US embassy cable - 05ATHENS617

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2014 
TAGS: GR, PREL, TU, AMB 
SUBJECT: MOLYVIATIS ON CYPRUS/TURKEY 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries.  Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Greek FM Molyviatis told Ambassador he was 
working on a meeting between PM Karamanlis and Turkish PM 
Erdogan (on the margins of the March 22 EU Summit in Brussels 
and just before Molyviatis's visit to Washington), and his 
own trip to Turkey in April for discussions of Greek-Turkish 
bilateral disagreements in the Aegean and the Cyprus issue. 
On the Aegean, Molyviatis held out little hope of resolution 
(until there was some measurable progress on Cyprus) and 
warned that ongoing Turkish "provocations" were becoming a 
political problem that might impact on Greek support for 
Turkey's EU accession.  On Cyprus, Molyviatis agreed that 
Cypriot President Papadopoulos did not seem inclined to 
engage on new talks. 
 
2.  (C) At their February 28 meeting, Molyviatis told 
Ambassador that Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Erdogan had 
agreed to meet on the margins of the March 22 EU Council in 
Brussels.  The staffs were trying to work out a quiet dinner 
for the two.  In addition, Molyviatis had decided to travel 
to Ankara in April for substantive discussions on the 
Greece-Turkey bilateral relationship.  Molyviatis said that 
"it was time to revive the process" but he cautioned against 
expectations of a breakthrough on either the bilateral 
relationship or Cyprus. 
 
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AEGEAN TENSION BECOMING POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR GREECE 
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3.  (C) Referring to the February 24 round of "exploratory 
talks" between Greek and Turkish experts (the 
Skopelitis-Tuygen channel) on air/sea space and continental 
shelf issues, Molyviatis admitted to Ambassador that nothing 
special had occurred.  The channel itself was good for 
Greek-Turkish dialogue, but there was no real convergence of 
views.  (NOTE: One of the Greek members of the negotiating 
team as well as the Turkish Embassy here confirmed this view. 
 They told us it was "more of the same.") END NOTE.) 
 
4.  (C) Asked whether the Aegean issues would become easier 
to resolve if the Cyprus issue was solved, Molyviatis was 
quick to respond that Cyprus was not a bilateral issue. 
However, he admitted that progress on Cyprus would create a 
new climate of trust and optimism that would impact 
positively on Aegean tensions. 
 
5.  (C) Molyviatis, reiterating his theme to visiting CODEL 
Goodlatte on February 25 (septel) warned that ongoing Turkish 
"provocations" in the Aegean undermined public support for 
Turkey's accession to the EU.  Molyviatis himself said the 
"thousands of euros a day spent on dogfights over the Aegean" 
was also a looming problem for Greece.  Molyviatis warned 
Ambassador that for Turkey to continue "in this way" would 
give rise to serious political difficulties for the Greek 
Government, and could affect the way the Greeks support 
Turkey in other fora. 
 
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CYPRUS GOING NOWHERE 
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6.  (C) Molyviatis and Ambassador agreed that there was not 
much interest in a new initiative on Cyprus as long as the 
Greek Cypriots were unwilling to put some of their concerns 
on the table.  In response to Molyviatis's question whether 
the new team at the State Department would put forward new 
ideas for Cyprus, Ambassador acknowledged that the new team 
would necessarily review the issue, but the onus would remain 
with the Parties to regain momentum themselves, rather than 
an outside push. 
 
7.  (C) In response to Ambassador's question about how to get 
Papadopoulos to act constructively, Molyviatis told 
Ambassador that despite Greek support for reopening the 
Cyprus issue "and we talk all the time to Papadopoulos about 
it", Molyviatis did not believe the conditions existed to 
restart negotiations.  Ambassador urged Molyviatis to 
continue to press the Greek Cypriots to respond to UNSYG 
Annan's request to Nicosia to lay out their specific concerns 
about the Annan Plan. 
 
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ANKARA PROTOCOL "DOOMED" BY RECOGNITION ISSUE 
--------------------------------------------- 
8.  (C) Molyviatis agreed with Ambassador that it was a good 
sign to see a Turkish delegation in Brussels to negotiate the 
Ankara Protocol.  Molyviatis was, however, gloomy in his 
predictions that the signing of the Protocol would become a 
headache for the EU because Turkey (he believed) would try to 
sidestep the "obvious" link between signing the Protocol and 
the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.  While both 
Molyviatis and Ambassador agreed it would be best to avoid a 
midnight crisis on this issue on October 2 (before Turkey-EU 
talks begin on October 3), the Minister clearly did not hold 
out much hope that this would be the case. 
 
9.  (C)  COMMENT:  Molyviatis' comments reflect the situation 
that, despite the close, personal relationship between PM 
Karamanlis and Turkish PM Erdogan, there has been little 
positive movement in Greek-Turkish relations since Karamanlis 
took power nearly a year ago.  Karamanlis is preoccupied with 
domestic difficulties, particularly a ballooning budget 
deficit, and, in any event, is known for his extreme caution 
and unwillingness to get out in front of sensitive issues. 
END COMMENT. 
RIES