US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO485

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  NORWEGIAN ENVOY SAYS TSUNAMI 
COOPERATION DOABLE--IF GSL WANTS IT; EU REP MAY DEFER TALK 
WITH TIGERS 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) In a March 6 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, summarizing his findings 
after a trip to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
headquarters in Kilinochchi the previous day, said that "if 
the Government of Sri Lanka really wants a mechanism (to 
cooperate on tsunami assistance), they can get it."  He added 
that Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen would be calling 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga to make this point on March 
7.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) had made numerous 
comments on the Norwegians' draft proposal for the 
mechanism--most of them minor bureaucratic quibbles, he 
noted.  Brattskar said the GSL also has some important and 
legitimate concerns, including protection of minority rights 
and not allowing the LTTE to gain control of offshore 
resources. He said he had reminded the GSL to view the 
mechanism as a political issue, rather than a bureaucratic 
one.  In fact, he said he had emphasized to the GSL that 
Tiger agreement to a mechanism would be tantamount to an 
implicit recognition of the principle of federalism--and thus 
a substantial LTTE concession. 
 
2.  (C)  Brattskar said he was concerned that, despite the 
encouraging signals he had received from Kilinochchi, the GSL 
appeared to be hesitating.  If the GSL cannot agree to this 
comparatively simple arrangement, how will it be able to 
negotiate something far more difficult--like an interim 
administration? he queried.  And if it becomes obvious that 
the GSL cannot do that and never will be able to do that, how 
will it be possible to maintain the Ceasefire Agreement?  He 
indicated that GSL failure to overcome its penchant for 
bureaucratic nitpicking and see the big-picture benefits of 
an aid cooperation mechanism could undermine the strength of 
the ceasefire. 
 
3.  (C) In a separate conversation on March 6, EU Charge 
d'Affaires Wouter Wilton told the Ambassador that the GSL had 
agreed that Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for 
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, could 
visit Kilinochchi during her March 7-8 visit to Sri Lanka on 
two conditions.  First, Ferrero-Waldner should bring the LTTE 
leadership "clear messages" stressing the need for a joint 
mechanism on tsunami relief; urging the Tigers to renounce 
violence and respect human rights; and underscoring the 
importance of adhering to the principles of the Oslo 
Declaration.  Second, the GSL requested that Ferrero-Waldner 
issue a public statement confirming that she had passed these 
points to the Tigers. 
 
4.  (C) Nonetheless, Wilton said, Ferrero-Waldner may not go 
to Kilinochchi after all.  The reason:  late March 5 the LTTE 
called, advising that Tiger supremo Prabhakaran was 
indisposed with an unspecified "childhood illness" and thus 
unable to meet Ferrero-Waldner.  The EU Mission was thus 
considering postponing the trip to Kilinochchi, deferring 
discussions until a previously scheduled trip to Europe by 
LTTE political wing leader Thamilchelvan later in the month. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  It is ironic that the GSL is urging the EU 
to press the Tigers on a joint cooperation mechanism at the 
very time, according to the Norwegians, the GSL appears to be 
dragging its own heels on the same point.  Our Norwegian 
colleagues have often (unfavorably) contrasted the GSL's 
legalistic, bureaucratic approach to the Tigers' more direct, 
pragmatic style.  (In the GSL's defense, directness is a 
virtue more easily wielded in dictatorships--like 
Prabhakaran's--than in democracies.)  Moreover, the mutual 
(and usually well-founded) distrust each party harbors about 
the other's motives raises an immediate red flag any time one 
side seems disposed to accept a proposal.  Unfortunately, 
this time the GSL's pettifogging may sink a proposal that 
could be a crucial first step toward building confidence 
between the two parties.  The recent uptick in tit-for-tat 
violence (septel) underscores more urgently than ever the 
need for some concrete progress in the peace process.  We 
will continue to urge the GSL to consider carefully and 
expeditiously this important opportunity to move ahead. 
LUNSTEAD