US embassy cable - 05PARIS1356

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FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESIGNATING HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Identifier: 05PARIS1356
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS1356 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-03-02 14:35:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ETTC PTER EFIN FR EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2014 
TAGS: ETTC, PTER, EFIN, FR, EUN 
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DESIGNATING 
HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
 
REF: STATE 34900 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (S) Summary: On March 1, poloffs delivered reftel demarche 
on designating Hizballah as a terrorist organization to 
Julien Deruffe and Yves Trotignon from the MFA's office of 
counter-terrorism and Remy Bouallegue, Lebanon/Syria desk 
officer.  Poloff also informed Dominique Boche, President 
Chirac's technical advisor on the Middle East, of the 
demarche.  Post will follow-up in the coming days at senior 
levels to emphasize the importance of reftel demarche to the 
USG.  GUIDANCE REQUESTS AT PARA 4.  End summary. 
 
2. (S) Deruffe, Trotignon and Bouallegue took careful notes 
of the details of the demarche and complimented it as 
"well-reasoned" and "thorough."  Furthermore, they said our 
demarche would be of great importance as the French 
government continued its inter-agency debate on the 
designation of Hizballah.  Nevertheless, they responded with 
lengthy counter-arguments of their own.  Trotignon said that 
French intelligence services remained unconvinced that 
Hizballah was a terrorist organization.  As an example, he 
noted that the presence of Hizballah procurement agents in 
Europe did not convince France that Hizballah was a terrorist 
(and not a purely military) organization.  In addition to 
this "technical" debate, Trotignon said there were numerous 
political reasons why France was hesitant to designate 
Hizballah.  Bouallegue cited U.S.-French efforts in Lebanon 
through UNSCR 1559, and asked how designation of Hizballah 
(especially after the recent assassination of former PM 
Hariri) would stabilize an already enflamed region?  The 
French preference, said Bouallegue, was to continue to focus 
on UNSCR 1559 and not to risk that resolution's legitimacy in 
Arab countries that were initially suspicious of it.  When 
poloff cited Hizballah's efforts to destroy prospects for 
Israel-Palestinian peace -- the test of the transatlantic 
relationship, according to France -- Bouallegue responded by 
describing Lebanon as France's "first priority."  He stressed 
the potential destabilizing impact of EU designation on 
Lebanese internal stability, especially the potential to push 
Lebanon's Shia community further in the pro-Syria camp. 
Bouallegue also argued that EU designation was inadvisable 
before the crucial Lebanese parliamentary elections in May. 
 
3. (S) Trotignon said France also feared Israel would take 
designation of Hizballah as a green light to assassinate 
Hizballah leaders and deputies, citing Israeli strikes 
against Hamas leaders following EU designation in 2003. 
Trotignon commented that Israel had demarched the French on 
designating Hizballah, but had not given the GOF any judicial 
or investigative proof of Hizballah's terrorist activities. 
Instead, said Trotignon, Israel had focused on political 
statements, which had diluted the effectiveness of their 
demarche.  Trotignon and Bouallegue both emphasized that the 
moment was "too delicate" in the Middle East to consider 
taking what they considered a rash step: supporting the 
designation of Hizballah as a terrorist organization.  Poloff 
argued that Hizballah was a tremendously destabilizing force 
within the Middle East, and that Europeans should make an 
objective assessment regarding Hizballah as a terrorist 
organization. 
 
4. (S) Although Trotignon said he was very pleased with the 
detail contained in the demarche, he asked who the French 
intelligence services should turn to if, upon analyzing the 
demarche's detail, they had additional questions.  He also 
expressed interest in further information on Hizballah's 
involvement in recent terrorist attacks in Israel.  Post 
requests guidance on how to respond to possible follow-up 
questions of an intelligence nature.  In addition, 
Bouallegue's linking of UNSCR 1559 and Lebanon's internal 
situation with the debate on designating Hizballah is a 
frequent point raised by French officials and one we expect 
they will deploy at the upcoming EU Clearinghouse meeting. 
Post requests Department guidance on responding to this 
linkage, specifically to answer the French assertion that EU 
designation now would undercut our mutual efforts to push for 
1559 implementation. 
 
5. (S) Comment: Although the MFA officials said French 
intelligence agencies remained unconvinced that Hizballah was 
a terrorist organization, political counter-arguments that 
focused primarily on the danger to Middle East stability of 
designating Hizballah were clearly the most important to 
Deruffe, Trotignon and Bouallegue.  This tracks with previous 
conversations the Embassy has had with the GOF, and 
demonstrates the difficult road ahead to convince France to 
designate Hizballah.  The French appear paralyzed by their 
analysis that designating Hizballah has no chance of a 
positive outcome and that such an action can only lead to 
instability and crisis.  End comment. 
Leach 

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