US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU787

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INTO THE MAOIST HEARTLAND - COUNTERINSURGENCY BY THE BOOK IN ROLPA DISTRICT

Identifier: 02KATHMANDU787
Wikileaks: View 02KATHMANDU787 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2002-04-22 11:22:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PTER PREL PHUM ASEC NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: INTO THE MAOIST HEARTLAND - COUNTERINSURGENCY BY 
THE BOOK IN ROLPA DISTRICT 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 377 
 
Classified By: Amb. M.E. Malinowski, Reasons 1.5 (b), (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary.  Emboffs joined Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) 
Western Division Commander on an inspection tour of newly 
established garrisons in Rolpa district, considered the 
Maoist heartland.  The tour coincided with the deployment of 
the PACOM assessment team to the Rolpa battalion 
headquarters.  Two RNA task forces have completed sweeps 
through eastern and northern Rolpa, leaving joint Army, Armed 
Police and civil police garrisons to restore security in the 
major towns.  This bold incursion, to be followed by similar 
sweeps through adjacent Maoist districts represents the right 
strategy, but operational and logistical challenges abound. 
RNA operations suffer from a lack of good boots as well as a 
shortage of manpower.  Additional arms and ammunition would 
not be effective without good boots, the RNA commander for 
western Nepal insisted.  Emboffs interviewed two captured 
Maoist leaders who described the insurgents' tactics.  After 
recent attacks in Dang, RNA efforts to respond were hindered 
when the Maoists felled trees across the highways and set 
fires to reduce visibility for helicopters.  Although the 
monsoon will have a negative effect on the RNA's mobility, 
the Maoists will face the same obstacles.  Morale was high in 
the garrisons, and the response from the citizenry positive. 
End Summary. 
 
Army Taking Back Rolpa 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S) A/DCM and Pol/Miloff accompanied Major General Sadeep 
Shah, Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) Western Division Commander, 
on an April 15 tour of Rolpa district.  The tour joined up 
with the PACOM assessment team in the Rolpa district capital 
of Liwang.  Shah and Emboffs also visited newly established 
garrisons in the district.  The RNA had just completed two 
task force sweeps through northern and eastern Rolpa, one of 
five districts long referred to as the Maoist heartland.  In 
their wake, the RNA established a permanent presence in the 
district capital, Liwang, and in three other towns. 
 
Remote Areas Pose a Challenge 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (S) General Shah and Emboffs met up with the PACOM 
assessment team at Liwang, which also serves as battalion 
headquarters.  The garrisons Emboffs visited were well sited 
and well entrenched, suggesting that the RNA has learned from 
past mistakes such as the poor defenses at the district 
capital in Accham, overrun by the Maoists in February 
(Reftel).  Daily patrols reach beyond the ridgeline and 
nighttime observation posts provide early warning 
capabilities.  (Note: The terrain is referred to as "The 
Hill-Country", but "Hill" must be taken in the context of a 
country which boasts the world's highest mountains.)  The 
garrison towns in Rolpa are in deep, narrow valleys along 
riverbeds.  The surrounding ridges and mountains rise up to 
12,000 feet, and the slopes are forty degrees on average. 
The centuries-old battle of terraces versus landslides 
continues, at least in these recovered valleys.  Footpath and 
helicopter are the only ways in or out.  The new garrisons 
remain small and widely separated, and therefore vulnerable 
to Maoist concentration. 
 
Garrisons Established in Joint Operations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) General Shah has taken joint operations to heart. 
Each population center has been garrisoned with a combined 
force of RNA, Armed Police Force (APF), and Nepal Police 
personnel.  Civil-Military Operations are assisted by the 
presence of the Chief District Officer (CDO) in Liwang and 
the attempted re-establishment of ward councils.  Schools and 
health clinics have reopened despite severe resource 
constraints.  Within the patrol range of the garrisons - but 
outside the garrisoned valleys - the steeply terraced fields 
were being tilled, though the land remained depopulated.  The 
newly-garrisoned centers are peopled by the elderly and young 
women with children; young men and boys have reportedly fled 
the district to avoid being conscripted by the Maoists. 
Rations are brought in for the garrisons to prevent the 
depletion of the townspeople's modest food supply, and the 
RNA is providing the health centers with medical supplies 
from its own stocks. 
 
More Sweeps Planned 
------------------- 
5. (S) In thorough briefings and a detailed explanation of 
the situation map at Division Headquarters in Nepalgunj April 
14, General Shah and his staff outlined their plans.  The two 
recent task force sweeps through eastern Rolpa would be 
followed immediately by two more task force sweeps that will 
establish garrisons in western Rolpa.  Other districts in the 
Maoist heartland - Rukum, Pyuthan, and Surkhet - will follow 
in succession.  Each task force comprises over three hundred 
men moving in multiple columns carrying 72 hours of rations. 
Rations are replenished by helicopter at an increasing number 
of landing zones cleared on hilltops throughout the area of 
operations. 
 
RNA: It's the Boots 
------------------- 
 
6. (S) General Shah made very clear that while he desperately 
wants to re-equip his units with M-16A-2 rifles, his greatest 
need is for boots.  After shoes, good quality uniforms are 
his second priority, and medical supplies third.  Arms then 
come fourth.  Shah did not raise the issue of helicopters, 
but when prompted stated that their primary usefulness to him 
would be for re-supply and casualty evacuation.  Shah stated 
that M-16s would be only marginally useful without boots to 
get the firepower where he needs it.  Shah and his staff 
reiterated that their biggest challenge is the "paucity of 
troops."  Nevertheless, Shah has compressed the training 
cycle for new recruits under his command so that they can 
relieve static troops as soon as possible. 
 
Captured Maoists Interviewed 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (S) Shah allowed Emboffs to interview two captured Maoist 
leaders who have agreed to provide information to the RNA. 
The former Maoists gave detailed accounts of their assaults, 
relating how they concentrated in nearby villages where they 
were not necessarily welcome and used untrained and unarmed 
villagers to fill out the ranks and provide human shields for 
the armed cadre.  When asked how the Maoists were instructed 
to treat villagers, one said that they had been admonished 
not to take "even needle and thread" from the people, but to 
participate in village life and help till the fields. 
However, he continued, in most cases by the time he and his 
comrades reached a village they would be far too tired to do 
anything but eat the villagers' food and sleep. 
 
Readout on Dang Attack: RNA's Reaction Capability Lacking 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
8. (S) With multiple exposed garrisons and a "paucity of 
troops," Shah is hard-pressed to reinforce or relieve 
positions under sudden siege, he explained.  Relief columns 
sent to the assistance of the recently overrun APF post at 
Satbaria, Dang district, had to travel hours overland. 
Moreover, Maoists had hampered their progress with trees 
felled across the road and boulders strewn across bridges.  A 
helicopter, launched at night to provide more ammunition to 
the defenders, could not locate the position because of the 
dark and the smoke from fires set by the Maoists. 
 
9. (S) Shah was able to set up blocking positions at choke 
points six and twelve hours' march away from the attack site. 
 The RNA succeeded in ambushing the Maoists best-trained and 
best-armed "First Platoon" two days after the attack.  Rather 
than immediately fleeing the area, this platoon moved into a 
village and locked everyone inside their houses.  After two 
days they commandeered a bus and drove brazenly down Nepal's 
main east-west highway, right into an alert RNA roadblock. 
The small unit at the roadblock spotted the Maoists, in 
battle regalia and with a light machine gun on the hood of 
the bus, and opened fire, killing seventeen.  The rest of the 
platoon fled into the jungle. 
 
Monsoon to Affect Both Sides 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (S) The arrival of the monsoon in mid-June will affect 
operations, Shah speculated.  Clear weather for the few 
helicopters will be limited.  Shah intends to overcome this 
by significantly increasing the stocks of rations and 
ammunition at the many garrisons.  He points out, however, 
that the monsoon will affect the Maoists as well.  Their 
movement will be restricted to the main trails and they will 
not be able to cross the four great rivers coursing down from 
the Himalayas in spate.  Shah believes the RNA, at least in 
his area of operations, will have the advantage, provided 
they have the boots and M-16s that will give them a decided 
edge over their opponents 
 
Morale Up, But Trouble Expected 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) Morale among the RNA, Armed Police Force (APF) and 
Nepal Police appeared high, in part because of the presence 
of the Americans.  Even Rolpa's Chief District Officer (CDO) 
was positive despite the fact that Liwang has been without 
electricity or phone service for the last four months, and he 
exerts little control and has no resources.  There was a 
general sense, here and at the smaller and more isolated town 
of Thawang, that the GON is doing it right and winning back 
towns and people from the Maoists.  Needless to say, all the 
garrisons expect to be attacked, as the Maoists cannot afford 
to let these initially successful incursions by the GON stand. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (S) The PACOM assessment team's report will provide a 
much more complete analysis of RNA operations and 
requirements.  It is clear, however, that the Western 
Division Commander is applying a proven formula to combat the 
armed insurgency.  Resource limitations may spell the 
difference between victory and defeat in the Maoist 
heartland.  If security can be established, the GON will have 
the opportunity to deliver services and win back hearts and 
minds.  Donor assistance will be important at that stage. 
The RNA's designs aside, the Maoists cannot disregard this 
attack at their very roots. 
 
MALINOWSKI 

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