-on MEA Dialogue ---------------------- 8. (C) In a follow-on meeting with MEA Americas Joint Secretary S. Jaishankar on February 23, Ross commented that SIPDIS the PAC-2 exchange was very forthcoming, and asked if Jaishankar had any feedback from the Indian side. Jaishankar responded that it will take a little time for him to receive feedback, but said he did gather that on some questions, it was not possible for the US side to provide a response at this time. Jaishankar thought the briefing was helpful for the GOI, and said that at this stage of India,s effort to determine its missile defense needs; &every bit (of information) we get8 is useful for India,s thought process. He noted a tendency in this type of meeting for Indian questioners to keep pressing, "Until you hit a wall." Jaishankar noted that conceptually, India is at a very early stage in its thought process on missile defense. 9. (C) Jaishankar asserted that, as a recent nuclear power, India brings few Cold War prejudices to its missile defense consideration. As a point of reference, he said the GOI is looking very closely at what Japan and Taiwan are doing with missile defense. Remarking on recent MD debate in the Indian press, Jaishankar observed that some commentators argue in favor of MD as a means of "adding to the uncertainties" of those who might launch nuclear weapons. 10. (C) Ross commented that while many believe the US is making missile defense available as part of its own overarching MD program, a future PAC-2 sale to India would be strictly for India's own use. In reference to India's interest in the PAC-3 system, Ross explained that even US Patriot batteries use a mix of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles. 11. (C) Jaishankar asked if the US now considers its NSSP obligation to provide a classified PAC-2 brief as having been fully discharged, and what the next step is. Jim Alverson, OSD/ISA-NESA India Country Director, responded that the US has completed the PAC-2 briefing, but that future missile defense dialogue and briefings would continue in accordance with NSSP. Alverson said that if India is interested in purchasing PAC-2, the USG and India would proceed along the same Foreign Military Sales process used for other major defense transactions. 12. (C) In a separate meeting on February 23, AC/RSS Director Robert Gromoll, SA/RA Director John Schlosser, and PolCouns met with MEA Additional Secretary for International Security, Meera Shankar. Shankar expressed appreciation for the "new depth" in the US-India bilateral relationship, reminding the US delegation that India was among the first countries to welcome the US vision of a missile defense shield. India's desires go well beyond MD acquisition, Shankar continued. The GOI is most interested in a technology partnership similar to MOUs the US has with other allies, including full collaboration and industrial participation. According to Shankar, since India's strategic MD framework is still being formed, the GOI has not reached consensus on whether they need a MD system or what elements it should have. As a result, New Delhi seeks more information about the future direction of the US MD network. Gromoll responded that he will follow-up on the possibilities of technical cooperation with Washington, and that the next step would be a formal letter of interest from the GOI. 13. (C) During a separate meeting that same day with Ed Ross, Shankar expressed appreciation for the PAC-2 briefing and the technical question-and-answer exchange that followed. She said India is at a very preliminary stage and is still conceptualizing whether it will pursue missile defense, and if so, what type and what elements it would seek. Beyond acquisition, Shankar expressed interest in areas of possible MD technological collaboration with the US. She inquired about PAC-2 and PAC-3 performance parameters in the Persian Gulf War (Note: The PAC-2 classified briefing contained PAC-2 performance information). Shankar stated that India has an interest in PAC-3. Ross explained that Ground Configuration-3, included in the brief, is the heart of the Patriot system with either the PAC-2 GEM or PAC-3 interceptors. He also expressed appreciation for the GOI's desire for industrial participation in MD. Shankar stressed that the GOI is very interested in MD "as a concept" that can strengthen India's nuclear posture of "No First Use." Shankar expressed strong interest in US-India technology collaboration on MD, and in pursuing a U.S-India Memorandum of Understanding on missile defense cooperation similar to that which the U.S. has with other countries. She further offered that India was looking forward to the March 3-4 command post exercise planning meeting with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency as an opportunity to build another dimension of our MD dialogue, and welcomed the invitation to send observers to the Roving Sands MD exercise at the end of March. She asked that the U.S. provide a written letter of invitation for India to send observers to the exercise (Note: MDA has since sent the letter to the GOI through Embassy New Delhi). PAC-2 Briefing Participant List ------------------------------- 14. (C) Delegation members for the 22 February classified PAC-2 briefing are listed below. India Delegation: -- Gautam Mukhopadhaya, Joint Secretary, MoD -- Maj Gen K. Mukherjee, Army HQ -- Brig Gen K.S. Sethi, Army HQ -- Brigadier P.C. Bakshi, Army HQ -- Lt Col P. Sharma, Army HQ -- Col R.K. Bhutani, Army HQ -- Col Vivekanandan, Army HQ -- Col K.J. Singh, Army HQ -- Rear Adm Nirmal Verma, Naval HQ -- Cmde T. Hari Ram, Naval HQ -- Cmde R. Bhatnagar, Naval HQ -- Air Cmde Matheswaran, Air HQ -- Air Cmde Pratap, Air HQ -- Air Marshal F.H. Major, DCIDS (OPS), HQ IDS -- AVM V.K. Verma -- Dr. V.K. Saraswat, Director RCI, DRDO -- A.S. Sharma, Project Director (WS), DRDO -- N. Prabhakar, Project Director (Mission), DRDO -- Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, Americas, MEA -- Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Under Secretary, DISA, MEA US Delegation: -- Ed Ross, Director DSCA/MEAN -- John K. Schlosser, SA/RA Director, DoS -- Robert Gromoll, AC/RSS Director, DoS -- Tom McIlvain, AC/RSS Foreign Affairs Officer, DoS -- Anne Smoot, DSCA India Program Director -- Jim Alverson, OSD/ISA-NESA India Country Director -- Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP Assistant for MD Policy -- Dave Kiefer, MDA -- Col Israel McReynolds, Army Director of Intl. Programs -- George Martinez, Army Security Assistance Command -- Major John Eggert, Army Patriot Program -- Lt Col Scott Denney, Chief, ODC India -- Maj Greg Winston, Deputy Chief, ODC India -- Maj Steve Hedden, Defense Coop. in Armaments, ODC India -- Maj Rick Bairett, US Embassy New Delhi, POL (notetaker) -- Stacy Gilbert, US Embassy New Delhi, PolMil (notetaker) 15. (U) DSCA/MEA Director Ross, SA/RA Director Schlosser, AC/RSS Director Gromoll, and OSD/ISA-NESA Country Director Alverson cleared this cable. MULFORD
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