US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO488

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WORRIED ABOUT LTTE AIR 
CAPABILITY; ASKS U.S. ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 816 0083 04 (NOTAL) 
     B. IIR 6 816 0091 04 (NOTAL) 
     C. IIR 6 816 0119 04 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S) In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 4, Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar expressed concern that 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air assets could be 
used to conduct suicide attacks against Government and/or 
foreign targets.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) views the 
Tigers' ongoing efforts to upgrade its air capabilities as a 
violation of the Ceasefire Agreement.  Kadirgamar asked the 
U.S. to "caution" the LTTE against conducting hostile 
activities against the Government of Sri Lanka and to demand 
that the air capabilities "be dismantled in a verifiable 
way."  The Norwegian Ambassador passed a similar message, at 
the Government's request, to LTTE authorities on March 5. 
While it is unclear that the LTTE activities constitute a 
technical violation of the ceasefire, the Tigers' decision to 
unveil potentially hostile air capabilities at this 
particular juncture, when development of a Government/LTTE 
"joint mechanism" on tsunami relief cooperation is inching 
forward, is puzzling.  We should seek opportunities to send 
the message that LTTE deployment of air assets is a 
provocative act, which threatens the ceasefire and the peace 
process.  End summary. 
 
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LTTE AIR ASSETS: 
GSL NOW OFFICIALLY CONCERNED 
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2.  (S)  On March 4 Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar 
called the Ambassador to pass on a letter to Secretary Rice 
asking for U.S. assistance in discouraging the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from exploiting its air 
capabilities against the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL). 
(Note:  A copy of the letter has been faxed to SA/INS; the 
original will be pouched to SA/INS.  End note.)  The letter, 
dated March 4, notes that the GSL had already raised the 
LTTE's construction of a runway in Iranamadu with the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) without obtaining any 
satisfactory resolution.  The GSL now has confirmed, via 
video footage "and through other sources," that the LTTE 
possesses two aircraft, "of possible Czech origin," capable 
of carrying "war-heads of substantial explosive power and a 
significant flying-range."  This enhanced capability poses 
"destabilizing implications for the maintenance of regional 
and international peace and security."  The Ambassador 
undertook to relay this message to Washington as quickly as 
possible. 
 
3.  (S)  Kadirgamar's letter notes that with the acquisition 
of these air assets, the LTTE could claim control of the air 
space over "uncleared (or LTTE-controlled) areas," thereby 
seriously compromising Sri Lanka's national sovereignty.  If 
provoked, "the Government of Sri Lanka would be compelled to 
take all lawful measures in the performance of its legitimate 
task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka, to countermand any hostile action by 
the LTTE."  Moreover, by developing this capability, the LTTE 
has committed "a serious violation, both in letter and 
spirit, of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)."  In closing, the 
letter appeals to the U.S. to "express your deep concern at 
these developments, cautioning the LTTE against engaging in 
any form of unlawful and hostile activity, through the 
acquisition of aircraft and demanding that the newly acquired 
offensive air capabilities be dismantled in a verifiable way." 
 
4.  (S)  Attached to the letter is an aide memoire outlining 
the extent of GSL information about the airfield and aircraft 
(much of which we had earlier provided through our Defense 
Attache).  According to this note, construction of the 
runway, which the Sri Lankan Air Force had been monitoring 
since November 2003, appeared complete by the end of 
September 2004.  The completed airfield is about 1.2 km long 
and 30 meters wide and, according to the aide memoire, could 
accommodate a C-130.  At about the same time, the GSL also 
reportedly learned of two aircraft, as well as a possible 
unmanned aerial vehicle, in the Wanni, where LTTE 
headquarters are located.  The GSL reported the activity to 
the SLMM, which conveyed the complaint to the LTTE.  The LTTE 
acknowledged having the runway, but took no action to 
dismantle it.  In January 2005 footage from an unmanned 
aerial vehicle revealed the presence of two different 
aircraft "in good flyable condition" on the runway, which 
were later determined to be "medium range light aircraft 
similar to Zlin 143, reportedly of Czech manufacture." 
 
5.  (S) According to the aide memoire, this enhanced 
capability permits the LTTE to fly aircraft in and out of 
northern Sri Lanka "comfortably," potentially enabling "the 
transport of war material and personnel not only into Sri 
Lanka but also within and beyond the region in violation of 
UN Security Council Resolutions . . . (and could) serve as 
part of the infrastructure for a flying training 
establishment for suicide aviation activity of Al Queda 
type."  Moreover, "it is not inconceivable that on a single 
suicide mission one of these aircraft could drop separate 40 
kg bombs" on a number of sensitive national targets, 
including Parliament and the President's House, or the 
dockyards and oil tanks in the eastern district of 
Trincomalee. 
 
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NORWEGIANS ALSO PASSING THE WORD 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (S) In a separate conversation March 6, Norwegian 
Ambassador Hans Brattskar told Ambassador Lunstead that he 
had, at President Chandrika Kumaratunga's request, raised the 
LTTE's enhanced air capabilities with LTTE authorities when 
he met them at Tiger headquarters in Kilinochchi the previous 
day (septel).  LTTE political wing leader Thamilchelvan was 
blase, telling Brattskar that he did not understand the fuss, 
since the Tigers had had air capabilities for some time. 
(The Tigers had an earlier airstrip, which was bombed by the 
Sri Lankan Air Force during the period of hostilities.) 
Brattskar said he was unsure whether the activity actually 
constitutes a ceasefire violation, as the CFA does not 
specifically prohibit either party from upgrading its 
military capabilities.  Although President Kumaratunga--with 
her long-standing and well-founded concerns about LTTE 
suicide bombers--obviously feels very strongly about this 
issue, unless it is a breach of the CFA, the LTTE's new and 
improved air capabilities are not an issue for Norway, he 
said.  Ambassador Lunstead noted that the issue raises two 
related questions.  First, does the activity constitute a 
ceasefire violation?  Second, and perhaps more important, 
regardless of whether it technically constitutes a violation, 
why has the LTTE deliberately chosen to provoke the GSL at 
this specific time? 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (S) It is hardly surprising (especially to us, since we 
provided the GSL much of the information) that the Tigers are 
continuing, despite the ceasefire, to upgrade their military 
capabilities.  (The GSL, for example, with its acquisition of 
our former Coast Guard cutter "Courageous," is doing the same 
thing.)   What is surprising is that the Tigers should choose 
this particular juncture, when talks aimed at setting up a 
mechanism to coordinate post-tsunami relief look promising 
(septel), to expose their enhanced capabilities to the GSL. 
The intended message to the GSL, which may be feeling more 
confident after the increased international sympathy--and 
increased foreign assistance--garnered after the tsunami, 
could be, "Don't get too confident."  Some of the GSL's 
statements are a bit overblown; the Tigers could hardly use 
two single-engine prop planes to "take control of the air 
space" over northern Sri Lanka when the GSL has a modern air 
force with jet fighters.  Nonetheless, given the Tigers' 
long-demonstrated expertise in suicide bombing by land and 
sea, their acquisition of apparent air capabilities as well 
is an unwelcome development.  We should seek opportunities to 
send the message to the Tiger leadership that LTTE deployment 
of air assets is a provocative act which threatens the 
ceaefire and the peace process. 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD