US embassy cable - 05PARIS1382

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FRANCE: POSITIVE ON TSA INTERMODAL DIALOGUE, TEPID ON SOME EA REQUIREMENTS

Identifier: 05PARIS1382
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS1382 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-03-03 12:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: EAIR PTER FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE-JLEVIN, SBALL, EB/TRA-ARADETSKY, 
S/CT-KAGUILAR 
DHS FOR TSA-INTL PROGRAMS-DTIEDGE, 
DHS FOR BTS-RBEARDSWORTH, CCLARK 
ICE FOR FOREIGN OPS DIVISION 
CBP FOR OIA-KTHOMSEN 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU-SCRISTINA AND TSA-RCAMPBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: FRANCE: POSITIVE ON TSA INTERMODAL DIALOGUE, TEPID 
ON SOME EA REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: A. 04 PARIS 9137 
 
     B. 04 STATE 217111 
     C. 04 PARIS 7092 
     D. 04 PARIS 5566 
 
Classified By: ECONOMIC MINISTER-COUNSELOR THOMAS J. WHITE, 
EMBASSY PARIS FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  In February 24 meetings with TSA 
International Programs Assistant Administrator David Tiedge, 
French officials 
 
-listened to U.S. concerns about Emergency Amendment 
implementation, agreed to continue discussion, but 
sidestepped new commitments; 
 
-agreed to continue discussions toward a common matrix of 
aviation security measures for flights of interest, and 
requested TSA define a calendar of airport assessments; 
 
-foresaw few significant problems with new TSA restrictions 
regarding cigarette lighters on board aircraft; 
 
-agreed to launch a dialogue with TSA on rail and public 
transport security; and 
 
-reviewed France's global approach to counterterrorism and 
national security. 
 
2.  (SBU) Tiedge met separately with Air France senior 
executive Guy Tardieu who projected that Air France could 
provide its Master Crew List to the GOF for TSA in a matter 
of weeks.  In addition, Tardieu declared that Air France 
needed more French law enforcement support when denying 
boarding to No-Fly passengers and better coordination with 
French border police in order to improve the implementation 
of Selectee and No-Fly Emergency Amendments.  He thanked the 
U.S. for no longer subjecting French crew members born 
outside of France to NSEERS secondary screening upon entry 
and said that TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters on 
U.S.-bound flights should not present a significant problem 
for Air France.  END SUMMARY 
 
3.  (SBU) While in Paris to participate in European 
Conference on Civil Aviation (ECAC) meetings, TSA's Assistant 
Administrator for International Programs David Tiedge met 
with a GOF interagency group, which included representatives 
from the Ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs, 
chaired by Bernard Boube, Protection and Security Director at 
the General Secretariat of National Defense (SGDN).  (NOTE: 
SGDN, under the authority of the office of the Prime 
Minister, coordinates national security policy within the 
ministries and agencies of the GOF.  END NOTE.)  Tiedge held 
a separate meeting with Guy Tardieu, Chief of Staff to Air 
France (AF) CEO Jean-Cyril Spinetta and discussed operational 
security with France's civil aviation authority (DGAC) 
director for aviation security Yves Meusburger. 
 
SGDN:  TSA-GOF Dialogue 
------------------------- 
4.  (C) At SGDN, in response to a TSA proposal, Bernard Boube 
agreed that the U.S. and France should quickly launch a 
regular dialogue on security in all modes of transport, going 
beyond aviation to encompass rail and public transit.  Tiedge 
said the U.S. was interested in learning about France's 
experience in securing rail and land transport and public 
transit networks.  Such a dialogue, he said, would enhance 
the GOF/US close working relationship on these issues and 
give both sides an opportunity to share best practices. 
 
SGDN:  Aviation Security, EA Implementation 
----------------------------------- 
5.  (C) Tiedge offered that the U.S. and U.K. had agreed on a 
matrix of aviation security measures for "flights of 
interest" and suggested that TSA continue to work with the 
French civil aviation authority, DGAC (Direction Generale de 
l'Aviation Civile), to agree on similar measures for flights 
departing France for U.S. airspace.  Boube explained that the 
GOF has a catalog of measures in place for flights of 
interest and would like to continue discussions already begun 
with TSA (REF D) with a view to finding common ground.  Both 
sides agreed that the 2003 holiday period clearly 
demonstrated that establishing common aviation security 
measures in advance of threats to civil aviation is vastly 
preferable to having to cancel flights for lack of a set of 
joint incremental security steps to help manage crises. 
6.  (C) Tiedge asked why French airlines were not carrying 
out EA requirements on sharing Master Crew Lists, or 
complying with some notification requirements (to the 
Transportation Security Intelligence Service, TSIS, for 
example) in the No-Fly and Selectee EAs, according to the 
U.S./GOF agreement on alternative proposals for EA 
implementation (REF B). 
 
7.  (C) Boube responded indirectly, saying that U.S./GOF 
discussions should continue on the matter.  He indicated that 
the U.S. was fully aware that the GOF had a problem with EAs 
requiring French airlines to contact USG agencies directly 
and suggested that Selectee procedures in general should 
eventually refer to a future jointly-agreed catalog of 
security measures.  Boube expressed incredulity at the 
possibility that the Selectee list could contain tens of 
thousands of names and said that the challenges the Selectee 
list is designed to address would be better handled by more 
intelligence sharing between our experts, rather than by 
circulating a data-heavy list, which airlines had difficulty 
manipulating. 
 
8.  (SBU) SGDN's Henri Schlienger presented an overview of 
the GOF's management of aviation security and specifically 
asked TSA to define a calendar of visits for French airport 
assessments in advance. 
 
SGDN:  GOF Global National Security concept 
--------------------------------------------- 
9.  (SBU) In addition to discussing the above issues, French 
officials also reviewed France's global national security 
concept explaining the role and powers of the President, the 
Prime Minister and individual ministers, from threat 
assessment to planning objectives and readiness drills, to 
the "Vigipirate" program that implements security measures in 
the public arena.  They pointed out that, as opposed to the 
U.S. model of regrouping homeland security responsibilities 
into a single ministry, France's long experience with 
European conflicts and with terrorism within its boundaries 
reinforced the GOF's tested method of handling threats to the 
homeland through intense interministerial cooperation. 
 
DGAC: Operational Aviation Security 
--------------------------------------- 
10.  (SBU) In a separate meeting, Tiedge briefed France's 
civil aviation authority (DGAC) security director Yves 
Meusburger on TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters (and 
potentially matches) on U.S.-bound flights.  Meusburger said 
it should not present a significant problem for DGAC and that 
when necessary, DGAC would issue a security directive 
addressing airlines to comply with the restriction for 
flights departing France for the U.S.  Meusburger responded 
positively to Tiedge's reiteration of U.S. interest in 
continuing discussions on a common matrix of aviation 
security measures for flights of interest.  When asked why 
French airlines were not complying with all EA notification 
requirements, Meusburger indicated that Selctee name match 
notification to TSIS may be addressed in the future through a 
DGAC-issued security directive following additional 
coordination with SGDN and with relevant ministries. 
 
11.  (SBU) Tiedge agreed to DGAC's request to conduct a 
reciprocal security assessment of Air France's (AF) operation 
at JFK airport and suggested it be coordinated through the 
TSA office at Embassy Paris.  In addition, both DGAC and TSA 
 
SIPDIS 
discussed their respective organizational changes. 
 
Air France Efforts 
---------------------- 
12.  (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Guy Tardieu told Tiedge 
that AF's Master Crew List could probably be provided to the 
GOF for transmission to TSA (as agreed to in U.S./French 
alternative procedures, REF B) in the correct format in "a 
matter of weeks" following a period of necessary tests. 
Tardieu allowed that AF still had some difficulty 
implementing TSA-required No-Fly procedures and the airline 
had legal concerns about whether the airline had the 
authority to deny boarding to a someone seeking to board an 
AF flight on French territory on the basis of a U.S. 
government recommendation.  Generally, he said, GOF 
directives were sufficient to allow AF to implement EAs but 
AF needed more support from French Air and Border Police (the 
PAF - Police de l'Air et des Frontires). 
 
13.  (SBU) On the transmission of Passenger Name Record (PNR) 
data, which Tardieu understands is a Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) requirement outside the purview of TSA, 
Tardieu reported that technical problems persisted with 
transmitting required PNR data elements to CBP on flights 
headed for the U.S.  The problems stemmed, he said, from 
separate, unlinked data systems for reservation and departure 
control systems which are common to all non-U.S. carriers. 
Tardieu said AF appreciated the time that CBP's technicians 
already had spent in communications with AF's technical 
experts and said he believed it was simply a matter of time 
until technical solutions to transmission problems were in 
place. 
 
14.  (SBU) Tardieu thanked the U.S. for no longer subjecting 
French crew members born outside of France to CBP's National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) secondary 
screening upon entry and, when Tiedge updated him about new 
U.S. restrictions on items on-board U.S.-bound flights, said 
that TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters on U.S.-bound 
flights should not present a significant problem for Air 
France. 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
15.  (C) On the details of EA implementation, SGDN's Boube 
may have kept his comments deliberately vague so as not to 
commit the GOF to elements not specifically addressed in the 
U.S.-GOF alternative procedures agreement.  The Embassy's 
regular senior-level interlocutor at SGDN on EA issues -- 
Deputy Secretary General Scott de Martinville -- was away for 
the week and unavailable to meet with Tiedge on February 24. 
It is possible that Boube may not have been apprised of all 
the features of the EAs or of the agreement.  Embassy will 
seek more information through our regular contacts at SGDN. 
 
16.  (U) TSA Assistant Administrator David Tiedge cleared 
this message. 
Leach 

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