US embassy cable - 05HARARE345

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S INTERIM REPORT CARD ON IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SADC ELECTION GUIDELINES 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 318 (B) 2004 HARARE 2003 (C) 2004 
     HARARE 1790 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  With just over four weeks to go before the 
nation's parliamentary elections, the GOZ continues to 
implement measures to further its case that it is complying 
with SADC election principles and guidelines.  Many of the 
measures have been superficial or incompletely implemented. 
That said, most observers here agree that the pre-election 
environment has improved considerably over the run-ups to the 
parliamentary election of 2000 or the presidential election 
of 2002.  This cable provides a brief status report on 
measures taken or being taken under each of the principal 
SADC guidelines.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----- 
Full Participation of Citizens in Political Process (Sections 
2.1.1 and 7.4) 
----- 
 
2.  (SBU) The new electoral law (refs B and C) has not led to 
improvements in this area.  It imposes greater restrictions 
on the posting of campaign material and several MDC activists 
reportedly have been arrested (and quickly released) in 
connection with posting activities.  The opposition also 
reported at least three incidents in February in which ruling 
party supporters assaulted MDC activists for posting or 
distributing MDC campaign material; police have not taken 
action in any of the instances.  Local ZANU-PF elements in 
some areas are reportedly disrupting MDC door-to-door 
canvassing activities, as well.  The Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA) proscribes public criticism of the 
President and at least four individuals reportedly have been 
arrested during the past six months under this provision. 
All were quickly released, in some cases after payment of a 
nominal fine.  The opposition reportedly is not permitted to 
hold meetings or campaign in military or police installations 
while the ruling party is afforded easy access to such 
facilities. 
 
3.  (SBU) In spite of legal and police restrictions, in 
practice there appears to be more room for political 
participation than during previous national elections. 
Opposition and civil society contacts have told us that the 
conspicuous presence and activities of pro-ZANU-PF youth 
militia that pervaded the countryside in 2000 and 2002 so far 
are lacking.  An NGO representative advised that even in 
remote areas, "pungwes" (long political indoctrination 
sessions, complete with beatings, which many local 
communities were forced to attend - sometimes for days) that 
were common in the run-up to past elections are completely 
absent.  Political persuasion efforts now revolved more 
around promise of benefits than threats, although residual 
fear of violence remained considerable in many areas. 
Opposition supporters were wearing MDC t-shirts in areas 
where they previously could not do so without risking assault 
by ruling party supporters. 
 
----- 
Freedom of Association (Sections 2.1.2 and 7.4) 
----- 
 
4.  (SBU) Most opposition contacts report that MDC members 
nationwide generally enjoy more latitude to assemble than in 
past elections.  Police have been more liberal in their 
application of POSA and have permitted campaign rallies and 
activities in all ten provinces, in contrast to a much more 
restrictive environment during the past two national 
elections.   Police still selectively apply POSA, which 
requires notification of meetings to the police, strictly 
against the MDC, whereas ZANU-PF in practice can conduct 
meetings without regard to POSA requirements.  MDC meetings 
generally are monitored by police and closed down if they go 
outside the terms of the POSA notification/approval.  (Note: 
By its terms, POSA only requires that authorities be given 
prior notification of meetings, but in practice, the police 
assert authority to ban, reschedule, or relocate meetings. 
End note.)  Some local opposition activists allege that 
certain local areas remain "no-go" areas by virtue of 
selective police use of POSA or intimidation by local ruling 
party supporters. 
----- 
Political Tolerance (Section 2.1.3) 
----- 
 
5.  (SBU) By most measures, levels of political tolerance 
have improved markedly compared to 2000 and 2002.  Cases of 
politically motivated murder dropped from 48 in 2001 (the 
last full year before a national election) to three in in 
2004, while cases of torture dropped from 2245 in 2001 to 170 
during the first 11 months of 2004 (latest statistics 
available).  The dramatic drops -- more than 90 percent in 
each category -- follow nearly daily calls for tolerance and 
non-violence by GOZ and ruling party leaders publicly and 
privately over the past few months.  The publicity campaign 
represents a stark contrast to ruling party campaigns during 
the past two national elections, in which many leaders 
publicly called for forceful suppression of opposition 
activities and, in some cases, were personally involved in 
violence against MDC members. 
 
6.  (C) Anecdotal reports of violence during the past two 
weeks are on the upswing compared to previous weeks, but the 
month of February was still considerably less violent than 
analogous periods preceding the last two national elections. 
Opposition figures report that local ruling party structures, 
recognizing their vulnerability without resort to violence, 
are pushing leaders to permit them greater latitude in 
resorting to violence.  However, these same figures believe 
it is too late for the regime to affect the election's 
outcome by turning to violence at this point.  For now, 
though, the leadership is sticking to public and private 
pleas for tolerance, and NGO contacts tell us that prominent 
leaders have warned local structures about political backlash 
against ruling party violence.  We have heard of numerous 
instances in which the police have warned local leaders of 
each party that the police will take action against 
perpetrators of violence, regardless of political 
affiliation. 
 
----- 
Equal Access to State Media (Sections 2.1.5 and 7.4) 
----- 
 
7.  (C) The GOZ recently promulgated regulations providing 
for access by all political parties to state media.  MDC 
spokesperson Paul Themba-Nyathi told the Embassy on March 1 
that the party had bought 91 minutes of radio time and 91 
minutes of TV time and was scheduled to air its first ad the 
evening of March 1.  In the meantime, state TV and radio 
covered the MDC campaign launch, including the airing of 
several minutes of a speech by MDC President Morgan 
Tsvangirai, and has covered statements by various MDC 
 
SIPDIS 
candidates.  This marked much better coverage than in past 
election campaigns and MDC and civil society sources claim 
that it had a major effect on the electorate, galvanizing MDC 
supporters who had previously been apathetic.  The coverage 
was still considerably less than state coverage of the ruling 
party, which received hours of live coverage of the ZANU-PF 
campaign launch, including a long speech by President Mugabe. 
 State broadcast and print media have significantly lowered 
the level of vitriol directed against the opposition in its 
news and editorial policy since the eclipse of Information 
Minister Jonathan Moyo over the past few months. 
 
----- 
Equal Opportunity to Vote and be Voted For (Sections 2.1.6 
and 7.5) 
----- 
 
8.  (SBU) The exclusion the millions of Zimbabweans in the 
diaspora from voting remains a prominent complaint from the 
opposition and civil society and a serious electoral flaw. 
The constitution provides for universal suffrage for citizens 
but commits details to an election law.  The recently enacted 
election law bars absentee voting by those outside the 
country except for diplomats and members of the armed 
services.  A citizens' group filed an urgent application to 
the Supreme Court on February 24 to compel the GOZ to 
implement mechanisms to permit diaspora voting and the court 
has reserved judgment.  The Supreme Court found legislative 
bars to diaspora voting in the last election to be 
unconstitutional in February 2002, but by executive decree 
under the Presidential Powers Act, the GOZ effectively kept 
the diaspora from voting. 
 
9.  (SBU) Recent delimitation of constituencies resulted in 
the elimination of three MDC seats and creation of three new 
seats in areas of ruling party dominance.  Although 
population shifts would not seem to support this result, it 
remains unclear whether the delimitation exercise, which has 
been criticized bitterly by the opposition, actually violates 
constitutional provisions governing delimitation. 
 
10.  (SBU) Non-transparency and manipulation of voter rolls 
has underlain the rigging of past elections and, according to 
the opposition, the state of the rolls remains a major 
concern.  It charges that some voters have been arbitrarily 
removed from the rolls, which at the same time include names 
of the deceased or of citizens who are not resident.  Embassy 
FSNs who examined voter rolls in their precincts reported 
nothing untoward: they were afforded access on request, found 
their names, and said they were relatively impressed by the 
state of organization and automation at the inspection venue. 
 However, the rolls are only available for manual inspection, 
which undermines confidence in their integrity.  Withholding 
electronic copies is contrary to the recommendations of the 
relevant parliamentary portfolio committee on the election 
law, which recommended that the Registrar General make a 
national electronic copy available to the opposition, 
allowing for a more systematic examination and analysis. 
 
----- 
Election Institution Impartiality and Judicial Independence 
(Sections 2.1.7 and 7.3) 
----- 
 
11.  (C) The GOZ consulted extensively with the MDC over the 
appointment of the new Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC). 
The opposition publicly expressed reservations about the ZEC 
Chairman but accepted all of the five Commission member,s 
appointments.  Privately, MDC members advise that a majority 
of the Commission can be counted on to be impartial and 
reliable.  The Electoral Commission Law provides that a 
commissioner can only be removed for cause.  More problematic 
than the Commission's identity and tenure are potential 
resource constraints and the Commission,s overlapping 
authority with other election-related institutions.  Still 
lacking a functioning office and secretariat, the Commission 
must coordinate with the constitutionally mandated but 
largely toothless Election Supervisory Commission, and the 
constitutionally mandated and historically GOZ-aligned 
Registrar General.  The ESC and Registrar General are staffed 
largely by civil servants and retired security force 
personnel whose impartiality in many cases is doubtful.  The 
ruling party had wanted to consolidate these overlapping 
authorities before the election but, lacking the 
constitutional authority to do so, created a nominally more 
independent ZEC in part to address its SADC electoral 
obligations.  Whether the confusing array of institutions 
represents an improvement over prior elections remains to be 
seen. 
 
12.  Supreme Court Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku in 
February named three High Court justices to serve as an ad 
hoc electoral court, a measure publicly welcomed by the 
opposition.  The new court is designed to deal with 
election-related complaints expeditiously, within six months 
at the most.  Most election-related complaints associated 
with the election five years ago were decided in favor of the 
opposition but remain under appeal or, in some cases of final 
orders, were never  enforced.  The new panel remains untested 
so far, and it remains to be seen whether it will be capable 
of administering justice more speedily or effectively. 
Zimbabwean courts continue to be somewhat politicized or 
disinclined to reach politically sensitive decisions, 
although pockets of competence and integrity remain.  For its 
part, the GOZ has shown that it is prepared simply to ignore 
unfavorable decisions. 
 
----- 
Voter Education (Section 2.1.8) 
----- 
 
13.  (C) The new electoral law requires that voter education 
conducted by civil society be approved by the ZEC and 
conducted without foreign funds (political parties are not 
constrained in their voter education efforts).  We are 
unaware of instances in which this provision has been 
enforced, however, and civil society groups continue to 
conduct voter education activities gingerly, even as ruling 
party supporters have impeded some opposition party 
activities involving voter education.  However, NGOs involved 
in voter education appear to have reduced their profiles in 
recent months, probably in response to the electoral law 
strictures and out of fear that the GOZ may target them under 
the provisions of the as yet unsigned NGO bill.  The 
USAID-funded Zimbabwe Election Support Network, for example, 
has put out radio, print, and billboard ads on voter 
education, but has discontinued its voter education workshops 
pending explicit approval from the ZEC. 
 
----- 
Prevention of Rigging/Fraud (Section 7.5) 
----- 
 
14.  (SBU) The new electoral act incorporated several of the 
measures recommended by the opposition to reduce fraud, e.g., 
use of translucent voting boxes, one-day voting, 
vote-counting at the polling station.  Opposition members, 
however, now complain that the ruling party is manipulating 
the new measures.  They allege, for instance, that local 
ruling party elements have tried to convince some voters that 
the translucent boxes will permit government officials to 
know how people voted, or that local vote-counting will 
permit them to know how the individual community voted, with 
attendant adverse consequences for the community.  Opposition 
sources have also complained that one-day may not be enough 
time for all Zimbabweans to vote, especially those in urban 
MDC strongholds where the number of polling places may be 
deliberately insufficient. 
 
----- 
Security for Participants (Section 7.7) 
----- 
 
15. (C) Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador last month that 
the MDC had used the Police Commissioner's national pledge to 
crack down on all political violence to considerable effect 
in engaging local police.  The arrest of some ZANU-PF 
supporters on assault-related charges and wide police 
consultation with the MDC certainly mark departures from 
earlier practice, but police continue to be reticent in many 
cases to take action against ZANU-PF-initiated violence, 
reduced as it may be. 
 
----- 
Other 
----- 
 
16.  (SBU) It is premature to judge the GOZ's efforts in 
meeting several other SADC electoral guidelines, such as the 
adequacy of logistics (Section 7.6) and transparency of the 
voting process/access for party and candidate representatives 
(Section 7.8).  GOZ invitations for a SADC observation 
mission only went out in February, in clear violation of the 
90-day advance notice required under Section 7.10.  The GOZ 
reportedly blocked an earlier visit by a SADC technical team 
of lawyers assigned to examine the legal infrastructure to 
support the election. 
 
----- 
Comment 
----- 
 
17.  (C) Dramatic reductions in violence and opposition 
access to national broadcast media are significant 
improvements over past elections.  We believe that 
international scrutiny, coupled with Mugabe's desire to claim 
renewed legitimacy based on the elections, have contributed 
to the improved climate.  A key issue is whether Mugabe 
miscalculated and, by offering the opposition a space, has 
enabled the MDC to capitalize on the more relaxed conditions 
to an extent unimaginable just months ago.  On the other 
side, the ruling party continues to use its considerable 
systemic advantages to bolster its own election prospects and 
is building from a position of strength resulting from years 
of intimidation and intense polarization.  At this juncture, 
while it is clear that the GOZ's legal framework has created 
an "un-level playing field" from the outset, the real test 
will be political -- a statement that would hardly have 
seemed possible even three months ago. 
SCHULTZ