US embassy cable - 05DUBLIN254

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IRELAND IS UNDECIDED ON HIZBALLAH DESIGNATION, REQUESTS WRITTEN INFORMATION

Identifier: 05DUBLIN254
Wikileaks: View 05DUBLIN254 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dublin
Created: 2005-03-02 15:17:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ETTC PTER EFIN EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DUBLIN 000254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 
TAGS: ETTC, PTER, EFIN, EUN 
SUBJECT: IRELAND IS UNDECIDED ON HIZBALLAH DESIGNATION, 
REQUESTS WRITTEN INFORMATION 
 
REF: STATE 34900 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF MARY DALY, 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1. (S) Summary.  In a March 1 demarche, DFA said that it 
remained undecided on whether to support designation of 
Hizballah.  "At first glance," DFA said, the information 
emboffs provided fell short of a "smoking gun."  Moreover, 
DFA expressed concern that verbal information might not 
satisfy the evidentiary standards required for Clearinghouse 
discussions.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) On March 1, Emboffs delivered reftel demarche to 
Maurice Biggar, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) First 
Secretary, UN Desk for Terrorism and Illicit Drugs, Gerard 
 
SIPDIS 
Keown, DFA European Correspondent, and Stephen Dawson, DFA 
Deputy Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa.  The 
DFA officials said that GOI remained "undecided" on whether 
to support designation of Hizballah.  "At first glance," DFA 
said, the information that emboffs provided fell short of a 
"smoking gun."  Dawson said that the demarche information was 
helpful and more substantive than in previous demarches, but 
not as useful as would be the case with written copies for 
review and circulation.  Dawson told emboffs that reliance on 
hastily handwritten notes from the demarche would make it 
difficult for the GOI to conduct inter-agency deliberations 
on Hizballah's designation. 
 
3. (S) Biggar, who will represent the GOI at the EU 
Clearinghouse on March 16, also expressed concern that verbal 
information might not satisfy the evidentiary standards 
required for Clearinghouse discussions.  He interpreted 
Common Position (CP) 931 (para four) and Clearinghouse 
standard procedures as requiring written submissions.  Biggar 
added that this technicality might lead Member States to rule 
the U.S. submissions out of order in the Clearinghouse. 
Biggar held to this view when Emboffs pointed out that CP 931 
required "precise information," as opposed to written 
submissions.  He said that the GOI was accustomed during its 
EU Presidency last year to receive written submissions 
directly and to circulate them in advance among Member 
States.  Biggar and Dawson also noted distinctions among the 
types of allegations made in the U.S. submission, as some 
were legal in nature, while others appeared to be politically 
or intelligence-related.  They said that not having a written 
record of these distinctions would make it harder for them to 
deliberate among themselves and later with EU colleagues at 
the Clearinghouse. 
 
4. (S) Emboffs asked which direction the GOI was leaning in 
terms of designating Hizballah.  Biggar responded that since 
procedural obstacles at the February Clearinghouse had 
precluded substantive discussion of the designation, Ireland 
was not in a position to say whether it was leaning toward a 
yes or no vote.  Dawson said that, at first glance, the 
information provided in the demarche was not conclusive.  For 
follow-up discussions on the designation, Dawson also 
recommended clarification of the USG sources cited in the 
demarche, for example, whether the reference was to Embassy 
reporting.  The DFA representatives said they had no obstacle 
in principle against voting for Hizballah's designation, but 
they were determined to base their vote on concrete evidence 
presented in a manner that was procedurally sound. 
 
5. (S) Dawson asked why the United States was pushing for the 
designation at this time.  He noted some of the information 
provided in the demarche was several years old.  Moreover, 
Lebanon had become politically fragile while the Middle East 
Peace Process was entering a sensitive juncture.  Emboffs 
replied that it is not useful to frame the matter in a 
political context; the issue at stake was Irish support for 
the designation of Hizballah as a terrorist group.  Dawson 
conceded that politics were not the heart of the matter, but 
again questioned the timing of the demarche in light of 
recent political developments. 
 
6. (C) Comment: Reftel was clear about not leaving any paper 
during the demarche, but Post wishes to suggest consideration 
of flexibility on this point.  If it remains impossible to 
deliver written information, Post would appreciate talking 
points on meeting evidentiary standards, which we could 
provide to DFA as follow-up.  End Comment. 
KENNY 

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