US embassy cable - 05RANGOON296

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/PIMBS 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: ASEAN AMBASSADORS RESPOND TO RAZALI CLAIMS 
 
REF: A. STATE 36025 
     B. RANGOON 0266 
     C. 04 KUALA LUMPUR 4670 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Chief of Mission (COM) met separately 
with the Singaporean, Indonesian, and Malaysian ambassadors 
in Rangoon to hear their views on Burma's ASEAN chairmanship 
in 2006.  They dismissed the idea that their governments were 
prepared to be more activist on the issue of the Burmese 
assuming the chair.  Based on the comments of all three 
ambassadors, UNSYG Special Envoy Razali seems overly 
optimistic in suggesting that any of their countries will do 
more than "quietly remind" the Burmese of the need to meet 
certain international standards and actually propose that 
Burma step aside from the 2006 chairmanship.  Regarding 
Razali's continued role in Burma, the Malaysian ambassador 
was pessimistic, predicting that the ruling State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) would under no circumstances allow 
the Special Envoy (who has been shut out of the country since 
March 2004) to return until after the referendum on the new 
Constitution.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) On March 4, the COM met with Singaporean ambassador 
Thambynathan Jasudasen to hear his views regarding Burma 
assuming the ASEAN chairmanship in July 2006 and hosting the 
ASEAN Summit o/a December 2006.  When asked if he thought 
that there was any possibility that Singapore might suggest 
to the Burmese to step aside and pass the chairmanship to 
another country (Ref A), Jasudasen responded "If we asked 
that, the problem is then where do you stop?"  He said that 
if Burma was asked to step aside because of human rights 
issues "then what about Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam?" 
 
3. (C) Jasudasen said there were only a few ASEAN members 
with the "weight" to ask Burma to step aside.  In his view, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines "have the 
weight - Singapore doesn't have the weight."  He said 
Thailand has too many difficult bilateral issues with Burma, 
Indonesia is too concerned with domestic issues in the wake 
of the tsunami, Malaysia is unwilling, leaving only the 
Philippines.  (FYI: the Philippines would be the next country 
in the succession order after Burma for chairmanship; in 1999 
the Philippines took over as host of the 3rd annual ASEAN 
Informal Summit when Burma relinquished their turn as host of 
the event.  End FYI.)  However, he did not believe that the 
Philippines would make any strong push for ASEAN consensus to 
have Burma relinquish its turn, despite the blunt advice on 
democratization that President Arroyo appears to have 
delivered to Burmese Prime Minister Soe Win during his recent 
state visit to Manila (see Ref B).  The Singaporean summed up 
the situation by saying that everyone recognized the need for 
the Burmese government to make changes and that there was a 
downside to having Burma as ASEAN chair, but the problem was 
"Who will bell the cat?" 
 
4. (C) On March 7th, the COM met with Indonesian ambassador 
Wyoso Prodjowarsito and with Malaysian ambassador Dato Cheah 
Sam Kip, on separate occasions, to discuss the same topic. 
In each case, their reaction to the subject of passing over 
Burma for the ASEAN chairmanship was similar to that of the 
Singaporean.  Both dismissed the idea that their governments 
were prepared to be more activist on Burma as regards the 
chairmanship and noted there had been no such official 
instructions from their capitals on the matter.  Both 
ambassadors mentioned recent calls by ASEAN parliamentarians 
(including from Malaysia and Indonesia, Ref C) to deny Burma 
the ASEAN chair.  However, they stressed that these 
viewpoints were not those of their respective governments. 
The Malaysian ambassador said he did not think the ASEAN 
parliamentarians would have much luck getting their anti-SPDC 
presentation aired at the March 9-11 ASEAN-EU meetings in 
Jakarta. 
 
5. (C) Both ambassadors were explicit about their private 
frustrations dealing with the Burmese regime.  The Malaysian 
said he "couldn't understand their logic" and blamed the SPDC 
for the situation it found itself in vis a vis the 
international community.  He said that ASEAN governments, 
especially his own, found Burma to be "a great 
embarrassment," but it was not clear how to change the SPDC's 
behavior.  Direct pressure, both ambassadors agreed, would be 
counterproductive.  The Malaysian asserted that the GOB will 
"never do anything you ask them to do, even if it's in their 
interest."  He predicted that the policy of "quiet pressure" 
could continue in hopes the SPDC would take some steps to 
appease the international community before July 2006.  The 
Indonesian ambassador echoed this, saying it was too 
difficult for ASEAN leaders to directly criticize Burma, 
especially as the GOB is increasingly comfortable with the 
attentions lavished on it by China and, increasingly, India. 
However, the Indonesian added, he hoped the GOB would be 
willing to undertake some political reform before July 2006 
to avoid the embarrassment of a boycott by the United States 
and perhaps other western countries.  All three ambassadors 
thought it likely that the Burma situation would be discussed 
during the upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Cebu, 
Philippines at the end of March (none of the three thought it 
would be a major topic -- perhaps raised tangentially as part 
of the "regional developments" portion of the agenda). 
 
Comment 
 
6. (C)  Given the comments of the Singaporean, Indonesian, 
and Malaysian ambassadors, UNSYG Special Envoy Razali seems 
overly optimistic in suggesting that any of those countries 
will do more than "quietly remind" the Burmese of the need to 
meet certain international standards and actually propose 
that Burma step aside from the 2006 chairmanship (Ref A). 
Regarding Razali's continued role in Burma, the Malaysian 
ambassador was very pessimistic, saying that it was his "best 
guess" that the SPDC would under no circumstances allow the 
Special Envoy (who has been shut out of the country since 
March 2004) to return until after the referendum on the new 
Constitution.  (Note: the possible date for the referendum is 
unknown, but it is unlikely to take place before the end of 
2005. End note.)  End comment. 
Martinez