US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1715

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ADVANCING USG EFFORTS ON BHUTANESE REFUGEES

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI1715
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI1715 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-03-04 13:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM IN NP BT Bhutan Human Rights
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREF, PREL, PHUM, IN, NP, BT, Bhutan, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: ADVANCING USG EFFORTS ON BHUTANESE REFUGEES 
 
REF: A. STATE 27085 
     B. KATHMANDU 460 
     C. GENEVA 2859 
     D. NEW DELHI 1482 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The Bhutanese Ambassador reaffirmed to us on 
March 3 that Thimphu remains committed to repatriate Category 
1 refugees under the Dewey-Wangchuck framework, but is 
unlikely to allow any refugees to return until the 
constitution is finalized, and sees little prospect of 
progress on the refugee issue while political turmoil 
persists in Nepal.  Ambassador Tshering also reiterated that 
no Bhutanese would travel to Nepal to participate in the 
Joint Verification Teams in the current security situation 
and cited the recent imposition of a military curfew in the 
Jhapa District to bolster his case.  The demands by both 
Thimphu and Kathmandu that the other draft the next letter 
spelling out modalities of the Dewey-Wangchuck plan is 
another hurdle we must overcome to move the process forward. 
We support a trip to the region by A/S Dewey (or the 
Ambassador) as part of the effort to convince Thimphu that a 
solution to the refugee issue must be found.  The USG should 
continue to press Bhutan and Nepal to engage with the other, 
but the Nepalese King's dismissal of the Deuba Government has 
heightened Bhutanese security concerns and given Thimphu 
further arguments for delay.  The refugee issue is not a high 
priority for the GOI at this time, but the MEA is intrigued 
by talk of a "global solution."  The EU feels the time is not 
right to press the issue.  Mission continues to research 
conflicting local opinions about whether the RGOB could use 
the census to facilitate further expulsions.  End Summary. 
 
Bhutan's Position 
----------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Dewey-Wangchuck framework remains our best road 
map, but the return of any refugees, including verified 
Category 1 refugees is unlikely prior to the adoption of the 
constitution, which could take a year, Bhutanese Ambassador 
Tshering told Polcouns and Poloff in a March 3 meeting.  He 
 
SIPDIS 
reasoned that the Bhutanese people do not want refugees, 
possibly influenced by Maoists ideology, returning during the 
implementation of the constitution and formation of political 
parties.  (Note: This is the first time the RGOB has 
confirmed that political parties will be allowed under the 
new constitution.  End Note.)   He also reiterated that the 
RGOB will not restart the Joint Verification Team (JVT) 
process until the political and security situation in Nepal 
becomes more stable. 
 
3.  (C) Polcouns expressed USG desire to receive a response 
to the January 19 letter from A/S Dewey to King Wangchuck 
asking the RGOB to transmit a second letter to Nepal 
reaffirming its commitment to the JVT process.  Tshering 
responded that he believed the Nepalese were responsible for 
sending the next letter, demonstrating that the standoff over 
the exchange of correspondence between Kathmandu and Thimphu 
continues.  Tshering reiterated Thimphu's three major 
concerns:  1) the security of JVT members; 2) the lack of 
stability in Nepal; and 3) the unwillingness of the Nepalese 
opposition to abide by agreements made by the GON.  He 
commented that events since February 1 have reinforced 
Bhutanese concerns.  The Ambassador concluded that security 
remains foremost for the RGOB, and that it has no other 
alternative but to wait until the situation in Nepal 
improves.  He seemed incredulous at our suggestion that the 
JVT's might resume, citing the imposition of a military 
curfew in the Jhapa District as evidence of the dangerous 
security situation. 
 
GOI Views 
--------- 
 
4.  (C)  The MEA also does not consider the refugee problem a 
high priority at this time, particularly in light of the 
political problems in Nepal.  MEA Joint Secretary (Nepal) 
Ranjit Rae acknowledged to Polcouns on March 2 that the GOI 
had not heard that the new government in Nepal was willing to 
continue PM Deuba's policies concerning the refugees (Ref B). 
 Rae also inquired about the possibility of a "global 
solution," suggesting that this problem should not be too 
difficult to resolve, "because only about 16,000 families 
need to be resettled."  Polcouns responded that we need to 
see progress towards repatriation and have heard different 
messages from the international community about possible 
resettlement numbers as part of such a global solution. 
Commenting on the possibility of restarting the verification 
process, Rae agreed with the Bhutanese position that there 
must be security in Nepal for the JVT members, as neither 
side can afford another violent incident.  Queried by 
Polcouns, Rae reaffirmed Foreign Secretary Saran's promise to 
Ambassador Moriarty that New Delhi will encourage the 
Bhutanese to continue identifying and repatriating the 
refugees, especially those in Category 1 (Ref D). 
 
EU Views 
-------- 
 
5.  (C) EU Mission Development Assistance Counselor Brian 
O'Neill told Poloff on March 3 that the EU does not believe 
the time is right to press for a solution to the refugee 
problem.  He indicated that the EU was still interested in 
working together with the USG to find a solution to the 
problem, but that the EU was waiting for the situation in 
Nepal to become clearer. 
 
Options 
------- 
 
6.  (C) We do not believe that discussions of third country 
resettlement would lead to more expulsions by the RGOB, 
because Thimphu is genuinely concerned about its image on the 
world stage.  We have told the Bhutanese Government on a 
number of occasions that the refugee issue is the one issue 
that clouds its otherwise exemplary relations with the 
international community.  That said, the USG may want to 
reinforce to Thimphu that, if resettlement is discussed, the 
RGOB should not use the issue to justify further expulsions. 
We also need to bear in mind the USG stake in the success of 
Bhutan's democratic transition. 
 
7.  (C) We also do not believe that the introduction of a 
"third option" would lead to a Bhutanese refusal to take back 
any refugees.  The possibility of third country resettlement 
is already public, and the RGOB continues to maintain its 
willingness to repatriate bona fide Bhutanese citizens. 
However, the Bhutanese Embassy has repeatedly said that only 
refugees classified as Category 1 fall into this group and 
would be allowed to return.  Were the USG to provide a 
clearer picture to Bhutan as to how many refugees could be 
resettled in third countries, Thimphu would be reassured that 
they would not need to accept large numbers of persons, and 
possibly be more willing to resume the JVT process.  In order 
to provide a clearer picture of possible resettlement 
numbers, the UNHCR surveys must first be completed.  The 
surveys, which UNHCR has said could be completed in 
approximately 8 months, would assist in finding a durable 
solution when the political situation in Nepal improves. 
 
8.  (C) We believe that a high-level USG delegation to Bhutan 
would highlight our determination to move the process 
forward.  However, based on comments by the Bhutanese, such a 
visit would be less productive while the political situation 
in Nepal remains unclear, and until the Nepalese government 
has made a decision to allow the UNHCR surveys. 
9.  (C) We believe that maintaining a dialogue with a greater 
"Friends of Bhutan" group is important and continue to meet 
with them on the topic.  Officers from the EU Mission and the 
Australian and Canadian High Commissions are traveling to 
Bhutan in the near future and have pledged to provide 
readouts of their trips. 
 
Census 
------ 
 
10.  (C) Post continues to research the Bhutanese census.  We 
have asked Thimphu officials for details, including a copy of 
the census questionnaire, and are awaiting a reply.  We are 
also seeking input from our local human rights contacts. 
Mission will report back on the likelihood that the RGOB 
could use this census to facilitate further expulsions. 
MULFORD 

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