US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI877

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR WU LI-PEI TO STAY 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary:  After a two-hour meeting on March 3, 
President Chen Shui-bian managed to dissuade Senior 
Presidential Advisor Wu Li-pei from resigning his position. 
Wu had threatened to follow fellow pro-independence 
Presidential Advisors Koo Kwang-ming and Huang Chao-tang out 
the door in protest against Chen's recent concessions to PFP 
Chairman James Soong.  Explaining his frustrations to AIT, 
Wu said that he was disturbed by Chen's February 24 
declaration that the "ROC" is the largest common denominator 
between the DPP and PFP.  Wu asserted that the two leaders 
should have realized that the largest common denominator 
between them is the land and the people of Taiwan.  Wu also 
lamented that Chen remained silent on Soong's dismissal of 
Taiwan independence as an option for island's future.  More 
fundamentally, however, Wu said that he questions Chen's 
leadership style and his commitment to principles he thought 
they shared.  End Summary. 
 
Giving Chen Another Chance 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) After a two-hour meeting with President Chen Shui-bian 
on March 3, former Formosa Foundation Chairman Wu Li-pei 
announced that he will remain in his position as Senior 
Presidential Advisor, at least for the time being.  Wu had 
originally told AIT on February 27 that he wanted to resign 
in protest over President Chen Shui-bian's February 24 ten 
points joint statement with People First Party (PFP) Chairman 
James Soong (Chu-yu).  Fellow pro-independence leaders Koo 
Kwang-ming and Huang Chao-tang had quit as Senior 
Presidential Advisors on March 1 over the same issue, but Wu 
decided to give Chen the courtesy of a meeting before 
formalizing his resignation.  Although Wu told AIT on March 1 
that he did not expect anything that Chen would say to change 
his mind, Wu later told the press after his meeting with Chen 
that he understands the pressures that led the President to 
make his February 24 statements. 
 
The Problem with Chen-Soong Meeting 
----------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Explaining why he is so disappointed with the ten 
points statement, Wu told AIT that Chen's recognition of the 
"Republic of China (ROC)" is not a problem, however, he is 
disturbed by Chen's declaration that the "ROC" is the largest 
common denominator between Chen and Soong.  Wu asserted that 
the two leaders should have realized that the largest common 
denominator between them is the land and the people of 
Taiwan.  An outspoken opponent of the USG's "one China" 
policy, Wu also pointed out that Soong declared at the 
February 24 joint press conference that independence is not 
an option for Taiwan's future status.  He acknowledged to AIT 
that Chen did not agree with Soong but lamented that Chen did 
not disagree either.  On March 1 veteran DPP and New Tide 
leader Hong Chi-chang conceded Wu's point to AIT.  Chen, Hong 
said, could have eliminated much of the fundamentalist furor 
over his meeting with Soong if he had added "independence" to 
his recitation of Taiwan's future options in his joint news 
conference with Soong. 
 
4. (C) Wu maintained that only the 23 million people can 
decide Taiwan's future not the president or Soong.  Wu said 
that he had initially supported Chen's overtures to the PFP 
as a mean to break the policy gridlock of the past four 
years, but bemoaned that "Chen went chasing after demons but 
in the end got himself caught by the demon." 
 
Questions about Chen's Leadership 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Wu indicated that he is resigning not only over the 
Soong meeting but also because of his disillusionment with 
Chen's leadership style.  Wu told AIT that he is dismayed by 
how easily Chen can change his mind.  He said that all sorts 
of people have come to him over the past year, including 
former Presidential Office Secretary General Su Tseng-chang, 
to ask advice on how to approach Chen.  Wu said that he had 
no access to the President and was uncertain of who actually 
did.  He acknowledged that senior presidential advisors, such 
Koo Kwang-ming, Peng Ming-min, Lee Hong-hsi, are considered 
party elders, but dismissed as exaggeration claims that they 
could walk into Chen's office at anytime.  Recalling the time 
when people criticized Koo Kwang-ming for not informing Chen 
before taking out an Washington Post advertisement urging the 
U.S. to abandon the "One China" policy, Wu said that Koo made 
three attempts to contact the president, but could not even 
get the president's confidential secretary, Ma Yung-cheng, to 
return his telephone call. 
 
6. (C) Insisting that he is not the only person frustrated by 
Chen's leadership, Wu said that he recently met with former 
President Lee Teng-hui, and they ended up commiserating with 
each other about Chen's fickleness.  Lee had also recently 
spoken publicly against the Chen-Soong joint statement, 
questioning its legitimacy and calling Chen's action "wrong." 
 Wu said that both he and Lee feel that Chen has failed to 
build on the momentum of last year's February 28 "Hand in 
hand" Peace Rally to further the cause of Taiwan identity. 
 
Chiou Dominating Foreign Policy 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Wu also described his frustration about being 
dispatched by Chen to Washington in early February to explain 
Taiwan's policy positions without being properly briefed.  Wu 
told AIT that Taiwan's relation with the U.S. is handled 
exclusively by National Security Council (NSC) Secretary 
General Chiou I-jen, and that Chiou has not included him in 
his inner circle.  Wu said he found himself being asked tough 
questions about Taiwan's positions on various sensitive 
issues by Washington officials and not knowing anything 
beyond generalities. 
 
Comment: Keeping the Fundamentalists at Bay? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Presidential Office and DPP officials have admitted to 
AIT that they and the president were surprised by the 
vehemence of fundamentalist anger over the February 24 
Chen-Soong meeting, but see no alternative to working with 
opposition forces in a bid to control the political center 
(Septel).  Chen's 2004 victory and use of fundamentalist 
themes in last autumn's legislative election campaign raised 
expectations among core DPP pro-independence supporters that 
the president would follow through on their agenda in his 
final years of office.  Chen administration officials say 
they see no way to advance the government's foreign policy 
and domestic agendas, while remaining captive to their "dark 
Green" supporters.  It remains to be seen whether such 
calculated strategies will prevent Chen from appealing again 
to these supporters in elections later this year. 
PAAL