US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1102

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

RULING AK PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP SLOWLY ERODING

Identifier: 05ANKARA1102
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA1102 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-03-02 15:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

021527Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: RULING AK PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP SLOWLY ERODING 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 911 
 
     B. ANKARA 1074 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) With the March 1 resignation from Turkish Prime 
Minster's ruling Justice and Development (AK) party of 
controversial Istanbul MP Goksal Kucukali, the distribution 
of seats in the Turkish Parliament stands as follows: 
 
363 - AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
 
170 - CHP (Republican People's Party) 
 
  6 - DYP (True Path Party) 
 
  1 - HYP (Rise of the People Party) 
 
  9 - Independent 
 
2.  (U) Since February 15, four AKP parliamentarians have 
resigned, including Culture and Tourism Minister Mumcu (ref 
A). 
 
3.  (C) There is still no viable political alternative to AKP 
or Erdogan in the near term.  However, several trends will 
govern Turkey's near-term domestic political landscape: 
 
-- AK's power in Parliament will continue to erode at a slow, 
minimal but steady pace. 
 
-- The complex fault lines inside AKP, which revolve around 
both personalities and political preferences, will deepen. 
 
-- When dissatisfied AKP members see a viable political 
alternative, the pace of defections will pick up. 
 
4.  (C) Comment:  In the two weeks since Mumcu resigned, 
Erdogan has failed to re-set AK on a sustainable course.  He 
has not chosen an EU negotiator, and Turkey's EU candidacy is 
adrift (ref B).  He has not reshuffled his cabinet.  He has 
done nothing we can see to address issues in U.S./Turkish 
relations.  And he has done nothing to re-assert control 
within AK and woo back dissatisfied party members.  Instead, 
Erdogan took a February 15-17 trip to Albania and Bosnia; 
today, he is in Ethiopia, en route to South Africa.  Turkey's 
domestic politics are in for an extended period of unclarity. 
 End Comment. 
EDELMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04