US embassy cable - 05TOKYO1293

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2030 
TAGS: PREL, CH, JA, ASEAN 
SUBJECT: MOFA CHINA DIVISION DIRECTOR ON JAPAN-CHINA 
RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. A) TOKYO 001166 
 
     B. B) 001208 
 
Classified By: Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds.  Reasons:1.4(b/ 
d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  MOFA China Division Director Izumi told 
POL Deputy March 3 that Japan had strongly protested the 
PRC's proposed anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan, citing 
recent hopeful steps and the need for a peaceful resolution 
of the cross-Strait issue as arguing against such 
legislation.  He urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the issue. 
Izumi opined that President's Hu's inability to consolidate 
his authority has made him vulnerable to hardliners on Taiwan 
and Japan.  Boosting Hu might redound to U.S. and Japanese 
interests, as would strengthening ASEAN, he suggested.  End 
Summary. 
 
PRC Anti-Secession Law 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  During a March 3 meeting with POL Deputy, MOFA Asian 
Affairs Bureau China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi 
expanded on GOJ February 22 and 23 discussions with visiting 
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu 
(ref A).  In discussing the proposed anti-secession 
legislation with Sun, MOFA interlocutors made four basic 
points.  First, the proposed legislation would upset hopes 
for following up recent positive steps in cross-Strait 
relations, such as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's 
acceptance of "the results of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting," 
PRC President Hu Jintao's relatively mild language on Taiwan 
in his New Year's speech, and the agreement on direct charter 
flights during the Lunar New Year.  With these small, but 
important steps toward a cross-Strait dialogue, why would the 
PRC risk roiling the cross-Strait waters with anti-secession 
legislation?  Second, MOFA laid down a marker that Taiwan 
issues were of interest to Japan.  While the PRC may view 
Taiwan as a domestic matter, MOFA asserted that cross-Strait 
relations have regional implications.  Third, MOFA expressed 
its strong concerns regarding the possibility that the text 
of the anti-secession law would mention the use of force 
against Taiwan.  Japan strongly opposes the use of force to 
settle cross-Strait matters.  Fourth, MOFA called on the PRC 
to establish as soon as possible a cross-Strait dialogue in 
order to find a peaceful resolution to the cross-Strait 
issue. 
 
3.  (C)  Izumi commented that he did not know how the PRC 
would take the GOJ assertions, but he felt that MOFA had sent 
a clear message.  He noted that LDP, DPJ and Komeito Party 
leaders had each sent similar messages to the PRC.  Izumi 
urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the anti-secession law. 
 
Hu Vulnerable on Taiwan and Japan 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Commenting that Hu Jintao had yet to consolidate his 
authority, Izumi said that China's cross-Strait policy was a 
good indicator of Hu Jintao's hold on power because it was 
such a sensitive matter.  He expressed concerns that former 
President Jiang Zemin would be able to include hard-line 
language in the anti-secession law.  Having stepped down from 
office, Jiang Zemin may now freely snipe at Hu's handling of 
important issues, and Taiwan is an area where Hu is 
particularly vulnerable.  Izumi cited talk circulating in 
Beijing of Japan's supposed betrayal on Taiwan issues on the 
heels of PM Koizumi's amicable bilateral summit meetings with 
Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao late last year.  GOJ approval of a 
visit by former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui and the 
inclusion of Taiwan in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Consultative Committee are cited as evidence of 
Japanese perfidy, Izumi said. 
 
5.  (C)  Hu's inability to determine PRC policy toward Japan 
has led to drift in the political relationship, Izumi noted. 
He attributed Beijing's inability to get past the issue of PM 
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine to Hu's relative 
weakness.  Consequently, that one issue has been allowed to 
block progress on bilateral matters such as the conflict over 
Japan's EEZ in the East China Sea.  Izumi hopes that Premier 
Wen will accept Japan's invitation to attend the Aichi Expo 
later this year as a means of improving bilateral relations. 
To date, State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi plans to lead 
China's delegation to the Expo.  In the meantime, he 
suggested, the United States and Japan should try to think of 
ways of boosting President Hu in order to strengthen China's 
foreign policy moderates.  Secretary Rice's upcoming visit to 
Beijing will be helpful, as would trilateral talks on 
security issues among the United States, Japan, and China, 
Izumi commented. 
 
Relations with ASEAN 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  In the context of guiding China's foreign policy, 
Izumi suggested it would also be helpful for the United 
States and Japan to take steps to strengthen ASEAN as an 
institution.  Currently, China is able to "pick off" 
Southeast Asian countries individually, often using Thailand 
as a messenger, but if ASEAN were a stronger institution, it 
would stand a better chance of standing up to China.  The 
United States, Japan and Australia should consider how to 
strengthen Indonesia's role in ASEAN, he advised. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C)  Izumi had just returned from Beijing where he had 
accompanied Asian Affairs Bureau DG Sasae (ref B) and his 
comments may reflect frustration with the PRC's insistence on 
holding the bilateral relationship hostage to the Yasukuni 
issue.  Izumi's suggestion for U.S.-Japan-PRC trilateral 
talks on security issues was the first we had heard this 
proposal.  We are uncertain the degree to which such talks 
have wider GOJ support. 
MICHALAK