US embassy cable - 05HANOI507

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, PRM 
 
BANGKOK FOR REGIONAL REFCOORD HONNOLD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, VM, CB, ETMIN, HUMANR 
SUBJECT:  (SBU) Exploring a Montagnard-focused Humanitarian 
Resettlement Program 
 
Ref: A) 2/3/05 Ryan-Marine E-mail; B) 3/1/05 Adams-Knapper E- 
mail 
 
1. (SBU) This is an action request.  Post proposes exploring 
prospects for a Montagnard-focused Humanitarian Resettlement 
Program, the goal of which would be to help to mitigate the 
outflow of Montagnards to Cambodia.  Post has informally 
raised the approach outlined below with PRM and EAP (Refs A 
and B); we now seek front channel approval to begin the 
steps outlined in paragraph 7. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) Among the factors driving Montagnards into Cambodia 
are:  the desire for economic opportunity; a response to 
deliberate misinformation from outsiders (i.e., that the 
UNHCR or the USG can help Montagnards to recover lost land); 
and a fear of religious or political persecution.  In 
proposing an in-country humanitarian resettlement program to 
help to mitigate the outflow of Mongtagnards to Cambodia, we 
recognize that the only long-term palliative to the 
Montagnard refugee problem will be social and economic 
development in the Central Highlands. 
 
3. (SBU) In resolving this situation, the UNHCR needs to 
have a prominent role, including the ability to monitor 
those Montagnards found not to be refugees who are returned 
to Vietnam from Cambodia, but a history of troubled GVN- 
UNHCR relations may make this difficult.  This is further 
complicated by the fact that there is a small but active 
group outside Vietnam seeking to destabilize the Central 
Highlands in order to gain autonomy or independence for the 
region. 
 
4. (SBU) There are key issues about which we need more 
information, including to what extent Montagnards who have a 
genuine fear of religious or political persecution make up 
the overall population of those who have fled to Cambodia 
and details about their demographics, such as place of 
origin, age or family status.  Finally, and most 
importantly, we do not know whether the GVN will be serious 
about setting up an in-country processing program. 
 
Issues to Consider 
------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Before approaching the GVN, we will need to have a 
clear idea of our target population and a sound basis for 
why we believe this group merits bilateral efforts to 
establish an in-country processing program.  We also need to 
be mindful of Vietnamese sensitivities:  the GVN will not 
cooperate on a program specifically aimed at transporting 
from Vietnam those "suffering religious and other 
persecution." 
 
6. (SBU) Publicly, we would want to present this effort as a 
multilateral, humanitarian endeavor.  Privately, our focus 
should be on working together to move this issue to the 
positive side of the bilateral ledger.  The GVN has shown 
some willingness to work with the USG on Montagnard "follow- 
to-join" cases.  There has been incremental progress in 
passport issuances to long-pending Montagnard Visa-93 cases: 
for example, eight families have received passports -- out 
of 78 total cases -- as of February 25.  That said, we 
continue to look for greater cooperation in contacting and 
processing these existing family reunification cases as an 
indicator of the GVN's seriousness about cooperating on a 
broader in-country program. 
 
The Way Forward 
--------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Our approach should have four steps: 
 
-- Step 1) Determine our target population.  Embassy Hanoi 
and ConGen HCMC will draw up a list of questions for the 
UNHCR to ask refugees under its care in Cambodia, the goal 
of which is to try to establish the demographics of our 
possible target population. 
 
-- Step 2) Establish for ourselves the eligibility criteria 
for the program.  Once we get a better idea of our target 
population, we must come up with a well-defined set of 
specific criteria for access to a possible in-country 
program.  Out of an estimated 1.5 million Montagnards, there 
must be credible grounds for identifying a group of 1,000 to 
5,000 persons over a period of a few years that merits 
access to the program.  A somewhat broader interpretation of 
existing Priority One guidelines based on some existing or 
recent persecution probably offers the best approach.  But 
it remains to be seen whether the GVN would cooperate in 
issuing passports to individuals so identified. 
 
-- Step 3) Reach agreement with the GVN on what the issues 
are.  We will need to begin discussions with the GVN, 
between the Ambassador and Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang 
and then perhaps with Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, to 
secure its agreement that: 
 
-- Unauthorized travel by Montagnards into Cambodia needs to 
be addressed; 
 
-- Resolving this issue is in both countries' interests; 
 
-- Cambodia and the UNHCR have important roles to play in 
addressing this problem; 
 
-- While a percentage of the Montagnards in Cambodia are 
economic migrants or dupes of outside forces, a certain 
number represent a larger population of Montagnards who 
simply cannot or do not want to remain in Vietnam; and, 
 
-- A necessary, but only partial, response to this problem 
is allowing in-country processing of members of this group. 
 
In coming to the above conclusions with the GVN, the United 
States should be prepared to: 
 
-- Be flexible in how we describe the target population and 
the possible program; use of the term "refugee" would not be 
acceptable to the GVN; a better nomenclature would be 
"person at risk" or "individual of interest/concern." 
 
-- Work with other interested countries and organizations to 
"multilateralize" our efforts to help the Montagnards, 
particularly through targeted development assistance 
programs in the Central Highlands; 
 
-- Emphasize early and often that U.S.-Vietnam humanitarian 
efforts to resolve this issue can move the overall 
relationship forward and shift this issue to the positive 
side of the bilateral ledger; 
 
-- Underline that USG- and non-USG public and private 
organizations on the ground in the Central Highlands can 
play a symbolic and highly beneficial role in the region's 
economic development; ideally, Economic Support Funds would 
be available for these projects (although our ESF funding 
for Vietnam was zeroed out for FY 2006). 
 
-- Accept the GVN's position that outside forces such as the 
Montagnard Foundation and others are part of the problem; 
commit to persuading Kok Ksor and others that their actions 
are unhelpful; and, follow through on this commitment. 
 
-- Step 4) Work on the details.  PRM and ConGen HCMC/RRS 
will bear responsibility for sorting out and negotiating the 
details, which include cost, number of personnel, 
arrangements for facilitating interviews and setting up a 
venue for interviews.  One key issue, subject to necessary 
cooperation from the GVN, will be our ability to travel in 
the Central Highlands region to verify claims. 
 
MARINE