US embassy cable - 05RANGOON266

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, RP 
SUBJECT: BURMA: PM SOE WIN GETS BLUNT ADVICE FROM FILIPINO 
PRESIDENT 
 
REF: A. 04 RANGOON 249 
     B. MANILA 655 
     C. 04 MANILA 5529 
     D. JAKARTA 2275 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary: The Burmese regime's new Prime Minister, Soe 
Win, recently visited Manila and, as we've heard it, received 
a friendly though fairly blunt message from President Arroyo: 
 the international community expects a timetable for the 
regime's road map; the process will not be accepted without 
ASSK's participation; and the Philippines has made progress 
with the help of the UN, so the Burmese regime should follow 
suit and let the UN Special Envoy do his job in Burma. 
Assuming that the read-out we received was accurate, it 
strikes us as quite helpful that President Arroyo delivered a 
blunt political message to Soe Win.  However, the PM has not 
emerged as a key player within the regime and he is unlikely 
to deliver the entire message to the top generals. 
Furthermore, a collective, most certainly watered-down, ASEAN 
message to the SPDC on these issues will be more palatable to 
the generals.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Prime Minister Lt Gen Soe Win, leading his first state 
visit, traveled to the Philippines February 20-21 where he 
met with President Arroyo, other GRP officials, and leading 
members of the Filipino Congress.  PM Soe Win led a 27-member 
delegation that included four senior GOB ministers and five 
directors general.  Official Burmese state media 
characteristically portrayed the visit as a grand success, 
emphasizing a "close and friendly relationship" that has 
existed since the two countries established relations in 1956. 
 
3. (C) The Philippines Ambassador to Burma, Phoebe Gomez, was 
in Manila for the duration of the visit and participated in 
all of Soe Win's substantive meetings.  Gomez told the COM on 
February 28 that although the GOP accorded Soe Win head of 
government honors, President Arroyo was "forthright" in their 
bilateral meeting, telling the Burmese PM that "the world is 
asking for a timetable (for the regime's road map) and "the 
international community wants full participation (in the 
National Convention)." 
 
4. (C) According to Gomez, President Arroyo also noted to Soe 
Win that democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) could not 
be considered as capable of participating in the 
constitutional drafting process while she remains under 
detention, alluding to the notion that the SPDC's road map 
could not be viewed as inclusive.  Arroyo offered the 
Philippines experience as an example for the Burmese to 
consider:  the GRP, she said, has achieved a peace agreement 
with the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), but only did 
so with the involvement of the UN and the support of the 
international community.  "It would be helpful," Arroyo said, 
"if you accept UN Special Envoy Razali."  (Note: The SPDC has 
not permitted Razali to visit Burma since March 2004.  End 
Note). 
 
5. (C) PM Soe Win, according to Amb. Gomez, told President 
Arroyo that the regime's road map was at a "delicate stage" 
and the GOB's top priority is to complete unification of 
Burma's 100-plus ethnic groups.  "We have a tough task in 
achieving a consensus at the ongoing National Convention," 
Soe Win said, "this is not easy to explain to the outside 
world and that is why we can't have a specific timetable." 
The PM offered a standard regime line that ASSK and the NLD 
had "boycotted" the Convention and added that "if she (ASSK) 
opposes our efforts, it will be difficult to achieve our 
objective of national unity." 
 
6. (C) In a follow-on expanded meeting, President Arroyo told 
PM Soe Win that she had an obligation to be responsive to her 
parliament, NGOs, and other domestic pressure groups in 
explaining the GRP's role in ASEAN's constructive engagement 
policy toward Burma.  She observed that a meaningful dialogue 
between the SPDC and the democratic opposition should be part 
of this policy.  Soe Win claimed that there was momentum for 
economic and political progress in Burma, but added that "we 
will have to bear all pressures that may arise, because we 
are committed first and foremost to achieving our own 
objectives." 
 
7. (SBU) Amb. Gomez also told the COM that during the Soe Win 
visit she, Gomez, had talked with Senator Santiago, Chair of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had "just that 
morning" tabled a resolution asking the GRP to oppose the 
ASEAN chair moving to Burma in 2006 (ref B).  Gomez said that 
President Arroyo would probably "do what is proper" and 
communicate to the SPDC at some point that "segments of 
Filipino society" have concerns about this issue, but 
observed that the Burmese would not be responsive.  She added 
that the GRP would not be very proactive on blocking Burma 
from taking the chair, given that the Philippines will itself 
assume the chair in 2007. 
 
Comment: Great (Filipino) Taste, Less (ASEAN) Filling 
 
8. (C) PM Soe Win has, since assuming office last October, 
played only a supporting role to the SPDC's top generals, a 
clear downgrading of the job since the ouster of his 
predecessor, Khin Nyunt.  Interestingly, Soe Win and his 
delegation flew to Manila in a GOB-procured turbo prop plane, 
not the standard jet accorded to senior-level SPDC officials. 
 As a result, the trip took over nine hours (instead of three 
hours) and, according to Amb. Gomez, the delegation members 
arrived fatigued, adding to their apprehension at the 
prospects of possible anti-SPDC demonstrators in Manila. 
 
9. (C) Amb. Gomez said that a terrorism high-alert in Manila 
precluded any "troubles" and observed that Soe Win was jovial 
and confident by the end of the visit.  Nonetheless, assuming 
that Gomez's read-out was accurate, it strikes us as quite 
helpful that President Arroyo delivered a blunt political 
message to Soe Win on ASSK, the National Convention, and the 
regime's road map -- quite likely a result of Embassy 
Manila's recent efforts to urge the GRP to press the SPDC on 
these issues (ref B).  However, Soe Win is unlikely to 
deliver the entire message to SPDC head honchos Than Shwe and 
Maung Aye.  Furthermore, a collective, most certainly 
watered-down, ASEAN message to the SPDC on the road map will 
be more palatable to the generals.  End Comment. 
 
10. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Manila. 
Martinez