US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1556

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, KDEM, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: INDIAN EXPERTS CONTEMPLATE NEPAL WITHOUT A KING 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 1482 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During a February 25 lunch that the 
Ambassador hosted for visiting Ambassador to Nepal Moriarty, 
Indian experts on Nepal agreed that: 
 
-- The RNA was unlikely to collapse as a result of the 
suspension of military assistance; 
 
-- A Maoist takeover is more likely to result from political 
failure from the King and political parties than from 
military victory; 
 
-- The monarchy must make democratic changes or collapse as 
an institution; and 
 
-- The King's actions have strengthened the Maoists' 
position.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The lunch, hosted on February 25 by the Ambassador in 
honor of Ambassador to Nepal Moriarty, gathered several of 
India's most prominent non-government Nepal experts including 
retired Ambassadors, academics, and retired military 
officers.  Discussion focused on the crisis and the US and 
Indian responses. 
 
Implications of Assistance Cutoff 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) There was broad agreement that India's suspension of 
military aid would not impact the RNA so severely that it 
would be unable to withstand the Maoists.  Therefore, the 
experts advised, India, the US, and the UK should continue 
their current approach to maintain pressure on the King. 
Participants concurred that neither the Maoists nor the RNA 
had the military strength to defeat the other.  MG (Ret) 
Ashok Mehta disputed the notion that the RNA would soon face 
shortages of weapons or ammunition due to suspension of 
military aid, but conceded that the GOI and USG should 
investigate the question of RNA supplies more closely. 
 
4.  (C) Considering potential scenarios proposed by 
Ambassador Moriarty, participants identified two paths that 
could lead to a Maoist victory: a poorly-negotiated 
compromise (forced upon Nepal by other countries) that would 
hand too much power to the Maoists, or a campaign of targeted 
violence or assassinations that saps the will of the GON to 
resist the Maoists. 
 
5.  (C) Participants were skeptical that the supply of 
explosives for the Maoists' IEDs could be cut off.  Although 
these illegal explosives come largely from commercial sources 
in India, participants doubted that India could stop the 
smuggling or implement a chemical tagging system.  Terrorism 
expert Ajai Sahni reported that India had studied this option 
in the past, but that the Maoists constructed their 
explosives from common chemicals that were not amenable to 
tagging. 
 
Nepal's Political Future 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) The Indian experts came to no agreement on a solution 
to the present crisis, although they agreed broadly that: 
 
-- A constituent assembly could provide a political solution 
to the King's problem of legitimacy.  However, the Maoists 
would only support such a step if they are certain of 
dominating the process. 
 
-- In contrast to most Nepal residents, who reportedly are 
not considering radical changes to the monarchy, as they are 
widely supportive of the institution, many Indian Nepal 
experts are beginning to contemplate the future of the 
Kingdom without a monarch. 
 
-- The King has severely damaged the institution of monarchy 
with his absolutist tendencies.  The Palace would not survive 
Crown Prince Paras as King.  Former Indian Ambassador to 
Nepal AR Deo, who heads the Nepal Center at the prominent New 
Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 
stated that Nepal appears to be no exception to the 
international trend of monarchies ending around the globe. 
The question for policy makers is how to ensure a soft 
landing. 
 
7.  (C) Interlocutors agreed that India has relatively little 
leverage on the King.  Retired Ambassador G Parthasarthy, one 
of the architects of India's 1989 economic blockade of the 
Kingdom, noted that any attempt to squeeze the King 
economically would hurt primarily the people of Nepal, thus 
"repeating the mistakes of 1989."  Similarly, India has few 
levers to pressure the Maoists into concessions. 
Participants supported the Ambassador's observation that time 
favors the Maoists in the present crisis, and that the 
Maoists recognize this.  Because they were under relatively 
little pressure to negotiate, Parthasarthy and Deo warned 
that "other countries'" efforts to craft a compromise would 
favor the Maoists and might enable them to take over the 
government. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) Aside from the opportunity to hear comments from 
several of India's most prominent Nepal experts on whom the 
GOI draws for outside expertise, the exchange also was useful 
for its insights into the pulse of Indian specialists' 
thinking on the crisis.  The discussion was equally 
beneficial for clarifying misconceptions regarding USG policy 
(particularly military assistance), as a number of guests 
were unaware of important nuances in the USG position.  The 
guests were pleased at the opportunity to interact with 
Ambassador Moriarty on his stop in New Delhi before returning 
to Kathmandu. 
MULFORD