US embassy cable - 05BRASILIA564

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000564 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PTER, KSUM, XF, XM, BR, External Relations 
SUBJECT: ISRAELI EMBASSY FOCUSED ON ARAB-SOUTH AMERICAN 
SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 432 
     B. STATE 35934 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, Reasons 1.4 (b 
& d) 
 
1.  (C) In March 1 discussion with Poloff, Embassy of Israel 
Minister Counselor Eitan Surkis reiterated the GOI'S concerns 
with Summit preparations and Brazil's Summit-related 
diplomacy to date.  Although the Embassy had already met with 
the head of the Ministry of External Relations' (MRE) Middle 
East Division to discuss Summit issues, Surkis liked the U.S. 
approach and wanted to meet with MRE's lead on Summit 
preparations negotiations Ernesto Rubarth. (Rubarth is 
Special Assistant to MRE Political Under-Secretary Vera 
Pedrosa who is in overall charge of Summit issues.)  A 
complicating factor, Surkis acknowledged, was Vera Pedrosa's 
lame duck status as Under-Secretary which could make her even 
more reluctant than normal to be forthcoming with the 
Israelis. 
 
2.  (C) Surkis affirmed that the GOI had approached MRE with 
an invitation for Foreign Minister Amorim to stop in 
Jerusalem during his February Middle East trip.  The MRE 
response, he noted, was that there was no time on the FM's 
schedule which, in any case, was focused entirely on Summit 
preparations.  However, MRE said nothing about a FM visit to 
the Palestinian Authority, a stopover not announced earlier. 
When the Embassy discovered in a MRE press release that 
Amorim was to visit Ramallah and then reiterated its own 
invitation, the Ministry restated the time constraints on the 
FM, noting Amorim would only be in Ramallah a few hours.  In 
reality, Amorim spent almost 24 hours in Ramallah.  Surkis 
also noted last minute, unnecessary hassles at the Allenby 
Bridge caused by Brazilian failure to be forthcoming with the 
GOI. 
 
3.  (C) Perhaps due to the fallout from Amorim's perceived 
snub of Israel hitting a "raw nerve", Surkis felt, the GOB 
had gotten the message.  (Even Brazilian media pundits had 
taken note of the Foreign Minister's failure to demonstrate 
diplomatic even-handedness by not visiting Israel.)  He 
surmised that in order to counter the negative image it had 
created for itself with the U.S., Israel, and others, the 
Ministry arranged for President Lula to meet next week with 
visiting Deputy Prime Minister Olfert. (Foreign Minister 
Amorim will be traveling in Africa and unavailable for 
Olfert.)  In addition, the MRE repeated to the Embassy that 
the FM still intended to visit Israel in June/July -- a 
visit, Surkis sarcastically noted, that remained very much in 
doubt. 
 
4.  (C) Regarding the last week's Summit preparation meetings 
in Cairo, Israel understood that progress had been made on 
economic and social aspects of the draft declaration; 
however, the impasse between Arabs and Latins on political 
issues remained.  Surkis understood that no new text had 
emerged from the talks.  The next step will be a meeting in 
Brasilia for Brazil and Argentina (representing the South 
Americans) to brief the other South American countries.  A 
similar Arab League meeting is also expected. 
 
5.  (C) Finally, Surkis took note that the GOB still was 
"furious" over the leaked draft declaration and the 
Oppenheimer article in the Miami Herald.  Smiling wryly, he 
observed that perhaps the leak had "served its purpose". 
 
6.  (C) Comment: Surkis' comments track closely with our own 
understanding of the situation.  The MRE, we believe, 
underestimated the sensitivities aroused by its somewhat 
ham-handed diplomacy, yet are unwilling to acknowledge that 
the Summit and Amorim's ill-conceivd visit to the region 
could undermine the Middle East peace process at a delicate 
and promising moment.  Ambassador will deliver ref B points 
to MRE Secretary-General Samuel Guimaraes March 2 and will 
meet with the President of B'nai Brith of Brazil on March 4. 
 
Danilovich