US embassy cable - 05BUCHAREST548

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, RS, MD, RO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BASESCU'S MARCH 8-9 TRIP 
TO WASHINGTON 
 
REF: A. A) BUCHAREST 476 
 
     B. B) BUCHAREST 429 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas Delare for Reasons 1.4 B and D 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During the first few months of his mandate, 
President Traian Basescu has pledged to vigorously battle 
corruption, supported implementation of free market economic 
reforms and promised to steer Romania to EU accession in 
2007.  Basescu is intellectually and emotionally pro-American 
- a stalwart supporter of the U.S.-led Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) and firmly committed to transatlantic values 
and institutions.  He views Romania's strategic partnership 
with the U.S. as the lynchpin of his nation's foreign policy 
and he will underscore that commitment during his March 8-9 
visit to Washington.   End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Romania's new president, Traian Basescu, travels to 
Washington March 8-9 with the hope of cementing ties with the 
country he has characterized as "absolutely fundamental" for 
Romania's strategic interests.  Intuitively and 
intellectually pro-American, Basescu and his team view this 
trip not only as important for bilateral relations, but also 
as central to what he and his presidency have come to 
represent -- a strong orientation towards the U.S., free 
market economic reform, and democratic change that brings 
Romanian democracy closer to the people.  Throughout his 
political life, Basescu has earned a reputation as 
straightforward, plainspoken, and charismatic.  A former 
merchant marine captain and twice-elected mayor of Bucharest, 
Basescu offers a populist touch that contrasts sharply with 
the previous political leadership known for paternalism, 
formality, and a lack of transparency.  He has entered office 
committed to combating corruption and fully integrating 
Romania into European and transatlantic institutions. 
 
Romania's "Orange Revolution" 
----------------------------- 
3.  (C) Basescu's upset presidential victory against former 
Prime Minister Adrian Nastase on December 12 surprised even 
his closest political advisors and ushered in a new era of 
center-right government.  Upon the initial release of results 
on election night, youthful supporters clad in orange flooded 
the streets of central Bucharest in a scene reminiscent of 
events in neighboring Ukraine the week before.  In subsequent 
weeks he appointed center-right co-leader Calin 
Popescu-Tariceanu as prime minister, and rebuffed attempts by 
the then ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) to maintain a 
hold on the government and parliament. Basescu and Tariceanu 
asserted that they were committed to leadership untainted by 
corruption or communist pasts.  As a result, the new cabinet 
they formed is the youngest in Romania's post-communist 
history, with an average age in the late 30's.  It also 
includes many members with solid experience in the private 
sector and NGO community. 
 
4. (C) In its slightly more than two months in office, the 
new government has implemented bold measures such as 
introducing a 16 percent flat tax on incomes and corporate 
profits and declaring the fight against high-level corruption 
as a national security priority.  On the latter issue, there 
has been movement on several large-scale corruption cases, 
including a scandal involving the erasure of massive tax 
arrears owed by a politically connected oil refining company. 
In an attempt to redress some of the wrongs committed under 
communist rule, Basescu has vowed to open up additional files 
of the notorious former secret police for public inspection. 
He has also promised to reform Romania's inefficient and 
often corrupt judiciary, putting several agency heads on 
notice that he is closely monitoring their work and will be 
making personnel decisions based on their effectiveness in 
the near future.  On another sore point, Basescu has already 
taken steps to make good on his pledge to eliminate political 
pressure on the Romanian media, a significant problem under 
the previous government. 
These actions have boosted his post-election popularity to 
new heights.  He has publicly stated that he will be "the 
most hands-on president" since Romania's 1989 return to 
democratic rule. 
 
Seeking Strong Transatlantic Ties 
--------------------------------- 
5. (C) During his presidential campaign, Basescu repeatedly 
made reference to what he called a 
"Bucharest-London-Washington" axis. He clearly intended to 
emphasize that his government would seek to strengthen 
Romania's "strategic partnership" with the U.S. and Britain. 
We understand such assertions have raised eyebrows in 
Brussels, Paris, and Berlin.  Nonetheless, Basescu has 
refused to back off his robustly pro-American stance.  When 
pressed by the media as to what such a special relationship 
would entail, Basescu has pointed to the importance of a U.S. 
role in the Black Sea region and Romania's solid commitment 
to the NATO alliance.  More fundamentally, however, Basescu 
and his advisors have stressed that this policy orientation 
is grounded in shared democratic values, including a 
commitment to combating dictatorship and promoting freedom. 
 
6. (C) In his public appearances and discussions with U.S. 
officials, including the President, Basescu will undoubtedly 
seek our endorsement of his vision of a stronger strategic 
relationship.  Should he go into detail, we are likely to 
hear about Romanian desire to push forward on enhanced 
cooperation in the Black Sea area ) to include joint 
promotion of democratic values or initiatives to boost 
economic reform in littoral states.  He may also raise the 
concept of a Black Sea Trust Fund to be located in Bucharest, 
along the model of the Balkan Trust Fund in Belgrade.  Such a 
fund would be aimed at strengthening civic participation and 
democratic governance in the region.  Romania has not fleshed 
out the idea beyond a conceptual phase, but Basescu may ask 
for our overt support.  Finally, Basescu is clearly enthused 
about the &Orange Revolution8 that swept into power in 
Ukraine and here and would like to use the momentum he 
perceives to help jar loose the long frozen conflict between 
Moldova and Transnistria with the direct involvement of 
Romania.  Washington should read the last point, at a 
minimum, as a desire to be included in the current 
multilateral framework under OSCE aegis (See also Ref A). 
 
7. (C) Basescu and Tariceanu have also reaffirmed strong 
support for a potential U.S. basing presence in Romania. 
They view such proposed basing as confirmation of the trust 
the U.S. has in Romania as an ally. 
 
A Steadfast GWOT Ally: Romania in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
Emerging Strategy of Terrorist Preemption 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
8. (C) Romania has been a continuous supporter of U.S. led 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Basescu has vowed to 
ensure a Romanian troop presence in those countries "as long 
as necessary."  Romania has maintained more than 700 troops 
in Iraq, and is deploying an additional infantry company for 
UN force protection.  In Afghanistan, more than 400 Romanian 
soldiers serve alongside U.S. forces.  Romania has made its 
military facilities and airspace fully available to U.S. 
forces.  Basescu has pledged to support Afghan authorities in 
upcoming parliamentary elections and has promised to deploy a 
battalion in support of those elections. 
 
9. (C) In general, the commitment to the GWOT, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq receives broad bipartisan support in Romania, with 
few calls from the media or opinion leaders for a departure 
from this policy.  The Basescu administration has actively 
expressed support for the GWOT in international fora such as 
the UN and endorses President Bush's Proliferation Security 
Initiative. Finally, the Ministry of Defense has announced 
its intention to adopt a strategy of preemption vis-a-vis 
international terrorism.  This point is to be made in a 
defense white paper that is expected to see further 
definition and the light of day in about 30 days time. 
 
Forging Ahead on EU Accession 
----------------------------- 
10. (C) Basescu and his government are staunchly committed to 
securing Romania's 2007 EU accession. This enjoys widespread 
political and popular support, though the average Romanian 
remains unclear about the specific implications of EU 
membership.  Most view EU accession, together with 2004 NATO 
membership, as solidifying Romania's Western orientation 
after decades of communist rule.  Basescu is slated to go to 
Brussels in late April to sign Romania's accession treaty, an 
historic step that will set in motion the final process for 
implementing EU-mandated reforms.  EU member officials tell 
us Romania's membership in 2007 is almost certain, and would 
only be impeded by a major interruption in democratic 
governance or backsliding in anti-corruption efforts or other 
reforms. 
 
Some Points of Contention: Adoptions, Awards, Accidents and 
(Business) Acrimony 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
11. (C) While overall relations with Romania are excellent, 
there are a number of contentious issues which have either 
eluded resolution or which, though moving in a positive 
direction, could benefit from the attention of the White 
House or other USG authorities.  At the same time, at least 
one contentious issue is likely to be raised by the Romanians. 
 
12. (C) The first issue is Romania's failure thus far to 
resolve over 200 pending intra-country adoption cases for 
U.S. parents.  Although just a few weeks ago Basescu and his 
government pledged privately to create an international 
commission to review and resolve these outstanding cases, 
advisors in recent days have told us that pressure from the 
European Commission is making it "even more difficult" for 
Basescu and Tariceanu to carry out such a plan at present.  A 
direct and pointed request from President Bush that these 
cases be resolved may offer the only possibility for moving 
the Romanian government forward towards setting up a 
commission.  Basescu may agree to do so after key events 
related to EU accession take place in April. 
 
13. (C) The second issue is the awarding in December by the 
previous Romanian president of Romania,s highest honor, the 
Star of Romania, to ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic 
politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor.  Nobel Prize laureate Elie 
Wiesel immediately resigned his membership in the Order of 
the Star and -- along with prominent U.S. and international 
Jewish leaders -- continues to call for Romania to revoke 
Tudor's award.  The U.S. Embassy similarly has pressed 
Basescu and advisors to take appropriate action.  Basescu's 
team tells us the government is on the verge of setting up a 
process to revoke the award, with the mechanism likely to be 
in place before Basescu's trip to Washington. 
 
14. (C) The new Romanian Government's apparent willingness 
to tackle business issues requiring considerable political 
capital and courage ) notably including high-level 
corruption, radical tax reform and labor code reform - have 
drawn plaudits from U.S. business.  Nevertheless, compliments 
about the anti-corruption stance of the government should be 
linked with strong encouragement for appropriate prosecutions 
and effective implementation of numerous pieces of dormant 
anti-corruption legislation.  We note that the absence of a 
mention of corruption will be taken as a sign of 
indifference, not an impression we should make. 
 
15.  (C) On the negative side, the new government has been 
dilatory in meeting some contractual obligations with U.S. 
firms or in addressing flawed privatization contracts put in 
place by the last government that clearly disadvantage a 
number of U.S. purchasers.  In regard to the former, the 
largest project ever won by an American firm in this country 
has suffered from extensive contract reviews and payment 
delays. In this instance, Bechtel's 2.5 billion USD road 
project linking South-Central Romania to the Hungarian border 
has teetered on the brink of cancellation for months. 
Although some monies have just begun to flow, Bechtel is 
still owed about 90 million USD for work completed.  In 
addition, we understand that privatization difficulties may 
be raised by Congressional interlocutors of President 
Basescu.  If so, the complaints will likely relate to the 
flawed privatization conditions imposed by the last 
government that have prevented some U.S. purchasers from 
restructuring their new assets to become competitive. 
Noteworthy here are difficulties experienced by the U.S. 
purchases of 4x4 auto maker ARO. 
 
16.  (C) Finally, President Basescu can be expected to raise 
the December 2004 accident involving the U.S. Embassy Marine 
Security Guard detachment commander that led to the death of 
Romanian rock star Teo Peter.  Basescu is under considerable 
political pressure to make sure justice is done in a Romanian 
Court.  Naturally, given that Marine Corps legal proceedings 
against the former detachment commander have not even begun, 
the question of extradition and lifting of the Marine's 
immunity cannot even be addressed at the present time. 
Nevertheless, President Basescu may strongly ask for White 
House support for the Marine's return, probably repeating a 
promise made earlier to our Ambassador that the former 
detachment commander would receive a fair trial and, 
regardless of outcome, would not serve a single day in prison 
in Romania. 
 
Comment 
 
17.  (C) President Basescu is a plain speaking man who is not 
inclined to dodge a problem.  To his credit, his schedule 
includes a meeting with American adoptive parents and a visit 
to the Holocaust Museum.  In these cases, his advisors tell 
us that he will address the irritations of both groups, 
though neither may be wholly satisfied with the progress made 
to date or the explanation of constraints on his freedom to 
act.  On the question of the Marine and the death of the 
local rock star, the President has treated this extremely 
unfortunate event with dignity, not stooping to agitate the 
press for short-term political gain.  That latter sort of 
behavior was characteristic of former PM Adrian Nastase, 
Basescu's erst while rival for the presidency.  Nevertheless, 
nasty pressure from that same political quarter will compel 
President Basescu to make a plea for Romanian justice and the 
return of the former Marine detachment commander, so that he 
may demonstrate his ability to stand up for Romania. 
 
18. (C) Despite the potential negatives, the overall accent 
should remain on the positive.  Romania and President Basescu 
are extremely desirous of a closer strategic relationship and 
they continue to give substance to that desire with their 
unswerving commitment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
They see themselves capable of further contributions and will 
strongly make a case for bilateral cooperation in fostering 
political and economic reform, as well as strategic 
cooperation, in the Black Sea region.  Finally, Washington 
should note that President Basescu is an aggressive 
politician.  In his domestic campaigning he was clearly a 
master of making his opponent react to him.  Under attack, he 
can deliver a terrific counterstroke.  But it is also apropos 
to note that he is inclined to act in what he sees as 
Romania,s interest, even if it breaks crockery. 
Specifically, Washington should expect a strong push from him 
to rethink the approach to solutions of the 
Moldova-Transnistria problem.  Basescu is enthused about 
undisputed changes underway in South-East Europe and want to 
use those events to break the status quo. 
 
19.  (U) Amembassy Bucharest's Reporting telegrams, as well 
as daily press summaries, are available on the Bucharest 
SIPRNet website:  www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest 
DELARE