US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV1335

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KWBG, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: RAJOUB REPORTEDLY CLAIMING BROAD POWERS, SUCCESSES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
This message was cordinated with ConGen Jerusalem. 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Track II activists Boaz Karni and Dov Sedaka 
recounted to the Ambassador March 2 claims by recent PA 
National Security Advisor Jibril Rajoub of his own pivotal 
role and organizational successes within the Palestinian 
government and security operations.  Karni said that in a 
lengthy meeting with Rajoub the previous day, Rajoub had 
detailed what he claimed were his successful efforts to 
prevent -- "almost alone" -- the establishment of Abu Ala'a's 
first proposed government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Track II activists Boaz Karni and Dov Sedaka, both 
associated with the Economic Cooperation Foundation, briefed 
the Ambassador March 2 on recent discussions, including a 
lengthy meeting the day before, with former PA National 
Security Advisor Jibril Rajoub.  The three have worked 
together on various Track II activities in the past few 
years, including work on the recent Baker Institute paper on 
next steps in the peace process.  According to Karni and 
Sedaka, Rajoub told the two that he would be occupying a 
pivotal role within the Palestinian government and security 
operations.  Rajoub had described at some length what he 
claimed were his successful efforts -- "almost alone" -- to 
prevent the establishment of Abu Ala'a's first proposed 
government and influence the composition of the eventualy 
approved government. 
 
3.  (C) Rajoub also predicted that he would continue as 
national security advisor, occupying a new office very close 
to that of President Abu Mazen, and serve as the "key 
contact" on security issues, all points that he claimed 
President Abu Mazen told General Ward during their February 
meeting.  As for newly appointed Interior Minister MG Nasser 
Yusif, Rajoub reportedly said that Yusif's new responsibility 
is "too high for him (Yusif)."  As such, Rajoub also told 
Karni, he (Rajoub) wants to establish contact with "the 
Americans."  (Note: In a subsequent conversation, Karni told 
POL/C that Rajoub and Mohammed Dahlan are also worried that 
Yusif "does not understand the Israelis," and that they are 
"not sure he can handle meetings with the Israelis."  They 
reportedly  suggested that since Dahlan has removed himself 
from the security portfolio, Rajoub should find a way to 
accompany Yusif to any meetings with Israeli officials.)  The 
Ambassador said he had no indication that Abu Mazen had 
advised Ward of either Rajoub's alleged appointment as 
national security advisor, or Rajoub's claimed primacy on 
security issues.  Karni said Rajoub also claimed to be in 
dialogue with the Shin Bet. 
 
4.  (C) According to Karni, Rajoub also claimed to be the 
head of a new, super-empowered committee to conduct 
negotiations with the Israelis.  Rajoub claimed that this 
body, which he dubbed "the real team," would include Abu 
Mazen, Abu Ala'a, Mohammed Dahlan, Nasser Yusif, Saeb Erekat, 
Akram Haniya, and Nabil Shaath, and possibly Nasser Al Qidwa 
and Hassan Asfour.  Rajoub claimed to be "very proud" of his 
accomplishments to date, and according to Karni, said he 
wants to topple Abu Ala'a within three months. 
 
5.  (C) Rajoub also claimed to be working across borders and 
factions.  He reportedly told Karni that now is the time to 
bring into a national dialogue all factions, because the 
Syrians are trouble.  To that end, Rajoub said he would 
travel to Damascus March 6 and 7 to tell the Syrians to stop 
backing terrorist activities, and he claimed that he would be 
carrying the same message to Tehran in the near future. 
(Note: Karni told POL/C March 7 that Rajoub had postponed his 
Damascus trip for an indefinite period.)  In an apparent 
contradiction, Rajoub also reportedly said that he was, in 
fact, postponing the national dialogue while engaging in 
preparations for the Arab summit in Cairo.  Rajoub's aims 
there, he said, are to: gain support for the Palestinian 
"struggle," gain support for the new president and elected 
government, secure support for a return to the roadmap, and 
gain support for a renewed Arab initiative concerning 
Palestine. 
 
6.  (C) Karni said that Rajoub seemed to have "quite a lot of 
information" on the February 5 terrorist bombing in downtown 
Tel Aviv, and claimed that Ziad Nakhleh, allegedly the deputy 
chief of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Damascus, knew nothing 
about the attack.  Karni said that Rajoub claimed, both in 
their meeting and on television, that the attack was 
conducted independently, with no outside intervention, and 
that there had been total agreement within the Gaza Strip PIJ 
leadership to suspend attacks.  Rajoub reportedly expressed 
sorrow at the deaths and injuries caused by the attack, but 
noted that the incident was the first in which the GOI gave 
the PA an opportunity to condemn an attack.  Karni said that 
Jibril also cited what he claimed is a loss of stature by 
Hamas as a result of Syria's current weakness. 
 
7.  (C) Offering his own assessment, Karni said that if 
Rajoub and Dahlan, the original chiefs of the Preventive 
Security Organization branches in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, respectively, can cooperate, they would be "the best 
team on security."  (Note: During their respective tours as 
PSO chiefs, and since, Dahlan and Rajoub have been fierce 
competitors for power, including that arising from proximity 
to the late PA President Arafat, and for international 
connections and prestige.  End Note). 
 
8.  (C) The Ambassador pointed out to Karni and Sedaka that 
the international community has two imperatives that 
sometimes conflict.  The first is to make the Palestinian 
Authority act effectively against terror, and the second is 
to give Palestinian democratic institutions the chance to 
grow.  Abu Mazen's designation of Nasser Yusif as Interior 
Minister is a demonstration of proper civilian control of 
security forces, he said, and it is hard to believe that Abu 
Mazen told General Ward to speak to Rajoub on security 
issues.  If Abu Mazen determines that Rajoub is to 
participate on the Palestinian side in security talks, then 
the USG will deal with him, otherwise, the USG will deal with 
the designated security apparatus. 
 
9.  (C) The Ambassador stressed that the key issue is getting 
talks to resume sooner rather than later.  He noted reports 
that Israel is ready to transfer to the PA security 
responsibility for Jericho and Tulkarm, and that the issues 
remaining on the table seem resolvable.  Sedaka, an IDF 
reserve brigadier general with long experience in the 
Occupied Territories, responded that the GOI is being "too 
tough" on security points associated with the transfers and 
that an agreement already exists to guide the transfer.  The 
Ambassador noted that the sides need to sit down and 
negotiate the points, he said. 
 
10.  (C) Karni and Sadaka noted their observation that the 
IDF in the West Bank has gotten tougher since the appointment 
of MG Yair Naveh as head of the Central Command.  They noted 
that previous Central Commander MG Moshe Kaplinski had 
instructed his troops to refrain from any entry into Area A 
and from almost any entry into Area B.  Naveh immediately 
reversed that order, and IDF troops have been conducting 
numerous operations within those areas ever since. 
 
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KURTZER